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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a framework for assessing water 
governance by consolidating and refining disparate principles of water governance in the 
existing research literature. The developed framework is then applied in a case study of the 
Lerma Chapala basin in Mexico to assess the state of water governance, and identify 
accomplishments and constraints in the implementation of an effective water governance 
system. The study conducts a content analysis of primary data collected through semi-
structured interviews with multiple stakeholders in the basin (N=51) and secondary data 
from national water policy documents (N=18). 
Overall, the study identified one major achievement and five major constraints in 
the implementation of water governance in the Lerma-Chapala basin. The achievement 
pertains to successful stakeholder negotiations that resulted in a treaty for the allocation of 
scarce surface water resources in the basin; hence, mitigating allocation conflicts. 
Constraints include (1) the failure of water user representatives to advance issues that 
pertain to their stakeholder group in the Basin Council, (2) a fragmented approach to water 
management that hinders the success of programs and activities at the basin level, (3) the 
persistence of a centralized decision making protocol that neglects local context, among 
other issues. Overall, the application of the developed framework in a content analysis of 
policy documents and stakeholder interviews reveals a major disconnect between policy 
and practice in the Lerma-Chapala’s water governance experience. 
The dissertation contributes to the existing literature by providing a conceptual 
framework for assessing water governance systems. The refined set of five meta-principles 
allows for better conceptualization, and makes it easier to identify policy-practice 
disconnects and tease out achievements and constraints to water governance. In this sense, 
the framework could assist in guiding water sector reforms where changes are needed, to 
improve the water governance system.  
 
Key words: water governance, integrated water resources management, Lerma-Chapala, 
content analysis, Mexico, assessment framework, water policy, river basin 
council.  
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Chapter One 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction to the study 
During the 1990s, there was general consensus among most professional 
associations, international organizations and national governments with regards to our 
failure to properly manage water resources (Serageldin, 1995; Falkenmark, 1997; GWP, 
2000; Biswas, 2008). The concept of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
emerged from the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992 as a solution to existing and foreseeable water management problems. In 
general terms, Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 describes IWRM as a holistic, integrated and 
participatory approach to water resource management that considers the catchment and sub-
basin as its working unit (UNDSD, 1993). Hence, the implementation of this new paradigm 
requires new legislation and policy instruments, new administrative structures and 
procedures, and the redivision of labour and authority (Peña & Solanes, 2003; Aston et al., 
2006; Ballweber, 2006). These changes are particularly challenging in middle- and low-
income countries (Sajor & Minh Thu, 2009; Agyenim & Gupta, 2012). Encouraged by 
major international funding, development and aid agencies, many countries have adopted 
IWRM reforms, which have transformed the way water resources are governed, especially 
in developing nations. While this strategy has been successful in some jurisdictions, 
attempts to decentralize control over water resources have failed in other contexts, resulting 
in the persistence of state-centred top-down approaches to water management that were 
evident in the 1990s (Agyenim & Gupta, 2012; Oliveira et al., 2012; Hornidge et al., 2013; 
de Boer et al., 2016). 
Existing literature on water management largely recognizes that the present ‘water 
crisis’ is often a crisis of governance (GWP, 2000; Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; 
WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Biswas & Tortajada, 2010; Varis et al., 2014). The 
hydrological, technical, scientific, and physical dimensions of water management are 
essential for solving issues associated with water quality and water quantity. However, 
many experts agree that at present, the main implementation challenges for water 
management lie on issues associated with important components of water governance, such 
as decentralization, regulation, deregulation, privatization, water allocation, equity, policy 
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development, stakeholder engagement, transparency, accountability, collaboration, and 
institutional arrangements (Dourojeanni & Jouravlev, 2001; Tortajada, 2001; Solanes & 
Jouravlev, 2006; Mehan, 2010). For example, Tropp (2007) and Mitchell (2013) have 
emphasised that water governance strategies will determine the ability of jurisdictions to 
effectively apply technical and scientific aspects of water management that are necessary 
for solving water related problems and consequently, creating effective functioning water 
infrastructure and deliver services. In the words of Mitchell (2013:143), governance is “a 
key component for successful water management”. 
The broad scope of water governance research has resulted in the development of 
diverse assessment frameworks. The multifaceted nature of water governance research is 
largely a result of researchers approaching water governance from their unique disciplinary 
lenses (e.g., sociology, political science, economics, environmental science), and 
researchers seeking to answer different research questions. Hence, this body of work 
remains fractured (Biswas & Tortajada, 2010; Araral & Wang, 2013). Existing frameworks 
have different purposes, which include but are not limited to understanding the role of 
institutions in the functionality of water governance systems (Oliveira et al., 2012; Franzen 
et al., 2015), untangling the interplay of formal (statutory) and informal (customary) 
components of water governance systems (Wood, 2015; Rola et al., 2016), and explaining 
the impact of stakeholder participation in planning and decision making on the outcomes 
of water governance (Carr et al., 2014; Gallego-Ayala & Juizo, 2014). Biswas and 
Tortajada (2010) argue that independent studies of good water governance would improve 
our understanding water governance. However, it has been noted that it could be 
challenging to compare the outcomes of multiple studies due to the utilization of diverse 
assessment frameworks (Woodhouse & Muller, 2017).  
This dissertation addresses this issue by developing a framework for assessing water 
governance. This developed framework is based on a consolidation and integration of core 
water governance principles that have been established in the literature over time. Since the 
existing water governance literature has emerged from multiple disciplines, the framework 
developed here is multidisciplinary in nature. Following its development, the framework is 
applied in a case study of Mexico’s Lerma-Chapala basin (LChB). Mexico is a country that 
began its IWRM reform in 1992, resulting in the formation of the Lerma-Chapala Basin 
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Council (LChBC) as a water governance forum in 1993. This experience is considered 
appropriate to examine progress in the transition between water governance paradigms, and 
to identify factors that support or limit the implementation of a viable water governance 
system.  
1.2 A shift in water management paradigms 
Before the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992, most countries (including Mexico) utilized a sub-sectoral project-based 
approach to develop, allocate and manage water resources (Garcia, 1998; Savenije & Van 
der Zaag, 2008). This was characterized by senior government institution(s) utilizing state-
centred top-down approaches. This system was also based on a centralized, hierarchical 
and bureaucratic model, with little or no coordination between sectors and water resource 
interest groups; thus decisions were made primarily by high ranking officials (GWP, 2000; 
Falkenmark et al., 2004; Savenije & Van der Zaag, 2008; de Loë et al., 2009). Additionally, 
water management had a predominantly sectoral-technical approach that focused largely 
on planning, construction and operation of water infrastructure for the purposes of 
irrigation, energy generation, domestic consumption and industrial uses, while neglecting 
the management of ecosystems (Radif, 1999; WWAP, 2006; Garcia, 2008).  
After the 1992 Rio conference and the publication of ‘Agenda 21’ (UNDSD, 1993), 
major international funding, development and aid agencies started promoting IWRM as a 
solution to water-related problems around the world (Mitchell, 2005; WWAP, 2006; 
Saravanan et al., 2009; Tortajada, 2014). Consequently, IWRM has been adopted in many 
countries with varying degrees of success. Examples of these attempts include Mexico’s 
enactment of the National Water Law in 1992 (Mestre, 1997), South Africa’s 
implementation of a National Water Act in 1998 (Aston et al., 2006), and Ghana’s 
establishment of a Water Resources Commission in 1996 (Agyenim & Gupta, 2012), 
among several others.  
Implementing an IWRM process signals an attempt to move away from the 
technocratic state-oriented top-down approaches that characterized water management 
before the UN Rio conference, towards more flexible multilevel and multi-stakeholder 
approaches associated with water management that became prominent after 1992. In this 
thesis, the terms pre-Rio and post-Rio are used to depict prevailing water governance 
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paradigms that existed before and after the 1992 Rio conference respectively. The key 
characteristics of these contexts are illustrated in Table 1.1. Ongoing water policy reforms 
represent major changes in many countries. Many jurisdictions are therefore struggling to 
implement these reforms on the ground (Agyenim & Gupta, 2012; Horlemann & 
Dombrowsky, 2012; Oliveira et al., 2012; Hornidge et al., 2013; Rola et al., 2016).  
Table 1.1: Governing approaches for water management before and after Rio 
Pre-Rio Post-Rio 
Sectoral approach Integrated approach 
State Control Inclusive stakeholder engagement 
Decisions made by high ranking officials and politicians Stakeholder participation in decision making 
Centralization Subsidiarity 
Top-down approach Dominance of bottom-up approach 
Political boundaries form planning and management units Basin as planning and management unit 
Economic development approach Sustainable development approach 
Focus on supply management Focus on demand management 
 
The IWRM reforms adopted by many countries are characterized by 
decentralization policies, multiple stakeholder engagement, polycentric decision making, 
and the formation of multilevel collaboration networks (Jacobson et al., 2013; Giordano & 
Shah, 2014; Grigg, 2014; Rola et al., 2016), which are key properties of water governance. 
Relative to developing countries, developed countries have generally been more successful 
in the adoption of IWRM, but not without challenges. Rogers and Hall (2003), note that in 
developed countries the establishment of water governance systems that utilize an 
integrated approach to water management, followed a long evolutionary process that 
spanned several decades. For example, “it took the US almost two hundred years to finally 
build in participation and ecosystem concerns into its water governance” (Rogers & Hall, 
2003:30) strategy. By contrast, international financing, development and aid agencies that 
advocate IWRM expected client countries (largely developing) such as Mexico, Ghana, 
Mongolia, Philippines to go through this transition over comparatively shorter periods of 
time (Agyenim & Gupta, 2012; Horlemann & Dombrowsky, 2012; Hornidge et al., 2013; 
Rola et al., 2016). Thus, little attention was paid to the fact that variations in political and 
cultural contexts could result in IWRM implementation gaps. 
1.3 IWRM and Water Governance 
While there exist many definitions of IWRM, the most widely cited definition is 
that provided by the Global Water Partnership (2000:22) as follows: IWRM is “a process 
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which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related 
resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable 
manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems”. Despite its wide use, 
this definition has been criticised as being normative, ambiguous and hard to implement 
(Biswas, 2004, 2008; Giordano & Shah, 2014; Woodhouse & Muller, 2017). IWRM is also 
described in the literature as a holistic approach that cuts across all sectors and includes 
social, economic and environmental concerns and interests (Mitchell, 1990; Grigg 2008). 
An appropriate execution of IWRM should be characterized by inclusive stakeholder 
participation that considers all water uses in planning and decision making. It should also 
consider both surface and groundwater, and utilize the basin as a planning and management 
unit (GWP, 2000). Despite implementing IWRM as a water reform strategy, problems of 
water availability and quality continue to persist in some jurisdictions among other 
challenges (WHO & UNICEF, 2014; OECD, 2015; WWAP, 2015).  
Tensions and conflicts are inevitable when multiple stakeholders from varying 
sectors and with widely differing interests depend on the availability, quality and allocation 
of water resources for their wellbeing and/or success. These conflicting interests among 
stakeholders over scarce water resources often generate political and organizational 
problems. Since water is fundamental to the wellbeing of humans and ecosystems, 
decisions around water allocation and utilization should be approached in an intersectoral 
(rather than a sectoral) scale to ensure that solutions address diverse needs in a holistic 
manner.  
The World Water Assessment Programme (2006:48) interprets the concept of water 
governance as follows:  
Governance is about making choices, decisions and tradeoffs. Governance addresses the 
relationship between organizations and social groups involved in water decision-making, 
both horizontally, across sectors and between urban and rural areas, and vertically, from 
local to international levels. Operating principles include downward and upward 
accountability, transparency, participation, equity, rule of law, ethics and responsiveness. 
Governance is therefore not limited to ‘government’ but includes the roles of the private 
sector and civil society. The character of relationships (and the formal and informal rules 
and regulations guiding such relationships) and the nature of information flow between 
different social actors and organizations are both key features of governance. 
This interpretation suggests that governance involves dialogue and negotiations among 
multiple stakeholders (not only government) who are engaged in decision making 
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concerning water resources (e.g. allocation, policy, development, and rights). It also 
emphasises the importance of the subsidiarity principle, evident in the need to create 
vertical and horizontal collaboration and information networks, and the harmonization of 
formal and informal regulatory and administrative frameworks1. Finally, this definition 
also provides us with seven operating principles of water governance: accountability, 
transparency, participation, equity, rule of law, ethics and responsiveness, which the 
present study regards as core concepts that can be used as criteria to assess water 
governance, and view what happens in practice. It is in the effort to promote order and 
mitigate or settle existing and potential problems and conflicts that the link between IWRM 
and water governance lie. 
Water governance pertains to the formal (statutory) and informal (customary) rules, 
institutions and organizations that guide the actions and interactions of multiple-
stakeholders and determines the processes through which water-based decisions are made 
(Lautze et al., 2011; Cook, 2014; Boer et al., 2016; Cookey et al., 2016). Water 
management on the other hand involves day-to-day tasks, including practical, technical and 
routine functions, such as infrastructural development, operation and monitoring, and the 
practical implementation of measures and decisions made through a governance processes 
(Lautze et al., 2011; Cook, 2014; Cookey et al., 2016). As such, water governance and 
water management have been defined as independent but interacting concepts (Tortajada, 
2010a). Griggs (2011) offers an illustration of this relationship by comparing roles of 
management and governance in different water sectors (Table 1.2). These examples aid in 
our understanding of the concepts of water governance and water management within 
different sectors as used by prominent scholars in the field of water studies (e.g., Tropp, 
2007; Tortajada, 2010a; Mitchell, 2013). 
 
 
                                                            
1 Formal and informal systems are those through which authority is exercised (Rogers & Hall, 2003) applying 
clear mechanisms of control (Aminova & Jagers, 2011). The literature describes formal rules as those being 
codified and legally adopted (i.e. laws, regulations, legal codes and procedures), and informal rules as those 
that are not codified and rooted in customs, traditions, practices and/or social conventions (i.e. unwritten 
socially shared codes of conduct that regulate social life) (WWAP, 2003; Rogers & Hall, 2003; Pahl-Wostl 
et al., 2008). Nonetheless, different elements (i.e., authorities, institutions, regulations, rights, organizations, 
structures, networks, and processes) and their interactions, are also considered as components of formal and 
informal systems. 
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Table 1.2: Management and governance roles for water sectors 
Water sector Management Roles Governance Roles 
Public and industrial 
supply 
Supplies water through utilities and 
other systems 
Regulates access, allocation and 
quality of water resources while 
empowering utility services in their 
role. 
Waste water and 
environmental 
quality 
Provides removal and treatment of 
wastewater and takes steps to enhance 
environmental water quality 
Ensures access to water is regulated, 
regulates discharges and water quality, 
empowers waste water service 
providers in their role 
Stormwater and 
flooding 
Provides stormwater and flood control 
services 
Regulates flooding and nonpoint 
sources of water, ensures policies and 
plans exist as precautionary measures 
Irrigation and farm 
drainage 
Provides raw water and drainage 
systems in irrigated and rain-fed zones 
Regulates allocation of water for 
irrigation, allocates farm drainage, 
empowers irrigators 
Instream flow 
control 
Coordinates flow for hydropower, 
navigation, recreation, fish and wildlife 
Establish instream flows, control 
diversions and discharges rules and 
principles 
Source: after Grigg, 2011. 
In general terms, water governance establishes an enabling environment that 
legitimises appropriate action through regulations, policies and institutional structures 
(both formal and informal). In this context, water governance should enhance order, 
transparency, legitimacy, and accountability among water stakeholders, and cater to the 
appropriate management of water resources. 
IWRM policy reforms require changes in the existing interactions (both formal and 
informal) among politicians, law makers, institutions, regulators and civil society (Rogers& 
Hall, 2003; Tropp, 2007), among others. To date, these reforms have transformed the way 
water resources are governed in many jurisdictions that demonstrate a successful transition 
from more traditional hierarchical state-centred top-down approaches to more inclusive and 
pluralistic approaches to decision making. Several authors identify this transition among 
governing systems as a pivotal roadblock to the successful implementation of IWRM 
(Tropp, 2007; Agyenim & Gupta, 2012; Horlemann & Dombrowsky, 2012; Oliveira et al., 
2012; Hornidge et al., 2013; Rola et al., 2016). This is a difficult problem to solve, but 
Rogers and Hall (2003) suggest that the solution may lie in establishing systematic methods 
to assess progress and to identify where changes are needed, in order to aid in this transition.  
This thesis agrees with Jacobson and colleagues (2013), who suggest that an 
assessment framework could help bridge the implementation gap and provide a systematic 
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approach for analysing how water governance systems are performing. This is also 
supported by Horlemann and Dombrowsky (2012:1548), claim that the implementation of 
an IWRM process “often requires a fundamental realignment of governance structures”. 
For example, many developing nations have adopted IWRM reforms, and this has required 
restructuring and creating institutions and organizations (such as river basin councils), to 
aid in the transition from traditionally authoritarian regimes to more inclusive participatory 
models for governing water resources. An assessment framework is here seen as a 
diagnostic tool that will help identify the strengths of governance systems, constraints that 
hinder the viability of the system, and possible areas of opportunity for improvement. 
Hence, an assessment framework can help guide water sector reforms towards desired 
governance and management goals (Halbe et al., 2013; Jacobson et al., 2013; Akhmouch 
& Correia, 2016). 
1.4 Approaches to assess of water governance. 
In separate reviews of water governance literature Bachelor (2007), Araral and 
Wang (2013), Woodhouse and Muller (2017), and Pahl-Wostl (2017) found that there is no 
shortage of approaches for studying water governance due to its interdisciplinary nature, 
and the absence of a consensual definition of the concept itself. In this context, Woodhouse 
and Muller (2017) point out that this diversity does not only poses a methodological 
challenge for the study of water governance, but also makes it difficult for the outcomes of 
multiple studies to be easily compared. Pahl-Wostl (2017) contends that there is limited 
knowledge on water governance systems and conditions necessary for successful water 
governance reforms. Both, Pahl-Wostl (2017) and Woodhouse and Muller (2017) 
emphasise the need to develop approaches that are context-sensitive. However, Pahl-Wostl 
(2017) recommends further research on ‘transformative water governance’, and the 
development of frameworks for analysis as key to enhancing our understanding of water 
governance. 
The present study started out by surveying water governance literature on 
assessment frameworks. Contemporary water governance literature reveals a wide array of 
frameworks and methods to assess water governance, which echoes the findings from most 
studies that have involved a critical review of the literature. It is possible to group the 
literature based on the main thematic areas of research. These four broad and relevant 
9 
 
 
clusters of literature include (1) the importance of considering the existing local context 
(i.e., political, social, cultural, economic, environmental, scale), when developing 
institutional and/or policy reforms (Hornidge et al., 2013; Wood, 2015; Casiano Flores et 
al., 2016; Mapedza, et al., 2016); and (2) the value of stakeholder engagement in water 
policy and in development planning (Bell et al., 2011; Carr et al., 2014; Kuzdas et al., 
2015; Akhmouch & Clavreul, 2016). For example, in the first case, Casiano Flores, 
Vikolainen and Bressers (2016) borrowed the “Governance Assessment Tool” developed 
by the OECD and applied it in the Atoyac sub-basin in the State of Tlaxcala, Mexico. This 
tool analyses the local context to identify supportive or restrictive conditions for the 
implementation of water-based policies and/or projects. Their study utilized data from 
official documents and interviews, which are analysed using a combination of matrix 
models with descriptive-analytical and semi-normative categories. In this case, results 
indicated that federal water sanitation policies could not be fully implemented in the sub-
basin because the municipality lacked sufficient operational capacities. They concluded 
that decision makers did not consider local conditions during the policy development phase, 
resulting in implementation failures. However, they noted that more recent context-
sensitive reforms by the state government increased the state’s role in sanitation, which 
resulted in improved implementation of wastewater treatment policy in the sub-basin. 
In the case of an example addressing the second thematic area, Dore, Lebel and 
Molleb (2012) adopted an exploratory problem-solving framework for analysing 
transboundary water complexes, and applied it in the Mekong basin2. The researchers 
examined connections among water-based stakeholders and institutions, the drivers that 
influence and motivate actors in their decision making, various tools used for decision 
making, and the impacts of water allocation decisions. The authors observed that although 
decision-making processes are not always equitable, there are hopeful signs that the water 
governance system is becoming more inclusive. They suggest welcoming a diversity of 
stakeholders with different perspectives as a mechanism for improving water allocation 
decisions.  
While the assortment of frameworks found through the survey of literature 
contribute to the advancement of knowledge, they add to the complexity of assessing water 
                                                            
2 The Mekong basin is shared by five countries: China, Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. 
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governance. The themes of focus are largely acknowledged in the literature as key to better 
understanding water governance (Rogers, 2002; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Biswas & Tortajada, 
2010; Mitchell, 2013; OECD, 2015; Akhmouch & Correia, 2016), and therefore, their 
results provide valuable information that helps in our understanding of water governance. 
However, the broad range of frameworks found in the literature makes it difficult to 
compare results among case studies, and hence, it also constrains the advancement of our 
knowledge of water governance. This wide array of frameworks to assess different facets 
of water governance justify the need for a refined and holistic framework which adequately 
captures multiple stakeholder perspectives, legal and administrative frameworks, existing 
policies and the trajectory of water governance systems.  
1.5 Conceptual framework 
Building on existing water governance literature, the current dissertation develops 
a framework for assessing water governance by refining, consolidating and clearly defining 
a set of assessment principles3 (Rogers, 2000; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; 
Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006; Batchelor, 2007). A framework is here interpreted 
as a structure that keeps a research project focused by aiding researchers analyse and 
compare the contents of different data sources to help address their research question 
(Green, 2014; Imenda, 2014). In the case of the current study, the research question pertains 
to the efficacy of water governance, while the data that are analysed and compared include 
policy documents and interviews with the various stakeholders. In geographical terms, such 
a framework makes it possible to also understand how issues of water governance evolve 
over space and time. The framework developed in the current study attempts to simplify 
the analysis of water governance by refining and categorizing existing water governance 
principles in the literature into fewer coherent groups. The proposed framework is aimed 
at helping assess the effectiveness of water governance systems by identifying 
accomplishments and constraints in the implementation of water governance. This 
framework could also help stakeholders in the planning process by revealing existing water 
governance deficiencies and making it possible to compare conditions in different socio-
political contexts. 
                                                            
3 Principle is here understood as a fundamental declaration of values, in relation to a specific issue, which 
functions as a guide that explains how something works (after Ashton et al., 2006). 
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Peter Rogers (2002) made the first known attempt at offering a set of water 
governance principles with their respective operational definitions. To date, the most 
commonly cited water governance principles are those offered by Peter Rogers and Alan 
Hall (2003) who identified 12 principles that they believe should characterize the structure 
of effective or viable water governance systems. By doing so, they also "create the 
important basis for assessing the state of water governance in a given location, and it is 
through these assessments that opportunities for improvement can be identified" (Lauttze 
et al., 2011:3). The proposed principles suggest that water governance systems should be 
(1) open, (2) transparent, (3) inclusive, (4) communicative; (5) coherent, (6) integrative, (7) 
equitable, (8) ethical, (9) accountable, (10) efficient, (11) responsive, and (12) sustainable. 
These principles are widely recognized as qualities of a viable water governance system, 
and remain largely consistent within the broader literature (Lautze et al., 2011). In addition 
to these principles, the current study draws on other cluster of water governance literature 
to create a refined set of principles as criteria to assess water governance in the Lerma-
Chapala basin.  
Methodologically this thesis utilizes content analysis of various official water 
policy documents and interviews with key informants in the LChB. This research method 
was chosen for its ability to effectively reduce large amounts of data into coherent themes. 
Content analysis also made it possible to superimpose the framework on different clusters 
of data (i.e., policy documents and interviews) and compare them. In this study, eighteen 
documents spanning over two thousand pages and 51 interviews that cover 84 hours and 
48 minutes were analyzed. Because of the broad nature of water governance themes, 
content analysis is a preferred methodology for researchers working in this context (for 
examples see Drieschova et al., 2008; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008; Atuyambe et al., 2011; 
Farrelly & Brown, 2011; Lukasiewicz et al., 2013; Gillet et al., 2014; Vedachalam et al., 
2016). By analysing policy documents and stakeholder perspectives in the context of the 
proposed framework, the current study also analysed links between theory (i.e., existing 
policies and plans) and practice (i.e., stakeholders’ experience of water governance on the 
ground). By going back to the basic principles of water governance to develop an all-
encompassing framework that captures multiple aspect of water governance this thesis 
attempts to find common ground, consolidate concepts, strengthen the debate on water 
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governance, and allow for the comparison of results between case studies. The application 
of the developed framework to a case study in Mexico also tests the effectiveness of the 
developed framework. 
1.6 Area of study 
The Lerma-Chapala basin (LChB) in central Mexico (Figure 1.1) provides an 
opportunity to apply the proposed water governance assessment framework and further our 
understanding of the practice of water governance. The LChB experiences common socio-
political water management problems that remain prevalent in developing countries 
seeking to adopt IWRM and improve their water governance strategies. These challenges 
include a high and continually growing population, rapidly expanding urbanization and 
industrialization processes, and water demand by the agricultural sector, among other issues 
(WMO & CONAGUA, 2011). Decades of development in the basin have also created 
severe water problems, such as high pollution levels and anthropogenically induced water 
scarcity that have resulted from surface water being over-committed and aquifers over-
exploited (WMO & CONAGUA, 2011). 
 
Figure 1.1: Geographic location of the Lerma-Chapala basin 
Existing literature identifies the LChB as having one of the richest water governance 
experiences in Mexico and the broader Latin America (Dourojeanni & Jouravlev, 2001; 
Mestre, 2001; Parrado Diez, 2004; Sanchez Mesa, 2006; WMO & CONAGUA, 2011). For 
example, the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council (LChBC) which was created in 1993 was the 
first water governance forum in Latin America. The literature also acknowledges that 
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Mexico adopted an IWRM approach to solve its water management problems with the 
enactment of its National Water Law in 1992 (González-Villarreal & Garduño, 1994; 
Dourojeanni, 2001; Mestre, 2001). Nonetheless, a viable water governance system has not 
been achieved in the LChB, as progress in water user participation and the decentralization 
of functions has been very slow (Torregosa, 2004; Webster et al., 2009a). 
The LChB is also characterized by a high population density, a high urban 
population concentration and rapid economic development that relies on water resources. 
These key characteristics have placed the basin at the core of Mexico’s social, political and 
economic life. Despite covering a small geographical portion of the Mexican territory (i.e., 
2.4% of the total landmass), the basin supplies drinking water to 16% of Mexico’s 
population, including 2 million from Mexico City and another 2 million from Guadalajara 
(Cotler Avalos et al., 2006) through interbasin water transfers. Furthermore, as much as 
17% of all industry in Mexico is located within the confines of the basin (Jaime Jáquez, 
2004), contributing as much as 35% of Mexico’s industrial GNP (Mestre, 1997; Castelán, 
2001). The LChB houses approximately 13% of all irrigated lands in Mexico, which are of 
great worth to the country’s agricultural export earnings. Overall the basin’s tertiary sector 
supports a fifth of all national economic activities (Wester et al., 2000; Mestre, 2001). The 
dominant uses of water in the LChB are for agriculture, domestic consumption (i.e., 
drinking water) and industry (Figure 1.2.a). As illustrated in Figure 1.2.b, most of the water 
that is put to these uses are derived from groundwater sources. Decades of development 
and growth in the basin have resulted in surface water been over-allocated and groundwater 
sources which have generally been over-exploited (Mestre, 2001; Sandoval, 2004; Wester 
et al., 2009c; WMO & CONAGUA, 2011).  
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Figure 1.2: Water use in the Lerma-Chapala basin 
The contested nature of water within the LChB has resulted in conflicts among state 
governments, water uses, and water-based stakeholders. The Lerma-Chapala Basin Council 
(LChBC) was created to implement the water allocation policy, improve water quality and 
water use efficiency, and conserve the resources and ecosystems of the basin (Mestre et al., 
1994; Mestre, 1997; Wester et al., 2000; Castelán, 2001). However, official documents are 
not specific and only mention that these goals were to be achieved through the creation of 
‘specialized’ workgroups, through consensus building mechanisms, and through a 
participatory approach. The World Meteorological Organization and Mexico’s National 
Water Commission (WMO & CONAGUA, 2011) report that water pollution and scarcity 
problems persist in the basin, which raises questions about the ability of the LChBC to 
achieving desired water governance goals and implement an effective IWRM process. 
Conflicts within the basin can be grouped in two different categories: direct resource 
use conflicts and institutional conflicts. The most relevant direct resource based conflict in 
the basin is between the states of Guanajuato and Jalisco (up-down river) concerning the 
availability and allocation of surface water from the Solis Dam. This conflict began in the 
1950s and consistently resurges during prolonged periods of drought, the most recent one 
being between 1999 and 2003. This conflict between the agriculture-based water users in 
Guanajuato, environmental citizen groups in Jalisco, and Guadalajara’s water utility 
services who use water from Lake Chapala, further demonstrates the persistence of 
problems in the basin. This also illustrate the need for negotiation and dialogue around 
issues of water allocation, monitoring and governance. The LChBC is the forum where the 
negotiations pertaining surface water allocation and the signing of the agreement/treaty for 
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the allocation of surface water by stakeholders took place. This mutually agreed document 
was reached through a water governance process, where water users and government 
representatives from all five states in the basin negotiated for two years before reaching an 
agreement. This agreement seeks to bring legitimacy, transparency, rules, and clarity to the 
yearly allocation of surface waters; thus, mitigating the conflict for surface water allocation 
in the basin. 
Regarding institutional conflicts, the most evident challenge exists between the 
federal government and the government of the state of Guanajuato. One of the most serious 
problems in the LChB is the overexploitation of groundwater. To address this problem, the 
government of Guanajuato organized water users into Technical Water Councils (COTAS), 
which are subsidiary organizations of the LChBC, without the involvement of the National 
Water Commission (NWC). Consequently, the NWC, which is Mexico’s sole water 
authority, did not recognize these councils and has not delegated authority or 
responsibilities to manage groundwater by COTAS in Guanajuato (Wester et al., 2009a). 
This conflict illustrates the need for stakeholder participation, capacity strengthening, 
agreements for groundwater allocation, and the application of the subsidiarity principle. 
Details of major conflicts surrounding water governance, management and allocation in the 
LChB will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
1.7 Problem statement 
The current study recognizes the importance of assessment frameworks for 
monitoring the evolution of water governance over time (e.g., pre-Rio and post-Rio as 
demonstrated in Table 1.1). The literature recognizes that the shift from one water 
management paradigm to the next represents a change in status quo in many countries, 
especially developing nations (Peña & Solanes, 2003; Aston et al., 2006; Sajor & Minh 
Thu, 2009; Agyenim & Gupta, 2012; Halbe et al., 2013; Hornidge et al., 2013). Such shifts 
often results in complex problems that cut across social, political, cultural, and local 
contexts, consequently influencing the viability of governance systems and their capacity 
to support or restrict the implementation of IWRM systems (Rogers, 2002; WWAP, 2003, 
2006; Rogers & Hall, 2003; Jacobson et al., 2013; Mapedza, et al., 2016). The problem 
statement of this thesis is as follows: To tease out and understand constraints and 
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opportunities that emerge from attempts to implement a viable water governance system 
and an IWRM process through the application of a newly developed framework. 
1.8 Research aim and objectives 
The current thesis attempts to develop a holistic water governance assessment 
framework by refining existing principles of water governance contained in the research 
literature. This could enhance our understanding of water governance by highlighting its 
core aspects. 
The three major objectives of the study are: 
• to develop a water governance assessment framework by refining normative 
attributes that best conceptualize water governance in the existing research 
literature;  
• apply the developed water governance assessment framework to official water 
policy documents with the aim of understanding pre-/post-Rio water governance 
transitions in Mexico; and 
• apply the developed water governance assessment framework to stakeholder 
interviews to understand the state of water governance in the Lerma-Chapala basin, 
and how these conditions relate to policy and the overall creation of a viable IWRM 
process. 
1.9 Overview of content of thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. This first chapter introduces the study by 
outlining its aims and objectives. It briefly introduces the conceptual framework and the 
nature of conflicts in the study area. The second chapter presents the conceptual framework 
for water governance, outlines its operating principles, and provides working definitions 
for each of the principles to be used as assessment criteria. The third chapter provides 
background information on the case study and outlines details of the main conflicts present 
in the LChB. The fourth chapter discusses the research methods and analytical approaches 
that were utilized for the study. Chapter five presents the study results, while Chapter six 
examines the achievements and constraints to water governance in the Lerma-Chapala 
basin. The thesis concludes with Chapter seven, which discusses policy recommendations 
and future research opportunities that emerge from this dissertation. 
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Chapter Two 
2 Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the existing water governance literature that was drawn on to 
develop the water governance assessment framework. A total of five water governance 
principles were developed after reviewing the literature and consolidating existing 
principles. The chapter also clarifies key concepts such as water governance that are central 
to the study.  
2.1 What is water governance? 
While there has been long standing implicit research on water governance, explicit 
research on the notion is still relatively new (Tropp, 2007; Biswas & Tortajada, 2010; 
Mitchell, 2013; Pahl-Wostl, 2017; Woodhouse & Muller, 2017). ‘Governance’ is a concept 
that was prominently discussed in the social and environmental sciences during the1980s 
and 1990s. Traditionally, the concept of governance, was strictly defined as the act of 
‘governing’, as is practiced by government and public administration officials (Turner 
& Hulme, 1997; Stoker, 1998; Johnston et al., 2000; Marinetto, 2003; Van Kersbergen & 
Van Waarden, 2004; Tropp, 2007; de Loë et al., 2009). Overtime, the concept of 
‘governance’ has evolved to include the ways in which power, authority, and decision 
making are arranged within a multilevel and multi-stakeholder (i.e., civil society, private 
sector and various levels of government) collaborative structure, where government 
maintains some steering capacity4 (Jessop, 1997; Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1998; Fukuda-Parr 
& Ponzio, 2002; Marinetto, 2003). Thus, the concept now transcends previous notions that 
portrayed it as characterized by top-down structures and practices. This is noteworthy in 
the area of water governance since the implementation governance in the water sector 
requires major changes in policy, institutional structures and management, which in many 
jurisdictions represents an important change to the prevailing status quo (Hornidge et al., 
2013; Mapedza et al., 2016; Rola et al., 2016). Hence, attempts to implement water 
governance systems often encounter resistance from powerful traditional forces that favour 
a centralized, hierarchical, state-oriented, top-down approach. 
                                                            
4 Steering capacity refers to the idea of being able to “influence” or “steer” decisions in a particular direction, 
as opposed to a control-command structure where decisions are made unilaterally by top level authority.  
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Good governance in the water sector was first identified as a means to achieve water 
security at the Second World Water Forum in The Hague in 2000 (Rogers & Hall, 2003). 
As part of the forum, the Global Water Partnership identified water governance as the first 
of four priority areas for action, stating that “the water crisis is mainly a crisis of 
governance” (GWP, 2000a:16). To date no strong census exists on a single definition for 
water governance (Moench et al., 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Biswas & Tortajada, 2010, 
2010a; Lautze et al., 2011; Araral & Wang, 2013; Varis et al., 2014; Pahl-Wostl, 2017; 
Woodhouse & Muller, 2017). There are therefore many interpretations and definitions of 
water governance. For example, Rogers and Hall (2003) see water governance as a range 
of political, social and administrative ‘systems’ meant to develop and manage water 
resources and services. Further, the World Water Assessment Program (2003) considers 
water governance as including all social, political and economic ‘organizations and 
institutions’, and their ‘relationships’ to water resources development and management. 
Finally, the United Nations Development Program (2004) views water governance as 
political, social and economic ‘processes and institutions’ through which multiple 
stakeholders ‘make decisions’ about how best to use, develop and manage water resources.  
As a consequence of water governance having multiple definitions and 
interpretations, there are no standard approaches for assessing water governance. Water 
governance research also remains largely fractured (Biswas & Tortajada, 2010; Araral & 
Wang, 2013), hence the need for an assessment framework that consolidates multiple 
approaches to understand water governance. A search for common ground is desirable 
because a unifying assessment framework could make it possible to compare and 
understand the evolution of water governance structures over time and between different 
jurisdictions. 
Since the 1990s, IWRM reforms have been changing the way water resources are 
governed in many countries. However, the extent to which water sectors have transitioned 
form traditional state-centred top-down approaches (i.e., pre-Rio approaches), to a 
multilevel, multi-stakeholder collaborative approaches implied in the concept of water 
governance (i.e., post-Rio approaches) remains unclear (Chan, 2009; Sajor & Minh Thu, 
2009; Horlemann & Dombrowsky, 2012; Dell’Angelo et al., 2016). Rogers (2002) explains 
that a framework to improve water governance systems is needed because experiences from 
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many countries have shown that the actual performance of ‘textbook’ laws, institutions and 
regulations in the water sector have produced poor outcomes, suggesting that there are no 
‘reasonable’ functioning political system to implement them. Within the literature, there is 
an abundance of examples that indeed reveal the poor implementation of water governance 
related reforms (Wester et al., 2009a; Agyenim & Gupta, 2012; Oliveira et al., 2012; 
Hornidge et al., 2013; Casiano Flores et al., 2016; Mapedza et al., 2016; Rola et al., 2016). 
Nonetheless, the literature also shows that within some socio-political contexts, some levels 
of success have been achieved (Lemos & Farias de Oliveira, 2004; Biswas & Tortajada, 
2010a; da Costa Silva, 2011; Lennox et al., 2011; Dore et al., 2012; Gallego-Ayala & Juizo, 
2014; Mitchel et al., 2014). As has been noted by Norman et al (2013) and others (e.g., 
Grwcksch, 2015; Kuzdas et al., 2015; de Boer et al., 2016) the wide range of approaches 
to assessing water governance makes it difficult to compare these case studies. To date, 
there have been several calls for a unifying holistic framework for assessing and monitoring 
the progress of water governance (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Tropp, 2007; 
Biswas & Tortajada, 2010; Jacobson et al., 2013; OECD, 2015; Pahl-Wostl, 2017). These 
examples further justify the need to develop a water governance assessment framework that 
builds on the fragmented and largely dispersed literature. 
Rogers (2002) warns that there is no blue print or single model for effective water 
governance, because each case is dependent upon context. He also contends that the 
practice of water governance could become clearer through post-hoc examinations, and 
offers twelve principles of what should characterize an effective water governance system. 
These principles provide an evaluative lens against which to assess the characteristics of 
different water governance systems, and could help to identify challenges and opportunities 
to guide reforms aimed towards shaping an adequate or valid water governance system. In 
this sense, the present study agrees with Woodhouse and Muller (2017), who suggest that 
due to local complexity and diversity, practice can only be guided by general principles of 
water governance to address water issues and achieve social, economic and ecological 
goals.  
The water governance literature offers a number of explicit principles that have been 
used in diverse combinations. This thesis postulates that these principles provide common 
ground for debate and consolidating ideas. Though dispersed, they represent an important 
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step towards a unified concept of water governance. Through a literature survey, the current 
study identified seventeen different water governance principles, for which operational 
definitions are provided in the literature. These commonly cited water governance 
principles are: participative, inclusive, democratic, coherent, efficient, responsive, 
effective, equitable, ethical, accountable, integrity, rule of law, open, transparent, 
communicative, integrative, and sustainable (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 
2003, 2006; Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006; Barreira, 2006; Batchelor, 2007; 
Lautze et al., 2011; FAO, 2013; Mitchell, 2013). A critical look at these principles and the 
context of their use in the literature clearly revels that differently labeled principles 
sometimes overlap in meaning. The current study therefore categorizes them into fewer 
coherent groups based on similar meanings and key unifying elements. Following the 
categorization, the new framework is tested by applying it to a case study. 
Before moving any further into our framework, it is necessary to briefly present an 
in-depth summary of literature that addresses different water governance assessment 
frameworks and methods.  
2.2 Water governance: issues and frameworks 
The present study agrees with Woodhouse and Muller (2017) and Pahl-Wostl 
(2017) who both contend that the wide range of perspectives on water governance pose a 
methodological challenge for researchers seeking to understand the concept of how it 
evolves in specific contexts. A comprehensive review of literature that has sought to assess 
water governance between 2009 and 2016 reveals that there are almost as many assessment 
frameworks or approaches as the published articles. While these diverse frameworks are 
valuable in themselves, it is evident that a unifying framework could be more beneficial by 
making studies comparable and giving researchers the opportunity to track the spatio-
temporal evolution of water governance. The only common ground in these clusters of 
literature is the frequent use of the basin as the spatial unit for assessing water governance. 
Despite the wide range of frameworks and approaches to assess water governance, 
the present study grouped the assessment frameworks identified into four overarching 
thematic areas of research associated with water governance. These include (a) the 
importance of considering the existing local context, when developing institutional and/or 
policy reforms, (b) prevailing governing systems and their role in the implementation of 
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water governance reforms, (c) stakeholder engagement in water policy and in development 
planning, and (d) the capacity of water governance systems to adapt and address changing 
or evolving challenges and their adverse effects.  
It is important to note that these groups are not mutually exclusive. As Aston and 
colleagues (2005) have explained, various components of water governance are interrelated 
and interdependent. Consequently, studies that focus on one thematic area of research tend 
to touch on attributes of water governance that are associated with a different thematic area. 
An example can be seen in the work of Dell’Angelo et al (2016) in their study of the 
capacity of water governance systems to adapt and address changing or evolving challenges 
within the Ewaso Ng'iro River basin of Mount Kenya. Despite their primary focus on the 
adaptive capacity of water governance systems, their study veers into other topics 
associated with stakeholder engagement. Such complexities explain the fact that water 
governance themes overlap. Hence, the four thematic groups developed in the current study 
to capture the key issues addressed in the assessment of water governance within the 
literature are not mutually exclusive.  
The first thematic group pertains to the need for decision makers to consider local 
context (i.e., political, social, cultural, economic, environmental) when developing 
institutional, legal and or policy reforms. In the end, it could be the prevailing local context 
that determines the outcomes of implemented policies, plans and programs (Jacobson et 
al., 2013). When assessing water governance in local context, the relationship between 
formal (statutory) and informal (customary) systems has characterized the work of several 
researchers (Funder et al., 2010; Hornidge et al., 2013; Wood, 2015; Mapedza, et al., 2016; 
Rola et al., 2016). In their work that assessed water governance reforms in the Philippines 
using a ‘stage-based approach to institutional reforms’, Rola and colleagues (2016) noted 
that formal institutional reforms have often met opposition from local traditional (informal) 
systems. Hence, the core goals for most structural changes were unsuccessful. A study by 
Hornidge, Oberkircher, and Kudryavtseva (2013) that drew from social constructivism and 
boundary work came to similar conclusions upon assessing the implementation of irrigation 
reforms in Uzbekistan. They concluded that local (informal) water management practices 
remained dominant, in spite of formal institutional reforms (i.e., local water governance 
forums are not working). These examples relate to the water governance principles of rule 
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of law, transparency and accountability mentioned in the literature, since they illustrate the 
need for a strong and clear regulatory system which amalgamates formal and informal 
systems and highlights the importance of local voices in policy implementation. 
Another justification for the need to consider local context in the development of 
institutional, legal and or policy reforms, lies in the issue of scale. Dewulf, Mancero, 
Cardenas and Sucozhanay (2011) state that paying attention to scale is particularly 
important for outlining problems and defining relevant actors that should be factored into 
the conflict resolution process. The fact that water resources are not spatially confined to 
political boundaries also makes the issue of scale relevant. For example, the pollution of 
water in a specific jurisdiction could impact the quality of water that flows into another 
jurisdiction connected to the same water body. Gillet, McKay and Keremane (2014) 
addressed the issue of scale when they examined water disputes among water uses (i.e., 
irrigated agriculture and commercial forestry) triggered by a water allocation reform in the 
Lower Limestone Coast of south Australia. They found that conflicts could not be solved 
at the local level; hence, the judicial process had to be moved up to the state level in order 
to resolve the situation. This demonstrates that scale is inherently political, and should also 
be factored into the level at which issues are resolved. The scale level is directly associated 
with the concept of subsidiarity with regards of making decisions and taking actions at the 
most appropriate level, which is related to the water governance principles of coherence, 
responsiveness, efficiency, and effectiveness.  
A second thematic area of research assesses issues related to the prevailing 
governing systems and their implication in the implementation of water governance 
reforms. International financing, development and aid agencies have pushed client 
countries to pass IWRM reforms, which in many cases represent a change in status quo 
(Peña & Solanes, 2003; Aston et al., 2006; Ballweber, 2006; Sajor & Minh Thu, 2009; 
Agyenim & Gupta, 2012). As a result, the assessment literature has paid attention to the 
role of various actors and institutions in the implementation of water governance systems. 
De Boer, Kruijf, Özerol and Bressers (2016) in the examination of the relationship between 
the existing water governance system and collaborative actions and interactions among 
stakeholders build upon a collaboration framework with eight distinct and previously 
established classes of governance systems, which they apply to five case studies. They 
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conclude that the outcomes of a water governance system can be determined by the 
supportive and/or restrictive nature of stakeholder actions, especially those in higher levels 
of government.  
This finding is supported by several other studies (e.g., Wester et al., 2009a; 
Farrelly & Brown, 2011; Horlemann & Dombrowsky, 2012; Oliveira et al., 2012; Franzen 
et al., 2015). Oliveira, Heller, Nacimento and Lobina (2012) who applied the path 
dependency theory to the municipality of Belo Horizonte, Brazil, concluded that policy 
reforms towards an integrated and participative water management model have not been 
sufficient to break down old practices. Similarly, Franzen, Hammer, and Balfors (2015) 
who analyse how institutional legacies affect water policy reforms in southern Sweden 
concluded that the governance approaches utilized by different river basin organizations 
around water user participation vary in part because of ‘institutional memory’. They also 
conclude that the legacy of memory within institutional arrangements can facilitate or 
impede the development of cooperative networks, stakeholder participation and 
consequently, goal achievement. Finally, Horlemann & Dombrowsky (2012) apply a 
theory-based approach drawing from Young’s (2002) fit-interplay concept to analyse 
progress and problems in the implementation of IWRM in Mongolia. Their results show 
that horizontal and vertical coordination is challenging in Mongolia because the roles and 
responsibilities of stakeholders are not clearly defined in law, and because the capacities of 
newly created institutions and organizations need to be strengthened. They also conclude 
that rapid institutional change created friction between new and old institutional structures 
thus creating a gap in the implementation of IWRM.  
This thematic area of research is associated with several water governance 
principles. First, it addresses the need to clearly establish roles and responsibilities of actors 
and institutions (i.e., rule of law), in order to hold institutions and individuals accountable 
for their actions (i.e., accountability), but also to facilitate collaborative stakeholder action 
(i.e., coherence, participation). This group of frameworks are also associated with the idea 
that water management functions best when and resource-based decisions are made at the 
lowest appropriate level of social aggregation (responsive, efficient, effective), which 
implies vertical and horizontal information and collaboration networks (open, transparent, 
communicative, integrative).  
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A third thematic area deals with stakeholder engagement in water policy and 
development planning. Public participation has been part of the sustainable development 
debate since the late 20th century. The Rio Conference on Environment and Development 
declared that environmental issues have better results with the participation of all citizens, 
(see Principle 10, Rio Declaration 1992). Today, stakeholder participation is being 
promoted globally by international development and financial institutions when promoting 
sustainable development, IWRM, and water governance. With regards to water governance 
in particular, it is considered that the effective implementation of stakeholder participation 
in a decision-making process could bring transparency and accountability to the process, 
and led to decisions that are grounded in consensus and legitimacy. Such decisions tend to 
be more achievable (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006). 
This literature provides evidence that stakeholder participation can enhance the 
implementation and outcomes of water policies and programs (Bell et al., 2011; Dore et 
al., 2012; Norman et al., 2013; Carr et al., 2014; Gallego-Ayala & Juizo, 2014; Kuzdas et 
al., 2015; Akhmouch & Clavreul, 2016). Utilizing an “Analytical Hierarchical Process”, 
Gallego-Ayala and Juizo (2014) in an assessment of stakeholder involvement in the context 
of Mozambique’s Incomati River Basin acknowledge that stakeholder participation and 
involvement in the planning and decision-making process is central to successful water 
governance. Norman and colleagues (2013) developed the Water Security Status Indicators 
assessment method, which utilizes participatory methods that allow communities to assess 
their water security status. After applying the assessment, they concluded that active 
stakeholder engagement is an essential component of integrated planning and management, 
without which water governance goals cannot be achieved. Finally, Akhmouch and 
Clavreul (2016) conducted an OECD study on “Stakeholder Engagement for Inclusive 
Water Governance” (OECD, 2015a), and sought to assess stakeholder engagement in 
water-related decision-making, and the extent to which this leads to greater effectiveness, 
efficiency and inclusiveness. Their findings support recommendations for balanced 
stakeholder representation and open and regular communications among stakeholders to 
help steer successful water governance systems.  
This thematic area of research is in agreement with several water governance 
principles. First, it establishes the idea that decision making in a water governance process 
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should involve the participation of a wide range of stakeholders (inclusive, democratic, 
equitable, participation). Second, it promotes the notion that relevant clusters of 
information should be made available to promote effective dialogue, negotiations and 
decision making (open, communicative, transparency, accountability). 
Within the water governance research community, debates around the extent to 
which participation should occur and what role it should play continue to persist. The extent 
to which stakeholders should get involved, the nature of the involvement, the extent of 
power sharing, and the planning stage at which stakeholder participation should be 
considered largely depends on the socio-political context and the supportiveness or 
restrictiveness of prevailing governance systems (OECD, 2015a). It is also important to 
bear in mind that cultural, political, social, economic, educational and other local 
characteristics change over space and time, potentially impacting the level and type of 
stakeholder involvement at different times. This is illustrated in the work of Da Costa Silva 
(2011) who developed and applied a framework for understanding environmental justice in 
the context of ‘community-based watershed management’ in four Latin American 
countries. She concludes that the community-based watershed management projects have 
been able to mitigate environmental vulnerability and risk to access water resources. 
However, her results also reveal constraints that limit social participation, including the 
lack of clarity in stakeholder roles and the lack of capacities of the institutions responsible 
for implementing participatory tools. Interestingly, despite governance systems that 
promoted decentralization and participation, within the study communities, her study did 
not find any evidence of communities being empowered.  
Akhmouch and Clavreul (2016) are the only researchers found in this review of 
literature who provided an explicit typology of levels of stakeholder participation for their 
research. To determine the levels of stakeholder involvement, this dissertation uses 
Arnstein’s (1969) levels of participation, which has been commonly utilized in the 
literature. These levels, representing the degree to which power is redistributed from a top-
down to a bottom-up approach, are illustrated as rungs on a “ladder of citizen participation” 
arranged in a descending order of degree of participation (i.e., from optimum to minimal 
participation) (Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1: Arnstein’s Eight Rungs on a Ladder of Citizen Participation 
Rungs on a 
Ladder of Citizen 
Participation 
Nature of the Involvement 
Degree of 
Involvement 
(Power Sharing) 
8. Citizen control Citizens have full charge of policy and managerial aspects 
Degrees of citizen 
Power 7. Delegated power 
Citizens are given management power for selected or all parts 
of a particular plan or program 
6. Partnership Trade-offs are negotiated, and there are no unilateral changes 
5. Placation Advice is received from citizens but not necessarily acted upon Degrees of 
tokenism 4. Consultation Citizens are heard but not necessarily considered 
3. Informing Citizens’ rights, responsibilities and options are identified 
2. Therapy Power holders educate or cure citizens 
Non-participation 
1. Manipulation Rubberstamp advisory committees 
Source: Arnstein, 1969. 
With regards to the type of participation, the literature suggests that this should be 
selected according to individual and institutional capacities, context, and the goals and 
objectives established (Mitchell, 2002; Gomez & Nakatt, 2002). These forms of 
stakeholder participation may be applied in various combinations at different stages of 
implementation.  
The fourth thematic area of research seeks to understand water governance systems 
and their capacity to adapt and address ever changing challenges. These studies focus on 
the adaptive capacity of water governance systems to respond to the uncertainties of climate 
change and increasing population. These changing or evolving factors usually involve 
many different sectors and require an integrated approach to be adequately addressed. 
Consequently, the frameworks in this group assess aspects related to collaboration, 
information sharing and the ability of stakeholders to respond to adverse effects such as 
drought and flooding (Engle & Lemos, 2010; Hurlbert & Diaz, 2013; Grecksch, 2015; Van 
Leeuwen & Sjerps, 2015, 2016; Dell'Angelo et al., 2016). For example, Grecksch (2015), 
modified the Adaptive Capacity Wheel by adding two dimensions (i.e., adaptation 
motivation and adaptation belief), and assess the adaptive capacity of water governance in 
the Keiskamma River Catchment, South Africa, and uses the framework as a 
communication tool with stakeholders to identify strengths and weaknesses in the 
implementation of adaptation measures. He concludes that to overcome the implementation 
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gap it is necessary to ensure better coordination across and within governmental levels, to 
raise awareness, to strengthen institutional capacities and skills of decision makers and the 
public, and to increase the political will in order to overcome adaptation barriers. He 
recommends developing councillor awareness program in order to have better informed 
participation. 
In another example, Dell'Angelo, McCord, Gower, Carpenter, Caylor, and Evans 
(2016), applied a multimethod approach and used Ostrom’s eight ‘design principles’ of 
natural-resource management as a diagnostic framework for five communities on the 
Ewaso Ng'iro River basin on Mount Kenya. They conclude that the current water 
governance system on the basin has produced positive outcomes, increased stakeholder’s 
dialogue and participation, and decreased conflicts. However, there are concerns that the 
system is not adaptable to changing conditions related to population growth and climate 
change. This study illustrates the importance of institutional systems that stakeholders to 
collaborate and share information around issues of adaptation to population increase and 
environmental change. This last thematic area of research relates to a number of the water 
governance principles. It addresses the participation of a wide range of stakeholders (i.e., 
inclusive, participation, equitable), the importance of defining stakeholder roles to 
facilitate the collaboration (i.e., coherence, rule of law), the importance of making relevant 
information available to stakeholders to aid in decision making (i.e., communicative, 
transparent, open), the necessity of considering local context (i.e., coherence, responsive, 
ethical), and the importance of decision making that has implications for the long-term 
management of water resources (i.e., integration, sustainable). 
 
This cluster of literature discussed above shows that a variety of approaches have 
been applied to assess different aspects of water governance. It also reveals that there are 
many methods that have been applied, but there is no common ground on methods for 
evaluation, which further explain the complexity of assessing water governance. For 
example, some researchers use hypothesis testing (de Boer et al., 2016), others identify key 
themes (Wood, 2015), some measure percentages (Funder et al., 2010) or frequencies 
(Baumgartne & Pahl-Wostl, 2013), others look for trends (Carr et al., 2014) or patterns 
(Cook, 2014), and some used a comparative approach (da Costa Silva, 2011; Oliveira et 
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al., 2012; Franzen et al., 2015). For the most part, researchers have studied formal and 
informal aspects of water governance and relied on primary and secondary sources of 
information (i.e. interviews and surveys, or articles, media, texts). The literature review 
also reveals that most authors tend to use a descriptive approach (Chan, 2009; Wester et 
al., 2009; Bakker & Cook, 2011; da Costa Silva, 2011; Horlemann & Dombrowsky, 2012; 
Hornidge et al., 2013; Hurlbert & Diaz, 2013; Cook, 2014; Mapedza et al., 2016; Rola et 
al., 2016) to evaluate different characteristics of water governance, while others use a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (Engle & Lemos, 2010; Bell et al., 
2011; Cookey et al., 2016; Akhmouch & Clavreul, 2016; Dell'Angelo et al., 2016). The 
present study, like others, considers systematization and replicability as fundamental to a 
good data analysis, especially in studying confect ridden issues. Due to the complex and 
multifaceted nature of issues that emerge in water governance and the large amount of data 
that was analysed in the current study (i.e., policy documents and interviews), content 
analysis was used as a systematic and replicable data analysis tool. 
Finally, the survey of literature identified that most frameworks use a normative 
approach and compare case studies to desired ends and ideas that determine what ought to 
be done. It also identified a total of eight articles that used specific principles in their 
assessment. The principles used by Dell'Angelo and colleagues (2016)5 and those proposed 
by Akhmouch and Correia (2016)6 are the ones that at first glance seem more different 
from those offered by Rogers and Hall (2003). However, their associated concepts are 
described or defined similarly. The other researchers (Engle & Lemos, 2010; da Costa 
Silva, 2011; Oliveira et al., 2012; Hurlbert & Diaz, 2013; Grecksch, 2015; Van Leeuwen 
& Sjerps, 2016) use different combinations of three or four principles, with participation 
and accountability being the most frequently used, followed by responsiveness, equity and 
capacity. Most of the principles used in these six studies are included in the group of 
                                                            
5 Ostrom’s eight ‘design principles’ of natural-resource management: (1) Clear boundaries, (2) congruence 
with local conditions, (3) collective-choice arrangements, (4) monitoring, (5) graduated sanctions, (6) conflict 
resolution mechanisms, (7) recognition of the right to organization, and (8) nested governance (Dell'Angelo 
et al., 2016). 
6 Twelve OECD principles on water governance: (1) Capacity, (2) policy coherence, (3) appropriate scales 
within basin systems, (4) clear roles & responsibilities, (5) monitoring &evaluation, (6) trade-offs across 
users, rural & urban areas, & generations, (7) stakeholder engagement, (8) integrity & transparency, (9) 
innovative governance, (10) regulatory framework, (11) financing, and (12) data& information (OECD, 2015; 
Akhmouch & Correia, 2016). 
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seventeen principles for which operational definitions were found in the literature (Rogers, 
2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006; 
Batchelor, 2007). 
In summary, there are two major considerations necessary for deriving the core 
components of water governance and developing an assessment framework. These include 
the multifaceted nature of water governance, and the multiplicity and diversity in 
approaches found in contemporary literature that assesses the different aspects of water 
governance. Since the literature covers sufficient grounds on water governance when 
viewed as a whole, it seems unreasonable to add to the complexity of existing approaches. 
Hence, the study attempts to refine and consolidate existing frameworks or concepts that 
have been used to study water governance into fewer and understandable clusters. This can 
be seen as an attempt to go back to the basic principles of water governance, finding 
common grounds within the disparate literature and developing a holistic framework.  
The framework developed in this study therefore provides opportunities for the 
comprehensive and systematic analysis of water governance systems to identify where 
changes are needed and hopefully, help bridge the gap in the implementation of IWRM 
processes in practice. 
2.3 Back to the basics: principles for building a water governance framework 
Theoretical challenges that are presented by the complexity of assessing water 
governance and management have resulted in the proliferation of principles used in the 
literature to assess different water governance systems. The present study identified seven 
publications with commonly cited water governance principles. Thus, the principles cited 
in most of the literature overlap with at least one of these seven clusters of literature. 
Additionally, these seven publications (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 
2006; Aston et al., 2005; Aston et al., 2006; Bachelor, 2007) provide clear operational 
definitions for each principle. In total, this study identified seventeen different water 
governance principles with clear definitions in the literature (see Table 2.2). These 
principles are considered essential for effective water governance (Rogers, 2002; Rogers 
& Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006; Barreira, 2006; 
Batchelor, 2007).  
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Table 2.2: Water governance principles defined by researchers 
Principles Rogers, 2002 
Rogers & 
Hall, 2003* 
WWAP, 
2003 
Ashton et 
al., 2005 
Ashton et 
al., 2006 
WWAP, 
2006 
Batchelor, 
2007 * 
1 Participative X  X X X X  
2 Democratic    X    
3 Equitable X X X   X X 
4 Inclusive  X     X 
5 Coherent X X X X X X X 
6 Efficient X X     X 
7 Responsive  X X   X X 
8 Effective X   X X X  
9 Ethical X X X   X X 
10 Accountable X X X X X X X 
11 Integrity    X    
12 Rule of law      X  
13 Open X X  X X  X 
14 Transparent X X X   X X 
15 Communicative X X     X 
16 Integrative X X X   X X 
17 Sustainable X X     X 
Total number of 
principles 12 12 8 7 5 10 12 
* Consolidated principles were segregated to better represent the water governance principles included in each 
publication. 
The existing range of principles in the literature, which sometimes have overlapping 
meanings, makes the analysis of water governance complicated and difficult to capture 
coherently. Some researchers have attempted to reduce the number of existing principles 
into fewer categories to enable more coherent and well-structured analysis. Rogers and Hall 
(2003) consolidated twelve principles that were proposed by Rogers’s (2002) into seven 
principles. For example, to reduce redundancy, they bundled the principles of open and 
transparent into one principle (i.e., Open and Transparent) since both principles pertain to 
good governance being open (i.e., having institutions that work in an open manner) and 
being transparent (i.e., having structures in place that ensure that ensure policy decisions 
are transparent so that all policy stakeholders can easily follow the steps taken in the policy 
formulation). As seen in the above example, overlaps among principles makes it possible 
to reduce them into fewer coherent and well connected categories. Another example to 
reduce water governance principles is evident in the work of the World Water Assessment 
Program (2006). They identified an overlap between effectiveness and efficiency, and 
merged them into a single principle (i.e., Effectiveness and Efficiency), stating that 
“processes and institutions should produce results that meet needs while making the best 
use of resources”. This definition captures individual definitions of the Effectiveness and 
Efficiency principles provided by Rogers (2002). 
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There are also cases where commonalities among principles are not as clear. For 
example, Rogers and Hall (2003) bundle inclusive and communicative; where the former 
makes reference to wide stakeholder participation that follows “an inclusive approach when 
developing and implementing policies”, and the later identifies the need for governance 
institutions and systems “to communicate among the actors and stakeholders in very direct 
ways”. Even though broad participation is recognized by the authors as being built on the 
free flow of information, the overlap among these two principles is not explicit. The 
bundling of the principles inclusive and communicative by Rogers and Hall (2003) provides 
a good example where it is effective to merge two complementary principles that may not 
directly have a shared meaning. 
After examining the seventeen water governance principles offered in the literature, 
several redundancies and/or overlaps of concepts were identified. Thus, while the authors 
captured in Table 2.2 utilized different principles to assess water governance systems, there 
were concepts that were labeled differently and defined similarly. The two publications that 
provide a more detailed definition for each principle are the ones by Rogers (2002) and 
Rogers and Hall (2003), and their work appears to influence the operational definitions 
provided in later publications (see Appendix II). It was also noticed that researchers often 
used different terminology in reference to the same concepts. For example, effective and 
responsive are two principles that were found to be redundant. Rogers (2002) states that a 
water governance system should be effective. He then mentions that “Effectiveness also 
depends on implementing policies in a proportionate manner and on taking decisions at the 
most appropriate level” (Rogers, 2002:3). Rogers and Hall (2003) do not include effective 
within their list of principles but include responsive instead, and state that “Responsiveness 
also requires policies to be implemented in a proportionate manner and decisions to be 
taken at the most appropriate level”. ‘Participative’ and ‘inclusive’ were another set of 
principles with different labels and similar meanings. In such cases where the definitions 
provided for diverse principles were very similar the principles were merged under a single 
umbrella principle.  
The reduction and refinement process reduced the number of principles from 
seventeen to five overarching water governance principles (i.e., participation, coherence, 
rule of law, knowledge, and integration). Refined definitions were then developed for each 
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new principle, based on the consolidation of minor differences in multiple definitions that 
depicted the same idea in the literature. For example, when Rogers (2002:3) operationalises 
the principle open, he states that stakeholders “should actively communicate about what 
the institutions and government do and the decisions they take” and “use language that is 
accessible and understandable for the general public”. This characterization overlaps with 
that of transparency, which requires that “policy decisions be transparent so that both 
insiders and outsiders can easily follow the steps taken in the policy formulation” and with 
communicative, which considers that “governance institutions and systems need to 
communicate among the actors and stakeholders in very direct ways”. Therefore, open, 
transparent and communicative principles could be encapsulated within a single principle.  
Two steps were taken in the development of the water governance principles 
proposed in the current study. First, it was necessary to make generalizations that subdivide 
various features into component parts, after which attention was focused on key unifying 
elements and similarities. Once the main topics were identified and the groups organized, 
it was necessary to divide some of the principles offered in the literature into subtopics. 
This was done in order to include them in the operational definition of a more coherent 
principle. For example, the principle equitable, which is defined by Rogers and Hall 
(2003:28) as: 
All men and women should have opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being. 
Equity between and among the various interest groups, stakeholders, and consumer-
voters needs to be carefully monitored throughout the process of policy development and 
implementation. It is essential that the penalties for malfeasance are, and are seen to be, 
equitably applied.  
This definition appeals to the concept of participation in the sense that it makes reference 
to an enabling environment that provides the opportunity for all men and women to 
participate in decision making to defend their rights to water. Nonetheless, this definition 
also makes reference to established mechanisms that monitor and guarantee the inclusive 
participation of all interest groups in policy development and implementation, and 
encourages penalties for wrong doing, which makes reference to the concept of rule of law. 
Consequently, the principle equitable was subdivided into component parts; (1) the idea 
that all men and women should have the opportunity to voice their concerns and defend 
their interests in a decision-making process, was included in the principle ‘Participation’ 
proposed in the present study, while (2) the idea that a clear system of oversight and checks 
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and balances should be established, to monitor compliance with the law, and the idea of 
allocating penalties was included in the definition of the principle ‘Rule of law’ proposed 
in the present study. Table 2.3 provides details of all five principles that were generated 
from the aforementioned process.  
Table 2.3: Water governance principles 
Principles commonly offered in the literature Refined principles used in the  proposed framework 
Participative 
Participation 
Democratic 
Equitable 
Inclusive 
Coherent 
Coherence 
Efficient 
Effective 
Responsive 
Ethical 
Rule of Law 
Integrity 
Accountable 
Rule of law 
Open  
Knowledge Transparent  
Communicative 
Integrative 
Integration 
Sustainable 
  
This responds to the call of Ashton et al (2005) who emphasize the necessity of 
integrating and including all water governance principles into a coherent cluster for the 
study and effective implementation of water governance. These principles not only 
represent the ideal settings of how water governance should function, but also provide a 
system for establishing and assessing criteria pertaining to the state of water governance 
and its associated strengths and opportunities in specific geographical locations (Rogers, 
2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006; 
Barreira, 2006; Hooper, 2006; Batchelor, 2007; Saravanan, 2009; Lauttze et al., 2011; 
FAO, 2013; Mitchell, 2013).  
Literature points to the importance of considering formal and informal structures in 
the assessment of water governance systems (Aminova & Jagers, 2011; Farrelly & Brown, 
2011; Hornidge et al., 2013; Jacobson, 2013; Mapedza et al., 2016; Rola et al., 2016). In 
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this regard, Jacobson, Meyer, Oia, Reddy, and Tropp (2013) indicate that formal (statutory) 
and informal (customary) structures may be compatible or incompatible, and they could 
effectively manage water resources or could compete with one another. Because water 
governance operated under various formal and informal structures, the current studies also 
factors these structures into the study of water governance  
2.3.1 Water governance principles 
This section presents the five water governance principles7 proposed in the current 
thesis. The section is organized according to the five principles. Under each of these 
principles, various clusters of literature are reviewed to capture the context of their use and 
multiple meanings associated with them. Following this exercise, each subsection 
concludes with the conceptualization of the principle as used in this thesis. The five water 
governance principles proposed in this thesis are discussed and conceptualized as follows: 
(a) Participation:  
In order to be successful, water governance should involve a multilateral and 
inclusive decision making process that ensures the participation of all stakeholders within 
the context of a river basin (Rogers, 2002; Moench et al., 2003; Peña & Solanes, 2003; 
Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Parrado Diez, 2004; Ashton et al., 2005; 
Tortajada, 2010a; WGF, 2012). These stakeholders should include all levels of government, 
the private sector, civil social organizations, and all other public and private service water 
users. To the best extent possible, these stakeholders should be engaged the policy- and 
decision-making process from conception, to implementation, and evaluation (Rogers, 
2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Ashton et al., 2005; Tortajada, 
2010a). Power sharing and legitimate stakeholder representation are key elements that 
should characterize a successful water governance system (WWAP, 2003, 2006; 
Falkenmark et al., 2004; Saravanan et al., 2009).  
A viable water governance system should also provide opportunities for the 
participation of all men and women, regardless of their social, ethnical or religious 
conditions. Broad stakeholder engagement in decision making at different scales 
strengthens legitimate representation, empowers people, and makes the water governance 
                                                            
7 Principle is here understood as a fundamental declaration of values, in relation to a specific issue, which 
functions as a guide that explains how something works (adapted from Ashton et al., 2006). 
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system more responsive to local issues (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Peña & Solanes, 2003; 
WWAP, 2003, 2006). For a water governance system to be more effective, it is necessary 
for stakeholders to have clear and regular communication (both vertically and horizontally). 
Concerning non-government stakeholders in particular, it is essential to have a fluent 
exchange of information between stakeholder representatives and the groups they 
represent, and vice versa (WWAP, 2006, 2012). For a water governance system to be 
viable, it is important that all voices are heard and all interests represented, especially in 
cases with marginalized and disadvantaged groups (Rogers, 2002; Moench et al., 2003; 
Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006; 
Batchelor, 2007; Tortajada, 2010a; FAO, 2013). Inclusive stakeholder engagement also 
encourages cooperation and collaboration, and has the potential to improve the likelihood 
of success in achieving set goals (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Peña & Solanes, 2003; WWAP, 
2003, 2006; Falkenmark et al., 2004; Ashton et al., 2005; Saravanan et al., 2009). Public 
participation could result in transparency, legitimacy, accountability, equity, efficiency, 
responsiveness, flexibility, continuity, and cohesiveness in water governance system.  
Based on the clusters of literature reviewed on participation and other related 
concepts, participation in the current thesis will imply inclusive and legitimate multi-
stakeholder representation in water-related decision making forums. Additionally, these 
stakeholder representatives should speak and/or act in the best interest of the groups they 
represent while valuing the interests and perspectives of other stakeholders.  
(b) Coherence:  
Water governance systems should ensure that policies, plans, programs, regulations 
and actions in the water sector are coherent, consistent, and clear. It should also avoid 
ambiguity by ensuring that various initiatives do not have conflicting goals (Rogers & Hall, 
2003). Achieving these goals requires a clear definition of stakeholder roles and 
responsibilities to help facilitate collaborative and well-coordinated stakeholder action 
(Moench et al., 2003; WWAP, 2003; UNDP, 2004; Ashton et al., 2006; Biswas & 
Tortajada 2010, 2010a; WGF, 2012), and to avoid overlapping or contradictory roles that 
often result on conflicts (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WGF, 2012). It is also important that roles 
are matched with authority and responsibility, and that institutions and organizations at all 
scales have the necessary financial, human and other logistical capacities to carry out their 
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roles and responsibilities effectively (WWAP, 2003; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Batcheor, 
2007). While individual stakeholders and their respective roles are important, the principle 
of coherence also requires that information be shares among stakeholders in order to 
encourage the coordination of activities, and create synergies in the implementation of 
solutions to common water management concerns (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Solanes & 
Jouravlev, 2006; Dore et al., 2012; WWAP, 2015).  
To be effective, water governance systems should have the capacity to adequately 
respond to anticipated problems and solve existing water resource issues. Water 
governance systems depend largely on their ability to make decisions and act at the most 
appropriate level (subsidiarity principle), making the system effective and timely, 
delivering what is needed when and where it is needed; while making the best use of 
resources to improve overall outcomes (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; 
Ashton et al., 2005; Conca, 2006; Tortajada, 2010a; WGF, 2012). Proximity to the source 
of the problems allow stakeholders and their decisions to be more in tune with the context 
in which issues present themselves (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; 
Conca, 2006; Tortajada, 2010a). Therefore, the devolution of power and authority to lower 
levels of government and civil social organizations, and the creation of water governance 
forums (such as river basin councils), could allow for decisions to be made and actions to 
be taken at the lowest relevant level of social aggregation, while using the basin as a 
planning unit. Regional and local authorities, as well as organized water users, should get 
increasingly involved in water management, which would make it easier for institutions 
and processes to adapt to change, while ensuring that there is a clear social, economic and 
environmental gain to be achieved by following enacted policies (Carr et al., 2014; 
Gallego-Ayala & Juízo, 2014; Grecksch, 2015).  
Grounded in the discussion of literature around the issue of coherence, coherence 
as used in the current study will refer to the facilitation of well-coordinated actions and 
stakeholder collaborations at all scales in order to deliver what is needed when and where 
it is needed, while making the best use of available resources. This requires that stakeholder 
roles are clearly defined and well matched with the delegation of authority and 
responsibility. As well, stakeholders should have the capacity to carry out their duties 
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effectively. These aforementioned actions should result in the effective management of 
water resources. 
(c) Rule of Law:  
Sound water governance requires a strong and clear regulatory and administrative 
framework to regulate planning, development, management and the equitable allocation of 
water resources (Rogers, 2002; Moench et al., 2003; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 
2006; UNDP, 2004; Tortajada, 2010a; Grigg, 2011). Laws, norms, regulations, treaties, 
agreements, protocols, management plans, and property rights are tools that provide 
legitimacy, clarity, transparency and credibility to the water governance system while 
reducing arbitrary actions and decision making (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003). The 
“rules of the game” and the consequences for violation of those rules need to be clear and 
easily accessible to all citizens (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; Batchelor, 2007). 
Formal (statutory) and informal (customary) rules are aimed at providing security, 
certainty, and transparency in water governance systems, while reducing arbitrary decision 
making, mitigating conflicts, and minimizing corruption (Moench et al., 2003; Rogers & 
Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2006; Batchelor, 2007). It is essential that the rules specify what is 
allowed, what is not allowed, the penalties for wrongdoing or misconduct, and who has the 
authority to enforce them and to what extent (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003). Water 
governance requires that authority be legitimately exercised only in agreement with 
publicly disclosed laws (formal and informal), which are adopted and enforced in 
accordance with established procedures. Penalties should be equitably applied for wrong 
doing to all stakeholders and stakeholder groups in a manner that encourages accountability 
and a sense of responsibility (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003). Gaps and contradictions 
in the rules of the game should be avoided, since they make regulatory frameworks less 
effective, and provide opportunities for corruption and abuses (WWAP, 2003, 2006; 
UNDP, 2004; Funder et al., 2010). 
Effective water governance requires clarity concerning the roles and responsibilities 
of all the institutions, organizations, actors and networks involved in developing, 
implementing, and evaluating policy, at all levels (Moench et al., 2003; Rogers & Hall, 
2003; WWAP, 2003; UNDP, 2004; Ashton et al., 2005; Biswas & Tortajada 2010; 
Tortajada, 2010a; WGF, 2012). Conditions in which contradictory roles are merged under 
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a single authority, like being provider and regulator of services, should be avoided because 
they create operational and credibility problems (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2006; 
Batchelor, 2007; Griggs, 2011; Jacobson et al., 2013). A clear system of oversight and 
checks and balances should be established, to monitor compliance with the law and with 
stakeholder's responsibilities, and help avoid abuse of power by authorities or local elites 
(Rogers & Hall, 2003; Jacobson et al., 2013). Water governance systems also need well 
defined water governance forums with built-in arbitration, monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms, which could help with the resolution of conflicts associated with water 
resources (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003). Having roles and responsibilities clearly 
defined brings transparency to a water governance system, and strengthen with a system of 
oversights and establishing checks and balances. This in turn allows government officials, 
institutions and other stakeholders to be held accountable for their actions, decisions and/or 
omissions (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003; Tortajada, 2010a; WGF, 
2012; Jacobson et al., 2013). 
Water governance must be strongly based upon the ethical8 principles and context 
of the society in which it functions and rooted in the rule of law (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & 
Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Batchelor, 2007). It is important to consider local context 
(i.e., cultural, social, economic, political conditions), since unique conditions in specific 
contexts remain determinants of the viability of water legislation, policy and regulations 
and their respective outcomes. This is particularly critical when attempting to implement 
an imported water governance model (Moench et al., 2003; Biswas & Tortajada, 2010; 
Hornidge et al., 2013; Jacobson et al., 2013; OECD, 2015; Mapedza et al., 2016; Rola et 
al., 2016). Not taking local context into consideration when developing and implementing 
institutional and policy reforms could weaken the water governance system instead of 
strengthening its functionality (Hornidge et al., 2013; Jacobson et al., 2013; Mapedza et 
al., 2016; Rola et al., 2016).  
As evidenced in the review of literature, the concept of rule of law has many 
components. This principle will be used in this thesis to denote the existence of strong and 
clear regulatory and administrative frameworks (both formal and informal) that are rooted 
                                                            
8 Ethical is here understood as a system of accepted beliefs that conform to moral principles of what is right 
and wrong behavior. 
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in the socio-cultural contexts within which they function. It requires legitimacy in 
exercising authority and also requires that stakeholders are held accountable for their 
actions through the impartial application of penalties. It requires that roles involving power 
and authority are distributed in conjunction with checks and balances. The existence of 
arbitration forums for conflict resolution should also characterize the rule of law. 
(d) Knowledge:  
For water governance systems to function effectively, it is necessary that all actors 
and stakeholders communicate with each other in very direct ways (Rogers, 2002; Rogers 
and Hall, 2003). Dialogue and negotiations are a cornerstone of a successful water 
governance system; therefore, it is important to have relevant current and historical 
information that is relevant for making decisions around water resources (e.g. quantity and 
quality of surface and groundwater resources). This information should be made available 
to actors, stakeholders and the general public for scrutiny and evidence-based decision 
making (UNDSD, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Biswas & 
Tortajada, 2010a; WWAP, 2012, 2015). The mobilization of knowledge among 
stakeholders can yield decisions that are more fruitful and likely to achieve better outcomes 
that meet diverse stakeholder needs in an equitable manner (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Ashton 
et al., 2006; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Dore et al., 2012; WWAP, 2015). Stakeholders 
should work in a clear and open manner, actively communicating about what they do and 
the decisions they are taking, using clear and simple terminology, hence making all policy 
formulation and decision-making processes easy to follow by both insiders and outsiders. 
This will enhance the quality of water governance by promoting transparency, clarity, 
confidence, and credibility (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2005, 2006; 
Ashton et al., 2005; Ashton et al., 2006; Batchelor, 2007). This open flow of information 
not only facilitates a more effective coordination of collaborative activities both vertically 
and horizontally, but also provides the opportunity to hold institutions, organizations and 
actors accountable for their actions and decisions by monitoring progress (Rogers & Hall, 
2003; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Tortajada, 2010a; WWAP, 2015).  
An effective water governance system also utilizes communication and information 
systems for educational purposes. Disseminating information through formal and informal 
educational programs could increase awareness over a wide range of issues at local, 
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regional, national and international levels, among stakeholders and the general population 
(Rogers, 2002; Moench et al., 2003; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2012, 2015; 
Biswas & Tortajada, 2010a; FAO, 2013). Learning about water issues in other sectors or 
places and about strategies followed to solve water problems, not only aids on building 
empathy among water users at local and basin levels, but it also helps build consensus 
among stakeholders on how to achieve common set goals (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Dore et 
al., 2012). Increased awareness regarding water problems, policies, plans and programs 
could also increase the levels of stakeholder involvement and the implementation level of 
success (Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; Dore et al., 2012).  
Based on these multiple perspectives pertaining to knowledge in the literature, the 
current study deems knowledge as making relevant information accessible to all 
stakeholders and the general public for the purposes of education, decision making, 
awareness, public scrutiny and capacity building programs. In order to create a level ground 
for negotiations and quality collaboration, multiple stakeholders should communicate in 
open and direct ways using simple and clear terminology. This should, in turn, improve 
decision making, enhance stakeholder collaboration and put stakeholders in the position to 
make responsible decisions. 
(e) Integration:  
Water governance follows an intersectoral approach that recognises that all water 
uses and users are interrelated and interdependent, and considers the basin as a planning 
and management unit (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Ashton et al., 2005; Batchelor, 2007; WGF, 
2012; Mitchell, 2013; WWAP, 2015). A viable water governance system takes into account 
existing and future demands of surface and groundwater resources and their possible 
impacts to environmental, social, and economic interests within the basin, and considers 
vital aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems as present and future freshwater users (Rogers & 
Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2006; Tortajada, 2010a). It is important for policy and decision makers 
to consider strategies such as the rehabilitation, remediation and restoration of local and 
regional water cycles, more efficient and effective ways to preserve and protect the quantity 
and quality of surface and groundwater resources, and reducing risks and hazards 
associated with extreme weather events, aimed at the sustainability of water resources and 
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water services in a given river basin (Moench et al., 2003; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 
2003, 2006; Grigg 2008; WGF, 2012; Mitchell, 2013; WWAP, 2015). 
Water governance should be strongly rooted in local traditions and context, taking 
into account availability and quality of water and associated resources, because they could 
determine the outcomes of water policies, plans, and programs (Moench et al., 2003; 
Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Biswas & Tortajada, 2010; Tortajada, 2010a). 
Changing conditions in space and time require water governance systems to be flexible and 
be able to adapt and respond to the dynamics established by local contexts (Moench et al., 
2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; Cook, 2014). An effective water governance system should 
account for existing rights (including informal traditional water rights) and the rights of 
posterity through the policy- and decision-making process The overall goal of the 
appropriate water governance system should be to achieve long-term sustainability of water 
resources (Rogers & Hall, 2003).  
Grounded in the above literature, this thesis interprets integration as the application 
of an intersectoral approach that uses the basin as the planning and management unit. It is 
rooted in local contexts and considers existing and future demands of water resources and 
their possible impacts on environmental, social and economic interests, while seeking to 
promote long-term sustainability of water resources. 
 
While each of the five principles described above could independently act as a topic 
of research, assessing them collectively under a unified framework will paint a holistic 
picture of water governance and tease out various shortcomings. This thesis analyses all 
five principles together under a common framework to better understand water governance.  
This thesis poses that it is in these basic principles that a unifying definition of water 
governance can be captured. The principles proposed here, capture critical traits that should 
be evident in an ideal water governance system. In general terms, they indicate that ideally, 
a viable water governance system should have a strong regulatory framework that clearly 
establishes the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders and holds stakeholders 
accountable for their actions. They also recognize that relevant information should be made 
readily available to enable stakeholders negotiate issues on a level playing field, and make 
informed decisions that respond to the local context. These principles also reflect that 
decisions should be made close to where problems originate and that top-down and bottom-
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up networks need to be established to effectively coordinate stakeholder actions and 
decisions at various scales. They emphasize the importance of taking the values and 
interests of all stakeholders (including marginalized groups, ecosystems and future 
generations) into account during negotiations and decision making. Finally, they insist that 
decisions be made bearing in mind local conditions while aiming towards long-time 
sustainability.  
2.4 Expected contributions 
Water governance involves many scales, stakeholders, capacities and networks (to 
name just a few), which make it difficult to establish a single assessment framework that 
addresses all these differences. Researchers have applied several assessment frameworks, 
mainly approaching water governance from their area of expertise, or according to the 
nature of their research topic. This has, in turn, resulted in an increase complexity of 
assessment frameworks. For this reason, this thesis considers that ‘going back to the basics’ 
is a fundamental approach to establishing an all-encompassing framework.  
The framework proposed here aims to contribute to the literature by integrating the 
principles from the most complex to the more basic ones. For example, the proposed 
operational definition for the Participation principle includes the former definitions 
provided in the literature, like: (a) participation of a wide variety of stakeholders, (b) 
informed participation, to multilevel of cooperation and decision making and equity 
considerations, when those decisions are applied within the basin (c) equity between and 
among the various interest groups, (d) multilateral processes of decision making, and (e) 
collaboration and cooperation (Rogers, 2002; Moench et al., 2003; Rogers & Hall, 2003; 
WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Biswas & Tortajada, 2010, 2010a; Tortajada, 2010a; WGF, 
2012).  
The survey mentioned above (Section 2.2), points that most assessments were 
conducted at the basin scale. The present study considers a good opportunity to test the 
assessment framework proposed here to assess the conflicts in water management and 
governance in the Lerma-Chapala river basin. The next chapter presents complexities 
around water in this region.  
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Chapter Three 
3 Area of Study 
3.1 Introduction 
Mexico has a long-standing history in water resource planning and management; 
hence, the country is regarded as a leader in the Latin America context (Dourojeanni & 
Jouravlev, 2001; Mestre, 2001a; Dourojeanni et al., 2002). The enactment of the National 
Water Law (NWL) on December 1, 1992 marked an intended shift from a traditional 
centralized top-down sectoral approach (i.e., pre-Rio approach), to an integrated water 
resource management (IWRM) paradigm (i.e., post-Rio approach) (González-Villarreal & 
Garduño, 1994; Dourojeanni, 2001; Mestre, 2001; Wester et al., 2009b; Wilder, 2010). In 
general, this law embraced concepts such as decentralization, stakeholder participation, 
collaboration and coordination, water efficiency, polluter pays principle, subsidiarity 
principle, and full-cost pricing, as well as the integration of surface and groundwater 
management, and the use of the basin as a management unit (Hearne, 2004; Wester et al., 
2009b; Wilder, 2010). 
Within this thesis, Mexico’s Lerma-Chapala basin (LChB) is used as a case study. 
A major factor that makes the LChB an appropriate case study is the fact that it has been 
used by the Mexican government as a ‘testing ground’ for water policy. For example, 
IWRM which was originally an international policy prescription was first implemented in 
the basin (Wester et al., 2009b). The 1993 Lerma Chapala Basin Council (LChBC) was 
also the first multi-stakeholder water governance forum in Mexico and Latin America as a 
whole. Tortajada (2006) describes the LChBC as the most advanced River Basin Council 
(RBC) in Mexico, though she notes that RBCs were not functional in Mexico by 2006. The 
process of transitioning to a multi-stakeholder approach to water governance has been 
challenging, evident in the persistence of issues relating to anthropogenic induced water 
scarcity, water pollution, and environmental degradation in the basin (Tortajada, 2006; 
Wester et al., 2008; Wester et al., 2009b; WMO & CONAGUA, 2011; Preciado-Jimenez 
et al., 2013; Bautista-Avalos et al., 2014; Delgado-Galvan et al., 2014). A major goal of 
this case study is to apply the developed five-tier framework to further our understanding 
of how these persistent challenges have stemmed from issues associated with water 
governance and the implementation of an IWRM reform. 
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3.2 The physiography of the Lerma-Chapala Basin 
The location of Lerma-Chapala basin relative to the rest of Mexico is displayed in 
Figure 3.1. The River Lerma is the longest inland watercourse in the country (WMO & 
COAGUA, 2011). The basin has a total area of 47,116 km2 (CONAGUA, 2014), which is 
equivalent to 2.4%9 of Mexico’s territory. Its headwaters are located in the State of Mexico 
at the Chignahuapan Lagoon (Hidalgo & Peña, 2009) at 2,600 masl, and flows north-
westerly for about 708 kilometers until it reaches Lake Chapala (1,510 masl), which is the 
largest natural lake in Mexico (CONAGUA, 2014). 
 
Figure 3.1: Geography of the Lerma-Chapala basin 
The LChB has a high level of variability with regards to surface water availability. 
The basin has a yearly average rainfall of 711.5 mm, with regional variations throughout 
the basin (Figure 3.2). Temporally, rainfall is also highly variable, with a minimum average 
annual rainfall of 494mm in 1999 and a maximum of 1,022mm in 1958 (CONAGUA, 1999, 
in Wester et al., 2000). This variability, coupled with high population density, urban 
                                                            
9 Percentage of area calculated using the total area for Mexico of 1,959,248 km2 provided in Atlas del agua 
en Mexico 2014 (CONAGUA, 2014).  
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concentration and economic development, has resulted in decreased water quality and 
availability. Water scarcity and pollution has generated environmental, economic and 
social problems, which have further triggered conflicts in the region (Preciado-Jimenez et 
al., 2013). Arguably, the most prominent conflict in the basin pertains to the allocation of 
surface water. Water resource vulnerability is projected to increase in the LChB, as climate 
change is expected to decrease surface runoff, aquifer recharge rates, and the annual 
availability of water (Rivas et al., 2011; Acosta &Martinez, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 A shift in water management paradigms in Mexico: A policy-based perspective 
In addition to the physiography, there are policy components that add to the 
complexity of water governance in the LChB. The legal framework for governing water 
resources in Mexico draws its authority from the Mexican Constitution of 1917, with which 
Article 27 legitimizes the State as the sole owner of all land and water resources. 
Historically, water management in Mexico focused on building water-related infrastructure 
to satisfy sectoral demands, based on a supply-oriented strategy (Garcia, 1999; Wester et 
al., 2000; Castelán, 2001; Dourojeanni et al, 2002; Castro, 2006). Between the 1920s and 
the 1980s, the federal government supported and aggressive agrarian policy and therefore 
developed large-scale irrigation systems through the country, including the LChB (SARH, 
1984; CONAGUA, 1993a; Estrada Reyes, 1994; Whiteford & Melville, 2002; Castro, 
2006; Santos, 2007; Wester et al., 2009b).  
The prevailing paradigm during the 20th century in Mexico was that highly 
centralized and powerful federal government agencies were responsible for all water 
planning, development and management in the country. In 1926, the National Irrigation 
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Figure 3.2: Mean annual precipitation in the Lerma-Chapala basin 
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Commission (NIC) became the first federal institution dedicated to water policy, enabling 
the federal government to plan and develop water infrastructure in the country (i.e., large 
dams and irrigation networks) from a highly centralized institutional structure (Whiteford 
& Melville, 2002; Castro, 2006; Santos, 2007). Then, in 1946, the federal government 
replaced NIC with the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources (MHR), which became the first 
public institution at the level of federal cabinet exclusively dedicated to governing water 
resources. The MHR approached governance based on a centralized and technocratic 
institutional framework (Whiteford & Melville, 2002; Castro, 2006; Wester, 2009; Wester 
et al., 2009c).  
In 1976, water functions were subdivided among different government agencies. 
On the one hand, MHR merged with the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock to create 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (MAHR). On the other hand, all the 
responsibilities associated with drinking water and sanitation services were transferred to 
the newly created Ministry of Human Settlements and Public Works (MHSPW), and then 
moved to the Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology (MUDE) in 1983. Several 
authors mention that this institutional rearrangement emphasised sectoral differences, and 
consequently this separation of water planning, management and development activities 
between two federal ministries made coordination efforts difficult (Mestre, 1997; 
Whiteford & Melville, 2002; Tortajada, 2005; Tortajada & Contreras-Moreno, 2007). 
Several internal and external events led Mexico to change its centralized, sector- 
and supply-oriented water policy during the 1980s. On one hand, there were the financial 
constraints caused by repeated economic crises. On the other hand, a radical transformation 
in the conception of the role of the state by international development and financial agencies 
was taking place (Castro, 2006). This was, in part, driven by requirements for funding that 
were imposed by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
resulting in the Mexican State modifying its centralized hierarchical bureaucratic model 
with a series of structural changes that included a decentralization process (Rodriguez, 
1997; Hamnett, 2006; Buchenau, 2008), and the devolution of power from the centre to 
lower levels of government (Rodriguez et al., 2003; Castro, 2006; Sanchez Mesa, 2006). 
For example, reforms to Article 115 of the Mexican Constitution in 1983 permitted the 
transfer of responsibilities for drinking water, drainage and sanitation services utilities from 
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federal to state and municipal governments (Ingram et al., 1995; Rodriguez, 1997; Pineda 
Pablos, 2004; Castro, 2006; Sanchez Mesa, 2006). Consequently, MUDE and other federal 
institutions began to open state offices in the mid-1980s, to aid in the transfer of power to 
local scale (Rodriguez, 1997 Tortajada, 2005; Tortajada & Contreras-Moreno, 2007; 
Hidalgo & Peña, 2009). 
Following the above-mentioned events, the National Water Commission (NWC) 
was created on January 1989, becoming the sole water authority in the country responsible 
for growing water related problems. The economic crises of the 1980s had left the water 
sector in a critical state, and by the end of the decade water infrastructure was in a state of 
disrepair (Buras, 1996). By the late 1980s, water scarcity, unsuitable water allocation, water 
pollution, environmental degradation and a host of other problems worsened. The NWC 
was created with a mandate to define a new policy for water resource management and a 
new water law to solve water related problems (Johnson, 1997; Mestre, 2001; Pérez Prado, 
2003).  
The enactment of the National Water Law (NWL) in December 1992 arguably 
marked the most significant paradigm shift in Mexico’s water management approach. This 
shift was marked by the attempt to move further away from a the traditional top-down 
centralized sectoral approach, and into an IWRM approach (González-Villarreal & 
Garduño, 1994; Dourojeanni, 2001; Mestre, 2001; Wester et al., 2009b; Wilder, 2010). A 
partial explanation for this shift is offered by Wilder (2010), who states that Mexico’s 
federal government was under pressure to modernize its water policy framework during the 
negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in 1992. This law 
demanded decentralization in the water sector, the adoption of a subsidiarity principle, the 
engagement of multiple stakeholders in decision making, the creation of RBCs, the 
establishment of collaboration and coordination networks, as well as the integration of 
surface and groundwater management, and the use of the basin as a management unit 
(Hearne, 2004; Wester et al., 2009b; Wilder, 2010). For example, Article 13 of the NWL 
states that the NWC “will establish RBCs as coordination and consensus-building forums 
between the NWC, agencies from the federal, state and municipal levels and water users of 
a given river basin”. These forums have the “objective of developing and implementing 
programs and actions to improve water development, management, and service provision, 
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as well as the preservation of related resources [i.e., soils, forests, aquatic and terrestrial 
ecosystems] in the basin” (DOF, 1992: Article 13). Therefore, the RBCs envisioned in the 
1992 NWL are consistent with the definition of IWRM provided by the Global Water 
Partnership (2000:22), as follows: IWRM involves “the coordinated development and 
management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant 
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the 
sustainability of vital ecosystems”.  
Other changes took place in Mexico’s water sector during the 1990s. After the 1994 
financial crisis, Mexico needed to comply with ‘good governance’ and IWRM 
requirements imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in order to 
qualify for funds and work its way out of the crisis (Hamnett, 2006; Wilder & Romero 
Lanko, 2006; Wilder, 2010). One of the changes that took place was the transfer of the 
NWC from MAHR to the newly created Ministry of the Environment, Natural Resources 
and Fisheries (MENRF) in 1994. This change transformed the NWC from an agency with 
sectoral predisposition that was focused on supplying water for agriculture, to an 
intersectoral system that placed emphasis on issues such as water conservation (Wilder, 
2010). In essence, changes that took place in Mexico’s water sector during the 1990s 
marked a shift from a state-oriented top-down approach to a multilevel, multi-stakeholder 
and collaborative approach to water management. 
3.4 Water management in the Lerma-Chapala basin 
As part of the agrarian policy that was implemented by the Mexican government 
between the 1920s and the 1940s, agricultural areas of the LChB increased with the 
construction of dams and irrigation districts (Ruiz Briseño, 2005; Santos, 2007; Wester, 
2009). As result, irrigated area in the basin increased from 155,000 hectares in the 1930s, 
to 214,000 hectares in the 1950s, and 675,000 hectares in the 1980s (Wester et al., 2008). 
With regards to drinking water supply, population increased in the basin from 2.1 million 
in 1930 to 4.5 million in 1970, resulting in an increase in water demand mainly for 
consumption in urban areas (Wester et al., 2005). Water demand in the LChB also increased 
by the completion of two major projects that transferred groundwater to Mexico City and 
surface water to Guadalajara since the 1950s, even though these two cities are located 
outside the basin area (Caire, 2005; Castro, 2006; Wester et al., 2008). Industrial 
49 
 
 
development also increased rapidly in the basin in the 1950s and has continued to increase 
significantly, making the LChB one of the most important industrial corridors in the 
country (Castelan, 2001; Sandoval, 2004). According to Sandoval (2004), water resources 
in the LChB had reached equilibrium limits of withdrawal to availability ratio 
(m3/person/yr) by the end of the 1970s. Wester, Scott and Burton (2005) mention that by 
the mid-1980s, the consumption of surface and groundwater by agriculture, industry and 
municipalities was more than was renewably available, thus creating a condition known as 
river basin closure. These examples illustrate how the federal government implemented 
water demand and use policies in the basin.  
By the end of the 1980s, issues associated with the deteriorating quantity and quality 
of water resources in the LChB needed be addressed. With regards to quantity, several 
authors agree that water resources in the basin were over-committed (Barker et al., 2000; 
Mestre, 2001; Wester et al., 2005; Wester et al., 2008; Hidalgo & Peña, 2009), while 
formerly rich aquifers were being over-exploited (Mestre, 1997; Wester et al., 2000; 
Mestre, 2001; Wester et al., 2005). Pertaining to water quality, Mestre, Leon and Martinez 
(1994) stated that untreated municipal and industrial wastewater discharges were added to 
the existing flow of the River Lerma and its tributaries, and by the end of the 1980s, the 
LChB was considered as the most polluted basin in Mexico (Figure 3.3). Pressing problems 
such as increasing water demand, water scarcity, groundwater over-exploitation, low water 
efficiencies, surface and groundwater pollution, land use change, deforestation, and soil 
erosion, still prevail in the basin (Mestre, 1997; Castelan, 2001; Sandoval, 2004; Wester et 
al., 2008; WMO & CONAGUA, 2011; Estrada Godoy et al., 2013; Preciado-Jimenez et 
al., 2013; Bautista-Avalos et al., 2014; Delgado-Galvan et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 3.3: Surface water pollution levels in the Lerma Chapala Basin 
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3.5 Institutional and resource based conflicts 
Institutional conflicts and direct resource use conflicts are the two central types of 
conflicts that have emerged in the LChB. The main conflict in the LChB exists between the 
states of Guanajuato and Jalisco (Figure 3.1) and pertains to the allocation of surface water 
resources (specifically surface water from the Solis dam). The first Lake Chapala crisis 
revealed that the basin had reached its limits of water availability, as a period of lower than 
average rainfall10 resulted in a prolonged drought (1945-1958) and lake storage levels 
declining from an average of 6,429 million of cubic meters (hm3) between 1935 and 1945, 
to its lowest recorded level at 945 hm3 in 1955 (Wester, 2009; Wester et al., 2008). Santos 
(2007) explains that many people form Jalisco associated low water levels in Lake Chapala 
with the inauguration of the Solis dam (the largest in the basin) in 1949. Tensions increased 
as Jalisco appealed for the health of the lake ecosystem and Guanajuato defended the 
interests of its agricultural users. This ecological/agricultural conflict resurges during times 
of drought.  
The second Lake Chapala crisis began in 1994, and the NWC responded by 
transferring volumes of water from the Solis dam to Lake Chapala. During this crisis, lake 
levels dropped critically to the second lowest recorded levels in history in 2002, (Escobar, 
2006; Wester et al., 2008). The first transfer of surface water took place in 1999 (200 hm3) 
before members from the irrigation districts joined the LChBC. A second transfer was 
authorised in 2001 (270 hm3) but this time it was met with resistance from agricultural 
water users. Finally, a third transfer took place in 2003 (270 hm3) regardless of strong 
opposition from the Board Member for the agricultural use to the LChBC (Wester et al., 
2008). Figure 3.4 shows the volumes of surface water allocated and used in the LChB from 
1991 to 2015. Today, the availability and allocation of surface water remains the most 
disputed issue in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council (LChBC). (See Wester, 2009, Wester 
et al., 2007; Wester et al., 2008, and Wester et al., 2009b for further reading). For example, 
due to the transfer of vast volumes of water from Lake Chapala to the city of Guadalajara, 
conflicts have emerged between individuals living around the lake and those in 
Guadalajara. 
                                                            
10 Average rainfall in the Lerma-Chapala basin for the period 1935-1944 was 683 mm, while for 1945-1958 
it was 626 mm (from Paula Sandoval, 1994, in Wester, 2009). 
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Figure 3.4: Surface water allocated and used (cycles 1991/1992 – 2014/2015) 
Another conflict that exists in the LChB is the transfer of groundwater from the 
headwaters of the River Lerma in the State of Mexico to the adjacent basin, which is the 
Mexico City valley. Since 1950s, approximately 323 hm3 of water was extracted from 
underneath the wetlands of the River Lerma annually (Wester et al., 2000; Wester et al., 
2008). Decades of exploitation reflect a steady decline of piezometric levels of 1 to 3.5 
m/year, which in turn resulted in the desiccation of three lakes, the loss of aquatic 
ecosystems, the drying up of springs, a decrease of river flows, and land subsidence in the 
Valley of Toluca (Esteller & Diaz-Delgado, 2002). This conflict involves the federal 
government on one hand and the State of Mexico on the other hand. Traditionally, this 
ecological/urban conflict has been addressed bilaterally and treated as a localized problem 
(Santos, 2007). The overexploitation of groundwater resources at the headwaters of the 
River Lerma and the desiccation of these wetlands could have an impact down-river. 
However, this problem is seen by Council members as only pertaining the State of Mexico, 
and therefore is not discussed in the LChBC. 
With regards to institutional conflicts, the best example is between the government 
of Guanajuato and the federal government. One of the most urgent water problems in the 
LChB is groundwater overdrafting (Wester et al., 2005); nonetheless, the number of 
overexploited aquifers in the LChB continues to increase. In 2001, Mestre (2001a) reported 
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that almost 70 percent of all 38 aquifers in the LChB had been overexploited, and in 2014, 
the NWC reported that 30 aquifers (80 percent) had been overexploited (Figure 3.5) 
(CONAGUA, 2014). This problem is more acute in Guanajuato, which represents 49 
percent of the basin’s surface area, and has close to 17,000 deep-water wells, with a 
significant deficit in groundwater balance estimated at over 1,000 hm3 per year, that reflects 
an average of yearly drawdown groundwater level of two to three meters per year (CEAG, 
2001a; Sandoval, 2004).  
 
Figure 3.5: Overexploited Aquifers in the Lerma-Chapala Basin 
In January 1993, the NWC and the five state governments in the basin signed a 
coordination agreement to help cope with water problems in the basin. Among other things, 
this document recognised the need to reduce or stop groundwater overexploitation, and 
included the development of regulations for aquifers within the LChB (CONAGUA, 1993; 
Mestre et al., 1994; Mestre, 1997). In 1995, the state of Guanajuato, aware of the relevance 
of water resources for economic development and social well-being, began organizing 
water users and creating Technical Water Councils (COTAS), expecting them to play an 
active role in the preservation of their aquifers (Castelan, 2000; Guerrero Reynoso, 2000; 
Marañon, 2002; Wester et al., 2009a). The NWC created three Technical Groundwater 
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Committees11 in 1998, while Guanajuato created fourteen Technical Water Councils (11 
within the LChB) between 1997 and 1999, encompassing the entire territory of the State of 
Guanajuato (Guerrero Reynoso, 2000; Sandoval, 2004; Wester et al., 2009). Guanajuato 
did this without an active involvement of the NWC, hence, the NWC did not recognize or 
support these COTAS. Though they have won recognition by the NWC through the years, 
there has been no delegation of responsibilities to manage groundwater (Maganda, 2003; 
Wester et al., 2009a). In this sense, Wester, Hoogesteger and Vincent (2009a) indicate that 
COTAS in Guanajuato cannot self-regulate and reduce groundwater extractions before 
solving the institutional disputes over water control between the state and federal 
governments. This institutional conflict limits the level of participation of water users in 
reducing groundwater overexploitation, and consequently restricts progress in the 
implementation of water governance in the basin. 
3.6 Strategies to confront water management problems (1983-1992) 
A number of strategies have been implemented by the federal government to 
address problems like water scarcity and pollution. These strategies include: (a) legal 
reforms that bring together state and municipal (local) governments as stakeholders in 
water management, (b) signing collaborative agreements at the basin level; and (c) 
structural reforms to decentralize water authority.  
One strategy involves a major legal reform, which took place in 1983. Reforms to 
Article 115 of the Mexican Constitution permitted the transfer of responsibilities for 
drinking water, drainage and sanitation services utilities from the federal level to state or 
municipal governments (Ingram et al., 1995; Rodriguez, 1997; Pineda Pablos, 2004; 
Castro, 2006; Sanchez Mesa, 2006). State and municipal governments began to participate 
in water management activities, before 1983 the federal government was responsible for 
these activities. In Jalisco and Querétaro, urban water services were transferred to the state 
governments, while in Guanajuato, the State of Mexico and Michoacán, the transfer was to 
municipal governments (Pineda Pablos, 2004). However, various authors point out that this 
decentralization process was only partial because there was no transfer of federal funds to 
carry out these new municipal responsibilities efficiently, which partly resulted from 
                                                            
11 Regardless of the name difference, authors use the Spanish acronym COTAS indistinctively for both water 
user organizations. 
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Mexico’s severe economic crises of the 1980s (Ingram et al., 1995; Pineda Pablos, 2004; 
Castro, 2006; Sanchez Mesa, 2006). This decentralization efforts were strengthened during 
the 1990s. 
A second strategy was adopted on April 1989, when the NWC introduced a new 
approach to dealing with pressing water management issues in the LChB, mainly the high 
pollution levels of the River Lerma and the drying up of Lake Chapala (Mestre et al., 1994; 
Mestre, 1997; Wester et al., 2000). Before, the federal water authority would act 
independently to achieve its goals and objectives. In this new approach, the federal 
government joined efforts with all five state governments within the basin and signed a 
collaboration agreement to promote a coordinated development of water uses and clean up 
the basin. Four main objectives of the agreement were: (a) to develop and establish a new 
water allocation policy, (b) to improve water quality and reduce pollution, (c) to improve 
water efficiencies, and (d) to preserve the resources and ecosystems of the basin 
(CONAGUA, 1991; Mestre et al., 1994; Mestre, 1997; Wester et al., 2000; Castelán, 2001; 
Sandoval, 2004). On a practical level, they agreed to build and operate 48 treatment plants 
in what is known as the First Wastewater Treatment Stage (Mestre, 1997), which was an 
urgent step towards solving conflicts related to water pollution.  
By September 1989, the NWC and the five state governments created a Consultative 
Council12 to review and assess the completion of goals and actions relative to the objectives 
in the agreement. Some of the main objectives established in the agreement have been 
achieved, like the signing of the Agreement on Availability, Distribution and Water Uses 
of the LChB in August 1991 and the construction of the 48 wastewater treatment facilities, 
while others remain in progress. It is important to highlight that all tasks and activities 
associated with the Consultative Council were carried out by the federal and state agencies 
(Mestre, 1997). There was no participation from water users or other stakeholders in 
decision making, nor in the negotiations that resulted in the 1991 allocation agreement.  
A second collaborative agreement was signed by the members of the Consultative 
Council on January 1993. This agreement confirmed the intentions of the Council to to 
improve water efficiency, and preserve the resources and ecosystems within the basin, 
                                                            
12 With the publication of the 1992 NWL, the Consultative Council was transformed into the Lerma-Chapala 
Basin Council in 1993. 
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which were established in the first agreement. Finally, it aimed to regulate the use, 
exploitation and development of groundwater in the LChB and establish a Second 
Wastewater Treatment Stage, which included the construction of 52 wastewater facilities 
(CNA 1993; Mestre et al, 1994; Mestre, 1997). Besides confirming the need to improve 
sanitary conditions in the basin, this agreement also recognized that more groundwater was 
being pumped from the aquifers than was being recharged (CNA, 1993), and provided the 
basis for the creation of COTAS. 
A third strategy was implemented during the 1990s, in response to the enactment of 
with the 1992 NWL and to the federal government’s decentralization policies (Mestre, 
1997; Castelán, 2001). Decentralization strategies for the water sector included: (a) the 
decentralization of functions and powers from the NWC’s headquarters in Mexico City to 
13 Regional Management Offices (Figure 3.6), to ensure that all coordination and 
organization issues involving water management could be handled at the river basin scale 
(Tortajada; 2006; Scott & Banister, 2008; Wilder, 2010); and (b) the creation of 26 River 
Basin Councils (Figure 3.7) in the form of water governance forums, were stakeholders 
(e.g., NWC, government officials and water user representatives) could build consensus 
and coordinate actions and programs to improve water management practices at the basin 
(González-Villarreal & Garduño, 1994; SEMARNAP, 1996; Dourojeanni et al., 2002; 
Parrado Diez, 2004; CONAGUA, 2014).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Hydro-administrative Regions in Mexico 
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These three strategies significantly changed Mexico’s approach to water 
management. Between 1983 and 1992 the federal government ceased to be the sole player 
in overseeing water related issues in Mexico, as state and municipal authorities, and water 
user representatives started assuming these roles. With these three strategies Mexico began 
its transition from the traditional authoritarian pre-Rio model to a more flexible one in 
which multiple stakeholders were involved in decision making processes. The increase in 
stakeholder participation signals an embracement of the post-Rio concept of water 
governance.  
3.7 Establishing a water governance forum: the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council 
As a result of the 1992 National Water Law drawing attention to institutional 
structures for water management, the LChBC was created on January 28, 1993. Article 13 
of the NWL describes River Basin Councils (displayed in Figure 3.7) as water governance 
forums, where stakeholders (i.e., three levels of government and water user representatives) 
can defend their interests, discuss their differences, and (where possible) reach agreements 
to collaborate and coordinate their activities and projects to improve the development, 
management, and preservation of water and associated resources in the basin (DOF, 1992, 
2004). 
 
Figure 3.7: River Basin Councils in Mexico 
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Though the NWL was enacted in December 1992, there was no official structure 
for RBCs until 1994; hence, only government officials participated in RBCs. The first basic 
structure for RBCs was provided in Article 15 of the mandatory Regulations of the National 
Water Law (RNWL) (DOF, 1994). Article 15 of the RNWL was later amended in 1997, 
reducing the rank and number of government representatives while increasing the number 
of water user representatives (DOF, 1997). It was not until 1997 that Mexican legislation 
allowed water users in the basin to participate in equal numbers as government 
representatives in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.  
An important component of the Council was the establishment of a more detailed 
official structure (Figure 3.8) and roles, after the publication of the Basin Council 
Organization and Operation Rules (BCOOR) in July 2000. These organizational and 
operational rules were aimed at bringing more transparency and clarity to the River Basin 
Councils (RBCs). It is important to clarify that the NWC’s hydro-administrative regions 
(Figure 3.6) normally cover more than one RBC, and are intended to help resolve conflicts 
that arise between RBCs. The main objective of these rules was to regulate the activities 
and procedures that govern the organization and operation of RBCs (Article 1-BCOOR). 
According to these ‘rules,’ the LChBC has five main objectives:  
• to achieve a balance between supply and demand of water resources throughout the 
basin, for all uses;  
• to prevent, stop or rehabilitate pollution on surface and groundwater to achieve 
sanitary conditions;  
• to conserve and enhance land and aquatic ecosystems in the basin;  
• to promote sustainable and efficient use of water resources throughout the water 
cycle; and,  
• to promote a “water culture” which views water as a vital and scarce resource, with 
economic, social and environmental value and encourage public participation to 
achieve sustainable water use (CONAGUA, 2000, 2003a).  
These main objectives, as with Article 13 of the 1992 NWL are also consistent with the 
Global Water Partnership’s (2000) definition of IWRM.  
The structure of the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council established in the ‘Basin Council 
Organization and Operational Rules’ (CONAGUA, 2000) included the participation of 
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various stakeholders, including representatives from the main water uses in the basin, as 
well as federal, state and municipal governments. The structure of the LChBC (Figure 3.8) 
has six main components: 
 
Figure 3.8: Structure of the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council (2000-2008) 
a) The Board of Governors: this is composed of the head of the Director General of the 
NWC, the governors of the five states in the basin, and the elected water user 
representatives for the six water uses recognised in the basin. In total, there are six 
government and six water user representatives with voting rights, thus complying with 
the structure established in the mandatory Regulations of the NWL (DOF, 1997).  
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b) The Evaluation and Monitoring Group: this represents the Council’s operational 
branch, and its role is to track all Council’s agreements and actions, gather data and 
information to be used for further agreements, and assist in decision making (Article 
22–BCOOR). The group consists of representatives of the state governments, a 
representative of the Director General of the NWC, the Technical Secretary of the 
Council and the water users’ Board Members (Article 23–BCOOR).   
c) Specialized Workgroups: these, are created by the Evaluation and Monitoring Group 
with the purpose of carrying out special tasks assigned to them by the group. Council 
members are welcome to join these groups (Article 22- BCOOR). There were seven 
Specialized Workgroups established in the LChBC in 2008.  
d) An Information and Consultation Centre: this centre closed in 2004 (Silva Jimenez, 
2005) and had not reopened in 2008.  
e) The Water User Representatives’ Assembly: this is where the basin’s water users elect 
their representatives to the Board of Governors (Article 48-BCOOR).  
f) Auxiliary Organizations: these are smaller administrative units such as Basin 
Commissions, Basin Committees and Groundwater Technical Committees (COTAS), 
whose work pertains to sub-basins, micro-basins and aquifers, respectively (Figure 3.9). 
They are spatial components of RBCs that attempt to bring decision making to the 
lowest level of social aggregation by promoting water user participation in order to 
preserve water resources and contribute to water planning.  
 
Figure 3.9: Spatial Components of River Basin Councils 
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This general structure seems to provide the different stakeholders of the basin with the 
opportunity to be engaged in discussions and negotiations involving planning, development 
and management of surface and groundwater resources in an integrated manner. As shown 
in this section, there are multiple water user representatives for each state in the basin, as 
well as the federal and state government representatives involved in the LChBC. 
Additionally, stakeholder roles within the basin have evolved over time. 
3.8 Auxiliary Organizations: stakeholder engagement at the local level 
In 1997, the National Water Commission (NWC) began promoting the organization 
of water users in the LChB. By then the State of Guanajuato had already started its own 
organizational process (Castelan, 2001; Marañon, 2002; Scott & Banister, 2008). NWC 
created three COTAS in 1998, while Guanajuato created eleven COTAS in the LChB 
between 1997 and 1999 (Guerrero Reynoso, 2000; Sandoval, 2004; Wester et al., 2009a). 
There was no specific mention of COTAS in the 1992 NWL, nor in the 1994 mandatory 
Regulations of the NWL or its 1997 amendment. Guanajuato acted independently and 
without the involvement of the NWC in the creation of COTAS, which occurred before the 
publication of the BCOOR in 2000. Table 3.1 lists all COTAS in the LChB to December 
2013. These implementation differences resulted in differences between COTAS in 
Guanajuato and those created by the NWC, mainly in their objectives, general structure, 
and funding sources. The most important difference, from a water governance perspective, 
is variations in the level of participation. On one hand, the NWC expected groundwater 
users to participate in water management only for consultation purposes, which implied 
that the consideration of opinions and concerns of its members in developing policies and 
strategies was discretionary (Castelan, 2000; Marañon, 2002; Wester et al., 2009a). On the 
other hand, the State of Guanajuato created opportunities for surface and groundwater users 
to participate in water management activities to regulate water use, preserve their aquifer 
and use water resources efficiently (Castelan, 2000; Marañon, 2002; Sandoval, 2004: 
Wester et al., 2009a). Scott and Banes (2008), and Wester, Mollard, Silva-Ochoa, and 
Vargas-Velazquez (2009b) describe COTAS as playing a nascent role in the basin council 
and having a minimal impact in reducing groundwater extractions.  
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Table 3.1: COTAS in the Lerma Chapala Basin (2013) 
No. Name State Date of establishment 
1 COTAS Celaya 
Guanajuato 
November 28, 1997 
2 COTAS Laguna Seca November 28, 1997 
3 COTAS León October 1st 1999 
4 COTAS Silao-Romita October 1st 1999 
5 COTAS Irapuato-Valle de Santiago November 6, 1998 
6 COTAS Pénjamo-Abasolo November 6, 1998 
7 COTAS Salvatierra-La Cuevita January 7, 1999 
8 COTAS Río Turbio June 1st, 1999 
9 COTAS Acámbaro-Cuitzeo August 24, 1999 
10 COTAS Moroleón-Ciénega Prieta August 31, 1999 
11 COTAS Río Laja October 1st 1999 
12 COTAS Valle de Querétaro 
Queretaro 
February 20, 1998 
13 COTAS Amazcala September 25, 1998 
14 COTAS Huimilpan December 10, 1998 
15 COTAS Valle de Toluca State of Mexico July 30, 2003 
Source: CONAGUA, 2014. 
3.9 The Water User Representative Assembly: the election of water user 
representatives 
Because stakeholder engagement in a water governance process is described in the 
literature as representative participation, it is important to explain the election process in 
the LChBC. According to the Organization and Operation Rules, the election of water user 
representatives occurs in the Water User Representative Assembly, which is part of the 
structure of the LChBC (see Figure 3.10 for the full structure). This forum is where water 
users (at the regional, sub-regional, state and/or aquifer level) come together to elect their 
representatives to the RBC’s Board of Governors (articles 5 and 48 - BCOOR). But, the 
rules lack clarity and do not do not explicitly tease out how individuals are appointed to the 
assembly of representatives or explain their respective responsibilities. They also fail to 
specify how to incorporate the RBC’s Auxiliary Organizations (Figure 3.8) in to the 
election process. The assembly is also supposed to enable water users come together to be 
informed about topics discussed in the basin council, and/or to present their views on topics 
discussed in the RBC (Article 49 - BCOOR). Figure 3.10 outlines the structure of the 
Assembly. 
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Figure 3.10: Water User Representative Assembly 
3.10 Conclusion 
As demonstrated in this section of the thesis, water governance in the LChB is 
highly complex. There are multiple stakeholders involved at multiple scales, attempting to 
address multiple problems while defending their rights and interests in water resources. 
These complexities have together resulted in an abstraction of common problems and 
solutions. There are technical plans and programs in place, as well as laws, policies and 
institutional structures to address water management problems in the basin, however, these 
policies are not always reflected in practice. Technical and legal solutions are important, 
but it is also essential to consider social components in water governance. For example, 
shifts in water management paradigms may encounter formal and informal structures that 
support or constrain the implementation of a viable water governance system. It is 
important to assess how the water governance system reacts to this type of changes. To 
address these complexities, the assessment framework proposed in this thesis is used to 
assess the formal and informal aspects of water governance in the LChB. It is anticipated 
that this water governance assessment framework would provide opportunities for 
monitoring progress and identifying opportunities to improve the state of water governance. 
Consequently, this could help enhance the effectiveness of the IWRM process in the LChB. 
  
63 
 
 
Chapter Four 
4 Methodology 
4.1 Research procedure 
This chapter discusses the data sources and analytical procedures that were used in 
the current study. The research started by creating a refined water governance assessment 
criteria. This was achieved by consolidating disparate water governance principles in the 
literature into five meta-principles (see Chapter 2). These principles were then used to 
conduct a content analysis of relevant water policy documents with the aim of assessing 
the nature and extent to which the Mexican government employed key water governance 
principles between 1972 and 2008. Finally, the LChB was used as case study to determine 
the degree to which water governance principles laid out in various policies and plans have 
been successfully implemented on the ground. Three data sources used in this study 
included water policy documents and interviews with diverse stakeholders in the LChB. 
The next section details the content analysis protocol and the utilization of NVivo software 
for the analysis.  
4.2 Content analysis protocol 
Content analysis was used in the analysis of documents and interviews because it 
allows for effective data reduction through well-structured and consistent coding of 
multiple themes into fewer content categories (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990; Graneheim & 
Lundman, 2004; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Bryman, Bell & Teevan, 2012; Krippendorff, 
2013). This was particularly useful because of the vast amounts of data analysed (i.e., 18 
official water documents and 51 interviews). As well, it made it possible to compare the 
discussion of various water governance themes in the documents and interviews. The 
textual data included three water laws and six water policy documents enacted between 
1972 and 2008. Further detail on textual data is provided in Section 4.4.1. Interviewees 
include individuals from agencies at all levels of government directly and indirectly 
involved in the LChBC as well as water user representatives to the basin council. Finally, 
it was deemed important to include voices from three federal ministry’s headquarters in the 
sample because of Mexico’s centralized approach to water management before 1992.  
The study of water governance is complex and multifaceted, involving the 
perspective of multiple stakeholders with varying interests. Hence, similar to the current 
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study, multiple researchers (Drieschova et al., 2008; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2008; Atuyambe et 
al., 2011; Dewulf et al., 2011; Farrelly & Brown, 2011; Knüppe, 2011; Khalid et al., 2012; 
Lukasiewicz et al., 2013; Tambudzai et al., 2013; Gillet et al., 2014; Gruszczynski & 
Michaels, 2014; Nerkar et al., 2016; Vedachalam et al., 2016) have applied the 
methodology to gain a coherent understanding of water governance in different contexts. 
An additional benefit of the methodology lies in its ability to help researchers gain valid, 
reliable and replicable insights (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 1990; Krippendorff, 2013).  
Content analysis pays attention to two major clusters of text: (1) manifest content, 
which refers to the visible characteristics of texts (e.g., word frequencies, paragraph 
lengths) and (2) latent content, which refers to the contextual meaning embedded in texts 
(Krippendorff, 2013). This study is based on the notion that manifest and latent contents 
are part of a continuum that work together to construct meanings (Holsti, 1969; Weber, 
1990; Gray, & Densten, 1998; Berg, 2001; Sandelowski, 2001; Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009; 
Krippendorff, 2013). Consequently, both characteristics of the texts were analyzed. 
Specifically, the latent content analysis was used to interpret the meanings behind texts, for 
example, the context within which various water governance themes were discussed in the 
documents and interviews. The manifest content analysis on the other hand involved an 
assessment of the physical features of the text to understand variations in the level of 
attention given to various water governance principles within documents and interviews 
(e.g., the prominence of different themes that were discussed in documents). The analysis 
of both manifest and latent content made it possible to assess the existence of various water 
governance principles (i.e., within policy documents), and understand how these principles 
played out on the ground through testimonies of 51 key informants.  
As has been acknowledged by many previous researchers, counting remains a very 
controversial topic in qualitative research (Giacomini et al., 2000; Hannah & Lautsch, 
2011; Kuhn, 2012). Nonetheless, counting qualitative data is generally viewed as useful for 
identifying important patterns in the data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In the words of Seale 
and Kelly (2004:317), “counting in qualitative research can help in reassuring the reader 
that the researcher has not simply trawled through a mass of data and selected anecdotes to 
report that support his or her particular bias”. In the case of this thesis, it was important to 
compare dominant perspectives among diverse water stakeholders to those contained in 
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policies and other official documents. Hence, the number of instances in which various 
issues recurred in documents and interviews were registered to help record and visualize 
these trends, consequently making it possible to tease out disconnects among stakeholders 
and their experiences with prevailing policy conditions. 
All the data were imported into a qualitative data analysis software suit (NVivo 9) 
for analysis. Miles and Huberman (1994) define codes as labels to assign meaning to 
clusters of information of different sizes (i.e., phrases, sentences or paragraphs), which are 
used to organize, retrieve, categorize, and draw conclusions from the data. As such, the 
data was coded under the five principles. The use of NVivo facilitated “solid analytical 
observations and kept a clear trail of the data and the outcomes” (Chow, 2016:3); hence, 
enhanced the overall reliability of the analysis. The consistency of the coding structure 
within the software also made it possible to compare key emergent themes within and 
between documents and interviews (see QSR International, 2010). To enhance reliability, 
the codebook was discussed and refined with a fellow PhD student to ensure clarity. 
Satisfying the content analysis requirement of replicability requires an in-depth 
documentation of the data analysis procedures (Krippendorff, 2013). Hence, details of the 
analytical protocols that were used for policy documents and interviews are presented in 
the next section. 
4.3 Analytical structure 
The water governance framework developed in the study was used as the analytical 
structure for both documents and interviews. The purpose of the analysis was twofold: (1) 
to assess the implementation of various water governance principles in the LChB through 
the application of the developed framework (see Chapter 2 for framework); and (2) to test 
the efficacy of the developed framework. Figure 4.1 provides a conceptual summary of the 
protocol that guided the coding process. It highlights the main data sources, the structure 
of the data analysis (coding) and the outcomes that were derived from the analysis. Content 
analysis requires that an analytical codebook be formulated to guide the analysis. The 
codebook provides rules which govern what and how data is coded (see Appendix III).  
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Figure 4.1: Thematic structure for coding documents and interviews 
A summary of the coding protocol is provided in Figure 4.1. For parcels of 
documents and interviews to be coded, they had to adhere to one of the five water 
governance principles (i.e., Rule of law, Participation, Coherence, Knowledge, and 
Integration) in a pre-Rio or a post-Rio context. Principles were considered as pre-Rio 
context if they adhered to a technocratic state-oriented top-down approach, while they were 
considered as occurring in a post-Rio context if they adhered to a more flexible multi-
stakeholder approach. These aforementioned thematic structures were applied in a 
deductive coding process, since they had strict definitions outlined in Chapter 2. However, 
matches between data and definitions did not have to be literal to be coded. In the context 
of participation for example, post-Rio based occurrences included themes such as 
participation in multilateral decision-making forums, and multiple stakeholder engagement 
among others. The inductive coding process therefore resulted in the emergence of a broad 
range of themes under each water governance principle. Finally, the inductive codes were 
reduced into a few and more comprehensive categories through a code revising process 
which ensured that similar themes were lumped further together (Miles & Huberman, 
1994); hence, making the process of summarizing the results more effectively.  
4.4 Data sources 
The data for the case study of water governance in the LChB came from various 
sources. The Technical Committee of the Global Water Partnership suggests that when 
analysing water governance systems, it is important to understand its three primary 
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functions: constitutional, organizational and operational (Rogers & Hall, 2003). These 
primary functions cover diverse issues that include but are not limited to policy, legislation, 
institutional and organizational structures, and implementation mechanisms and processes 
for water development and management. These functions have also been discussed in the 
institutional arrangements literature (Mitchell, 1975, 1989; Watson et al., 1996; Young, 
2002; Lamoree & Harlin, 2002).  
Constitutional (regulatory) functions create an enabling environment within which 
the other two functions can operate, by developing policies, laws, norms and regulations, 
and disclosing them publicly; thus, establishing clear goals and rules that safeguard against 
arbitrary governance. It includes both statutory (formal) and customary (informal) laws that 
legitimize exercising authority according to established procedures (after Mitchell, 1975, 
1989; Watson et al., 1996; Young, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003). 
Organizational (actor/stakeholder) functions establish clear demarcation of 
responsibilities. These include checks and balances, and the division of power through 
clearly established roles that separate administration, regulation, enforcement and service 
provision functions, filling jurisdictional gaps and eliminating overlaps, and matching 
responsibilities to authority and to capacities for action (after Mitchell, 1975, 1989; Watson 
et al., 1996; Young, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003). 
Operational (implementation) functions pertain to processes used to carry out water 
management activities efficiently. It includes practical water management instruments such 
as information dissemination and awareness campaigns, but also those that fulfill specific 
needs such as service provision, enforcement, monitoring, data collection, and other 
activities established by the constitutional and organizational functions (after Mitchell, 
1975, 1989; Watson et al., 1996; Young, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003). 
Data sources were selected for the current study with these functions in mind. Water 
laws and policies, as well as institutional structure documents for the water sector are used 
in this dissertation for the collection of data concerning the constitutional and 
organizational functions of water governance. Face-to-face semi-structured interviews 
with key informants provided data pertaining to the implementation of the operational 
functions. It is important to note that research was conducted in series, and interview guides 
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were developed based on themes that emerged from document analysis. The next sections 
detail the nature of these data sources, their retrieval, and analysis protocols.  
4.4.1 Document data and analysis  
The specific documents which were analysed were grouped into three sets: (1) water 
laws, (2) Internal Regulations13 (institutional structures), and (3) water policy documents14. 
These document groupings made it possible to compare water governance principles among 
documents and understand major landmark events in the evolution of water governance in 
Mexico. Documents published between 1972 and the year of the study (2008) were 
retrieved and used in the analysis. This represented a total of 18 documents spanning 2,011 
pages. A summary of all the documents which were analysed is provided in Table 4.1. 
Water policy documents are the cornerstone of water resource planning in Mexico; 
consequently, all accessible water policy documents at the time of the research were 
included in the sample in order to analyse the evolution of water management narratives in 
Mexico. The 1972 Federal Water Law (FWL) was the earliest accessible document at the 
time of research, and is the law that preceded the shift from a pre-Rio to a post-Rio approach 
to water management.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
13 Internal Regulations documents (Reglamento Interno) are published in the Official Daily Paper of the 
Federation (Diario Oficial de la Federación) where the official structure of an institution is made public. This 
documents also outline the duties and responsibilities of all major areas within the agency. From here onwards 
will be referred to as “institutional structure documents”. 
14 There is no consistency for naming these documents, because the different presidential administrations 
change the name from “National Hydraulic Plan” to “National Hydraulic Program” or simply “Hydraulic 
Program.” For that reason all these documents are referred to as “water policy documents”. 
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Table 4.1: List of official documents analyzed 
Type of 
document 
Governance 
Function 
Paradigm 
Shift 
(1992) 
Title 
Number of Pages 
Original 
Document 
Text 
Only* 
Legislation 
Constitutional 
Before Federal Water Law (1972) 29 44 
After 
National Water Law (1992) 23 49 
National Water Law (2004 Reforms) 69 122 
Policy 
Before 
National Hydraulic Plan 1975 582 244 
National Hydraulic Plan 1981 139 82 
National Water Program 1984 256 103 
After 
Hydraulic Program 1995-2000 54 69 
National Hydraulic Program 2001-2006 128 165 
National Hydraulic Program 2007-2012 163 103 
Institutional 
structured 
documents 
Organizational 
Before 
Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources 
(MAHR), Internal Regulations (1977) 49 22 
Ministry of Human Settlements and Public Works 
(MHSPW), Internal Regulations (1977) 39 34 
Ministry of Urban Development and Ecology 
(MUDE), Internal Regulations (1983) 38 24 
Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources 
(MAHR), Internal Regulations (1985) 48 38 
Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources 
(MAHR), Internal Regulations (1989) 38 19 
After 
Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources 
(MAHR), Internal Regulations (1993) 43 24 
Ministry of the Environment, Natural Resources 
and Fisheries (MENRF), Internal Regulations 
(1996) 
48 28 
Ministry of the Environment and Natural 
Resources (MENR), Internal Regulations (2001) 82 40 
Ministry of the Environment and Natural 
Resources (MENR), Internal Regulations (2006) 183 83 
Total number of pages 2,011 1,293 
* The original documents have different font, size, line spacing, margins, etc.; consequently, for standardization purposes 
all documents were edited in Word from Microsoft Office 2007 considering only text with Times New Roman 12" font, 
1.5 line spacing, Normal Margin, and no spacing between paragraphs. Policy documents and water laws only include 
text, and for the institutional structure documents, only the administrative and operative areas included in the study were 
considered.  
Both manifest and latent content of the policy documents were analyzed. To enable 
analysis in NVivo, older documents in hard copy format were digitized, after which all 
documents were imported into the software for analysis. The analysis involved capturing 
varying levels of attention given to different aspects of water governance. This helped 
assess the dominance of pre-Rio and post-Rio contexts with which the five water 
governance principles that were developed occurred. The analysis involved reading all 
documents and coding them under their respective orientations (i.e., pre-Rio context or 
70 
 
 
post-Rio context) and principles (i.e., Rule of law, Participation, Coherence, Knowledge, 
and Integration). The analytical structure applied for both text and interview data is 
summarized in Figure 4.2. It depicts the deductive portion for coding data, which includes 
first and second tier nodes (see Figure 4.1). After coding all texts under their respective 
orientations and principles, NVivo automatically generated the percentages of texts in each 
document that were coded under each of the coding categories. Frequencies and 
percentages of text coverage are useful for assessing the relative level of attention given to 
various themes and topics (e.g., see Millar & Budgell, 2008). In the current study, these 
percentages and frequencies of coverage were used to assess the level of attention given to 
the five principles in a pre- or post-Rio contexts.  
 
Figure 4.2: Coding structure for documents and interviews 
4.4.2 Interview data and analysis 
Based on major themes that emerged from document analysis, interview guides 
were developed, after which interviews were conducted with key local and national 
stakeholders whose activities pertained to the LChB. This presented an opportunity to 
assess water governance within the context of the basin and test the water governance 
assessment framework which was developed in this thesis on the ground. The interview 
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process also provided insights on the extent to which existing water governances policies 
were being successfully applied on the ground. Thus, the study was able to identify key 
policy/practice disconnects. 
Out of 58 potential participants who were contacted, a total of 51 key informants 
participated in interviews, representing a response rate of over 80%. Key informants were 
selected among government officials, water user representatives within all states in the 
LChB and federal government representatives from headquarters in Mexico City. Details 
of these participants are contained in Table 4.2. Semi-structured interviews were used to 
enable the comparison of perspectives within and across stakeholder groups and provide 
opportunities for the emergence of individual stories (Schensul et al., 1999). 
Table 4.2: Informants from the Lerma-Chapala basin and  
from federal ministries’ headquarters 
State Federal Government # State Government # Water users # Total 
• State of 
Mexico 
• Queretaro 
• Guanajuato 
• Michoacán 
• Jalisco 
• National Water 
Commission * 
• Ministry of the 
Environment and 
Natural Resources * 
 
10 
• State Water 
Commission 
• Ministry of 
Agriculture 
• Ministry of the 
Environment and 
Sustainable 
Development 
15 
• Agriculture 
• Livestock 
• Industrial 
• Drinking 
water and 
sanitation 
• Other 
Services 
• Aquaculture 
23 48 
Mexico City 
(headquarters) 
• National Water 
Commission 
• Ministry of the 
Environment and 
Natural Resources 
• Ministry of 
Agriculture, 
Livestock, Rural 
Development, 
Fisheries and Food 
3  0  0 3 
Total Interviews 13  15  23 51 
* Local Office of the federal agency in each state in the Lerma-Chapala basin.  
The subset of key informants made it possible to capture a wide range of voices 
which were both directly and indirectly associated to IWRM related activities and the 
LChBC. Purposive sampling was used to identify key informants engaged in the LChB in 
different capacities (Patton, 1990; Guarte & Barrios, 2006), which included: (1) federal or 
state government representative engaged in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council, (2) water 
user representatives from all states, and (3) state level liaisons for various institutions 
indirectly engaged with the Council, for example, ecology and environmental ministries.  
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Semi-structured interviews were conducted using an interview guide on topics 
related to the five water governance principles developed in this thesis. Specific topic 
emerged from the document analysis, and are summarized in ten major thematic areas in 
Table 4.3. In-depth interviews helped diagnose problems, identify alternatives, and capture 
stakeholders’ suggestions for better water governance in the LChB (Paneque Salgado et 
al., 2009).  
Table 4.3: Interview topics and associated water governance principles 
Topics Associated Principles 
(1)  The role played by all three levels of government and water users in 
governance forums and networks. Coherence, Rule of law 
(2)  The type of issues and concerns brought forward and discussed within 
the LChBC. Participation, Knowledge 
(3)  Stakeholders’ role the LChBC, their engagement in decision making, 
and in the execution of agreements. Participation, Coherence 
(4)  The role of the LChBC in the application of an integrated water 
resources management process. 
Integration, Participation, 
Coherence 
(5)  The degree of cooperation and coordination among institutions, 
organizations and water users in the implementation of policies, plans 
and programs. 
Coherence, Integration 
(6)  The capacities of the LChBC and of its members (where applicable) 
with regards to human resources, professional profiles, equipment, 
funding, training, and information flow and availability. 
Coherence, Knowledge 
(7)  Limitations and opportunities to establish an effective water governance 
system in the LChB All five principles 
(8)  Changes they would like to see to improve water governance systems in 
the LChBC. All five principles 
 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted between July and October of 2008. While 
the shortest interview lasted 32 minutes, the longest interview lasted 3 hours and 19 
minutes. The average duration of each interview was 99 minutes. All interviews were 
recorded in digital format. Interviews were imported into NVivo 9 for analysis in audio 
format. NVivo 9 allows the researcher to code audio files be capturing and saving key 
parcels of the files. The software also documents the ‘time span’ for each and all coded 
excerpts and provides a column for transcribing or making notes that pertain to the coded 
parcels of audio. A major advantage of audio coding and analysis is that it keeps the 
researcher close to the original data, as it preserves features that are lost in transcription 
(i.e., tone of voice, silences, utterances, intonation, shifts in emphasis, levels of interests), 
hence helping the researcher contextualize the data more clearly (Gibson et al., 2005; 
Wainwright & Russell, 2010). Since interviews were conducted in Spanish and the research 
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was produced in English, only audio aspects of the interview that were coded and 
transcribed were translated. Language translation aspects are further addressed in Section 
4.5. Similar to the document analysis, the interviews were coded based on the content 
analysis structure provided in Figure 4.1.  
After interviews were coded under the principles (i.e., Rule of law, Participation, 
Coherence, Knowledge and Integration) and contexts (i.e., pre-Rio / post-Rio) they 
reflected that interviewees often focused on certain dominant principles even when 
questions concerned other principles. For example, issues around water pollution or the 
allocation of water resources, water users tend to complain about a feeble participatory 
water governance structure and the failure of their representatives to defend their interests. 
To get a sense of the major issues of concern to interviewees, the number of instances in 
which various principles were repeated (in the pre-Rio and post-Rio contexts) were 
quantified. Bernard (2003:101) contends that “looking for repetitions and similarities” 
within qualitative data constitutes a useful way of discovering dominant themes. In the case 
of this study, repetitions were used to identify commonly recurring themes, under the five 
principles and contexts that were discussed by interviewees as having implications for 
water governance. 
The final analysis that was conducted in the study involved comparing outcomes 
from the interviews to the contents of the official documents that were enforced at the time 
of the study. These documents included the 2004 National Water Law, the 2006 Internal 
Regulations of the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources, and the 2007-2012 
National Hydraulic Program. The purpose of this comparison was to assess the extent to 
which existing policies were being implemented in practice. This analysis also provided 
insights on various constraints and achievements in water governance within the LChB.  
By applying the same codebook to the interviews and documents, it was possible to 
identify similarities and differences between both data sources though content analysis. 
This comparison made it possible to compare theory (i.e., water governance policies) to 
practice (i.e., the state of water governance as experienced by stakeholder on the ground).  
All documents and interviews that were used for this study were obtained in 
Spanish. The researcher conducted the analysis in Spanish for as long as possible because 
original narratives could be altered and even lost in translation. The decision to conduct the 
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analysis in Spanish was also motivated by time constraints. For example, documents 
spanned over 2,000 pages, while total length of interviews was over 80 hours long. It was 
therefore not time efficient to translate these contents to English prior to analysis. Since the 
thesis was written in English, only direct quotes which were drawn from interviews and 
documents were translated. This is in agreement with Van Nes, Abma, Jonsson and Deeg 
(2010) who recommend that researchers remain in the original language for as long and as 
much as possible in order to avoid potential limitations such as loosing meanings in the 
analysis. 
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Chapter Five 
5 Results and Analysis 
This chapter focuses on reporting quantitative trends that emerged from the data 
analysis that was conducted to account for dominant themes within documents and 
interviews. This serves as a first step to understanding the aspects of water governance that 
were most prominent within Mexico’s water policy documents and the interviews that were 
conducted with stakeholders in the Lerma-Chapala basin. Because wide range of themes 
that emerged under the five proposed water governance principles, the quantification of 
emerging themes within interviews and policy documents made it possible to tease out 
dominant commonalities and differences. In addition to discussing these trends, the current 
chapter provides brief highlights of the key contexts within which various themes were 
discussed. Chapter 6 provides more depth by focusing on the nature and characteristics of 
the issues that emerged in the document analysis and interviews, after which documents 
and interviews are compared to understand the extent to which water governance policies 
translate into practice.  
This chapter is divided into three major sections. The first section presents 
descriptive trends of the amount of coverage that was given to various principles within 
policy documents (N=18), after which it briefly discusses the context of these themes. The 
second section provides trends on the frequency with which various themes emerged in the 
interviews (N=51) and briefly highlights key aspects of these themes. The third section 
compares the two aforementioned sets of results to understand the extent to which various 
water related polices are reflected in practice. In terms of the results presented here, the 
pre-Rio and post-Rio contexts are used to denote compliance and non-compliance to the 
five proposed water governance principles (i.e., Participation, Coherence, Rule of law, 
Knowledge, Integration) respectively. 
5.1 Longitudinal study: patterns in the occurrence of water governance principles 
in official documents through time (1972-1992 and 1993-2008) 
The results presented in this section were generated by applying the proposed water 
governance assessment framework in a content analysis of the official documents. Eighteen 
documents which were used for the analysis were grouped into three sets based on their 
orientation (i.e., type, purpose and format) of their content: (a) water laws, (b) institutional 
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structure documents, and (c) water policy documents. These groupings made it possible to 
compare water governance principles among documents and trace the temporal evolution 
of water governance in Mexico. Figure 5.1 presents relative percentages of text coverage 
in a pre-Rio context (below the axis), and the post-Rio context (above the axis) within each 
three types of documents. The vertical dashed line in the middle indicates the shift in water 
management paradigms, which occurred in 1992. Based on Mexico’s traditionally 
authoritarian approach to water management, I hypothesize that topics associated with the 
pre-Rio context will be predominant before 1992 relative to the presence of topics 
pertaining to the post-Rio context. Post-Rio context elements are expected to increase 
through time, especially after 1992, while pre-Rio context themes are expected to decrease 
after 1992.  
Results illustrate the context in which Mexico’s water management governing 
systems have transitioned between 1972 and 2008. Findings in Figure 5.1, show that, to 
various degrees, all five water governance principles are present in almost all official 
documents both in a pre-Rio and post-Rio contexts through the entire period (see Appendix 
V). Participation is the only principle missing in four institutional structure documents. 
Findings also show that before 1996 there were no provisions made within institutional 
structures to ensure that the participation of water users was implemented on the ground. 
In compliance with the definition provided for the Participation principle in this study, the 
1992 National Water Law makes reference to promoting inclusive stakeholder 
participation in water related decision making, as demonstrated by Article 14 as follows:  
The [National Water] Commission will accredit, promote and support the organization of 
[water] users to improve water resource use and the preservation and control of its quality, 
and to encourage the participation of water users at state, regional or basin levels, under 
the terms of this law and its regulations (DOF, 1992)  
Therefore, findings suggests a failure by the federal government to build a foundation for 
inclusive water user participation between October 199315 and July 199616. This finding 
also suggest that changes in the structure of the NWC took place after the financial crisis 
of 1994, when the Mexican State had to comply with the ‘good governance’ and IWRM 
                                                            
15 After the enactment of the 1992 National Water Law, the Internal Regulations of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Hydraulic Resources were first amended on October 29, 1993. 
16 The National Water Commission was transferred from MAHR to the newly created Ministry of the 
Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries on December 1994, but the structure of the MENRF was not 
published until July 8, 1996. 
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requirements imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, to qualify for funds. Thus, the first 
evidence of an institutional structure for facilitating this engagement occurred with the 
creation of the ‘Unit for Rural Programs and Public Participation’ (URPPP) in 1996. This 
area within the NWC was responsible for organizing water users and ensuring their 
participation in water related decision (SEMARNAP, 1996a). The Coordination of River 
Basin Councils (CRBCs) was then established in 1997 as an area subordinate to URPPP. 
The actions of the URPPP within the structure of the NWC comply with the definition of 
Participation, since this area became responsible for promoting inclusive stakeholder 
participation in water related decision making. This convergence between text and the 
definitions for the five principles proposed in this thesis is demonstrated in Figure 5.1.b, 
since the creation of URPPP is registered in the results for the 1996 MENRF institutional 
structure under Participation in a post-Rio context (Appendix V, Table 3).   
Torregosa (2004) confirms this major change in the structure of the NWC with the 
creation of the CRBCs, which was to support the development of RBCs and strengthen 
them. This new structure that supports water user participation, marked a change in pace in 
the consolidation of RBCs in Mexico. Ripples of this new structure that have been 
acknowledged in the literature include the promotion of water user organizations in 1997 
(Castelán, 2001a) and the creation of three COTAS in the LChB in 1998 (Guerrero 
Reynoso, 2000) (see Section 3.8). Furthermore, Article 15 of the mandatory Regulations of 
the National Water Law (RNWL) was amended in 1997, allowing water users to participate 
in equal numbers as government representatives in the LChBC, and in other RBCs (DOF, 
1997). Finally, before the creation of CRBCs in 1997, only two RBCs had been created in 
Mexico (i.e., the LChBC in 1993, and the Valley of Mexico Basin Council in 1995), which 
is a sharp contrast to the twenty three RBCs which were established between December 
1998 and September 2000 (CONAGUA, 2011)17. These changes demonstrate Mexico’s 
commitment to transition from a traditional state-centred top-down model to a more 
inclusive water governance-based approach. 
 
                                                            
17 The last RBC (Central Pacific Coast) was installed on February 25, 2009 (CONAGUA, 2011). 
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Figure 5.1: Timeline of the Transition in Water Governance Principles in Official 
Documents 
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The frequency with which the three types of documents mentioned themes related 
to the different water governance principles show that on average, all five principles were 
discussed predominantly in a post-Rio contexts. These findings were surprising because of 
the traditionally sectoral, centralized and authoritarian (pre-Rio) approach to water 
management in Mexico. Results also reveal that all three types of documents exhibit an 
increasing pattern of occurrences in a post-Rio contexts, which was an expected pattern. 
The lowest levels of these occurrences were registered during the 1970s, while the highest 
levels occurring in the first decade of the 21st century. However, unexpectedly, the 2007-
2012 NHP showed a decrease in the prominence of water governance themes. When 
reviewing this document, an increase in topics associated with climate change (when 
compared with previous policy documents) was noticed. This increase in the discussion on 
climate change could explain the drop in the percentage of text coverage associated with 
water governance themes, since climate change was at the forefront of policy and planning 
during this period. However, the topic of climate change is not a major focus of this thesis.  
The outcomes of the content analysis indeed reveal that in theory, drastic changes 
occurred in various water-related documents between 1972 and 2008, evident in the 
increase adoption of water governance principles that were geared towards creating an 
IWRM process.  
As expected, water laws (Figure 5.1a) and water policy documents (Figure 5.1c) 
display a marked increase in the percentage of text coverage in the context of the five water 
governance principles after 1992. Unique to institutional structure documents (Figure 
5.1b), results showed an unexpected, steady (instead of a noticeable) increase in the amount 
of text devoted to discussing the five water governance principles in a post-Rio context 
from 1977 to 2006. Nonetheless, the general trend suggests a progressive pattern in the 
adoption of water governance rhetoric in official documents. Literature indicates that 
Mexico followed a centralized top-down approach until 1983, when it began transferring 
authority and responsibility to state and municipal governments (Ingram et al., 1995; 
Rodriguez, 1997; Pineda Pablos, 2004; Castro, 2006; Sanchez Mesa, 2006). Hence, the 
‘collaboration’ of the three levels of government and the ‘coordination’ of their effort is a 
theme that became part of the government rhetoric after 1983, as illustrated in the following 
statement: 
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The 1984 National Water Program considers the coordination of the Ministry [of 
Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources - MAHR] with states and municipalities, because 
the [present] diversification of projects require the collaboration and participation of state 
and municipal governments, as well as the intervention of other federal institutions whose 
roles are related to projects associated with improving the use of water resources (SARH, 
1984:189).  
After 1992, results show an increase in the discussion of themes associated with the five 
water governance principles proposed in this thesis, as illustrated by the increase in the 
percentage of text coverage in a post-Rio context (Figure 5.1). For example, the previous 
quote only includes ‘collaboration and coordination’ activities among government agencies 
at all levels, but after 1992 themes like ‘collaboration and coordination’ expanded to 
include the activities of water users and other stakeholders, suggesting compliance to the 
participation principle. This is captured in the following quote:  
Article 5: For the implementation and application of the National Water Law, the Federal 
Government will promote the coordination of activities with state and municipal 
governments, without infringing their authority and within the range of their respective 
responsibilities, and will encourage the participation of water users and private 
individuals in the development and management of hydraulic public works and services” 
(DOF, 1992). 
This quote also provides evidence that demonstrates the utility of the water 
governance principles proposed in this thesis, and their occurrence in official texts. For 
example, Article 5 of the 1992 NWL (quoted above) makes reference to the Federal 
Government promoting the coordination of activities with various stakeholders in the 
development and management of water services. This example aligns with the Coherence 
principle which implies the facilitation of well-coordinated actions and stakeholder 
collaborations at all scales. Furthermore, Article 5 makes reference to the participation of 
multiple stakeholders (i.e., governments at federal, state, and municipal levels, as well as 
water users and private individuals) in the development and management of water 
resources, which complies with the definition of Participation which involves inclusive 
multi-stakeholder engagement in water related decision making. These evidence, in part, 
demonstrates the usefulness of the proposed framework as an assessment tool. 
Emerging trends in the three types of documents together suggest that, by 2008, 
Mexico had likely established an enabling environment that could have allowed for the 
implementation of a viable water governance system. Several authors have noted that 
IWRM was embraced in Mexican water policy in 1992 (González-Villarreal & Garduño, 
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1994; Mestre, 1997, 2001; Castelán, 2001; Dourojeanni, 2001; Pérez Prado, 2003; Wester 
et al., 2003; Castro, 2006), which from the perspective of the present study, explains the 
increase in the usage of water governance terminology in official water documents.  
The percentage of text coverage pertaining to the five water governance principles 
in a pre-Rio context varied across the three sets of documents. This was expected, because 
differences on the orientation (i.e., type, purpose and format) of each document. Water laws 
are the only group of documents that show a decreasing trend of occurrence with the highest 
levels registered in the 1970s, and the lowest values appearing in the first decade of the 21st 
century. However, institutional structure documents and water policies do not follow a clear 
increasing or decreasing patterns in the usage of pre-Rio terminology. This trend was to an 
extent expected, since the literature indicates that Mexico was transitioning from a 
centralized state-centred top-down approach to water management associated with the pre-
1992 period to a more flexible multilevel and multi-stakeholder approach implied in the 
concept of water governance after 1992. Hence, official documents prior to 1992 contain 
control-command characteristics, as well as strategies involving a regional development 
approach, with sectoral and economic tendencies, and supply management inclinations 
(Table 1.1), which are characteristic of the water management strategy applied in Mexico 
before 1992. This strategies are illustrated in the following quote from the 1981 National 
Hydraulic Program: 
Water has been a key factor in Mexico's economic development and will continue to play 
a vital role supporting economic activities and improving the lives of the population, 
which are also objectives established in the [National] Global Development Plan. The 
quantification of water demand at national and regional levels is based, on the one hand, 
on the evolution of water use and on technical projects on coefficients of water use 
volumes, and on the other, on the goals established in the [National] Global Development 
Plan and in sectoral plans and programs, such as the Mexican Food System, the National 
Agricultural and Forestry Program, the National Urban Development Plan, the National 
Industrial Development Plan, the National Energy Plan, and the National Plan for the 
Development of Fisheries (SARH, 1983:44). 
The strategies cited in this passage do not comply with the operational definitions 
provided for several water governance principles proposed in the present study. For 
example, these strategies mentioned suggest a fractured and sectoral approach (captured in 
a pre-Rio context) to water management, that do not comply with the ideals of facilitating 
well-coordinated actions and stakeholder collaboration and all scales captured under the 
definition of Coherence provided in this dissertation. Furthermore, this passage does not 
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comply (in a pre-Rio context) with the definition of Integration, since it does not 
demonstrate the application of an intersectoral approach that uses the basin as the planning 
and management unit. Additionally, it does not appear to be rooted in local context, and 
does not seem to be effective for promoting the long-term sustainability of water resources. 
This disparity between the operational definitions provided for the water governance 
principles provides further evidence of the usefulness of the assessment framework 
proposed in this research. 
As Mestre (2001), has explained Mexico’s approach to water management after 
1992 shifted towards the sustainable management of water resources, thus considering 
equally the economic, social and environmental elements of development, thus replacing 
the traditional focus on economic development. Among other changes, he suggests that 
Mexico adopted a demand management approach to water management, which replaced 
the traditional supply management approach. 
The analysis also reveals that the adoption of different water management 
paradigms were not absolute. For example, there were transitional periods where old and 
the new water management paradigms overlapped within the documents; hence, some 
characteristics of the old traditional ways can be observed after the adoption of new 
policies. This was especially evident in the existence of texts in a pre-Rio context within 
post-1992 documents. It is also worth noting the pre-Rio context was generally lower in 
prominence across all document types prior to 1992, something that was not expected. 
However, in general terms their percentage of text coverage tend to decrease after 1992. 
Thus, these findings are here interpreted as not contradicting the idea that, in theory, 
progress has been achieved in the adoption of water governance principles in Mexico. 
Nonetheless, it suggests that some authoritarian elements from the pre-1992 time period 
likely persist amidst the adoption of a water governance-based approach after 1992. For 
example, the exclusion of water users in decision making was implied in some post-1992 
texts such as the 1995-2000 Hydraulic Program which is quoted as follows:  
In [rural] communities [with less than 2,500 inhabitants], the participation of the 
population in the definition of criteria for the provision of water services has been 
insufficient, which has resulted on poor decisions being made because these do not take 
into account local conditions. In addition, there has been inadequate infrastructural 
maintenance, and there is unfinished works due to lack of funds or because of bad 
programming or poor project design (SEMARNAP, 1996: 22). 
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This quote from 1996 states that little public participation (if any) was taking place 
in rural communities, pertaining planning, development and management of water service 
utilities. It also discloses that government officials were making decisions with information 
that did not consider the local context. The text suggests that mistakes were made resulting 
in bad programming and/or poor project design, and that the mismanagement of financial 
resources and poor planning may have resulted in unfinished water infrastructure projects. 
This consequently impacted some rural communities that continued with inadequate water 
services and infrastructure.  
In summary, this section partly addressed the second objective of the thesis, which 
is to apply the developed water governance assessment framework to official water policy 
documents with the aim of understanding pre- / post-Rio water governance transitions in 
Mexico. Findings show a significant increase in the usage of post-Rio water governance 
terminology after 1992. They also point to a decrease in the percentage of text coverage of 
terminology associated with a pre-Rio context since 1992. Consequently, results reveal 
policy shifts in water management paradigms in Mexico after 1992 from a pre-Rio to a 
post-Rio practice.  
The application of content analysis with the conceptual framework resulted in the 
emergence of a broad range of context-based themes pertaining to water governance. These 
themes were then reduced into more comprehensive and coherent themes (Table 5.1) using 
a code revising process (see Miles & Huberman, 1994). In effect, the framework and 
methodology helped conceptualize over three decades of policy and planning for water 
resources in the Mexican context, since the official documents reviewed span over thirty 
years (1972-2008). For example, collaboration and coordination is a theme that emerged 
from the document data through inductive coding (Table 5.1), and is encapsulated within 
the operational definition of the Coherence principle provided in this thesis, in the sense 
that institutions and organizations should mobilize their efforts in ways that facilitate well-
coordinated actions and stakeholder collaborations at all scales in order to deliver what is 
needs when and where it is needed, while making the best use of available resources. Also, 
from a historical point of view, collaboration and coordination is a theme that appears 
consistently in all documents. The following quotes from the 1972 Federal Water Law 
(FWL) and the 2007-2012 National Hydraulic Program, respectively, illustrate how the 
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themes of collaboration and coordination appeared over time in official texts, and provide 
evidence of the usefulness of the framework proposed in this study: 
ARTICLE 54. The Ministry [of Hydraulic Resources], in coordination with the local 
authorities, shall develop the necessary [new] towns to compensate for urban property 
afflicted by the construction of waterworks. In the case of urban or communal lands, the 
Federal Agrarian Reform Law will be applied in coordination with the Ministry of 
Agrarian Reform (DOF, 1972).  
Finally, it should be emphasized that in order to fulfill each of the goals in the 2007-2012 
National Hydraulic Program, it is essential for the institutions and organizations with 
stake in the management and preservation of water resources in our country, to coordinate 
their activities and to collaborate with each other, and with society as a whole 
(CONAGUA, 2008a:163). 
Results from the analysis of official documents show some strengths of the 
proposed assessment framework. They indicate that there is no clear division in the 
transition between the old and the new water governance paradigms, in the sense that some 
of the characteristics of one may also appear in the other. For example, the quote above 
from the 1972 FWL establishes a coordination that is defined by the authority of each 
agency or level of government, as the local authority represents the town, the Ministry of 
Agrarian Reform is who applies the agrarian (and land) reform legislation, and the Ministry 
of Hydraulic Resources applies the 1972 FWL. However, it is not clear if this type of 
‘collaboration and coordination’ address or not the issue of institutional ‘fragmentation and 
sectorization’. This shows that the proposed framework is able to capture both pre-Rio and 
post-Rio characteristics in a water governance system, and identify various constraints, and 
opportunities for improvement, as it will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
Table 5.1 presents the themes that emerged from a code revising process as they 
pertain to the five water governance principles. These themes emerged from the application 
of an inductive coding process to the official documents discussed above, as well as from 
interviews with key informants, which are discussed in the next section. It is noteworthy 
that the water governance assessment framework proposed in this thesis is not set in stone. 
Hence, researchers could continue to build in any themes that do not conform to the 
definitions of any of the five proposed principles.  
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Table 5.1: Water governance themes by principle 
(from policy documents and interviews) 
Water Governance 
Principle Post-Rio Context Themes Pre-Rio Context Themes 
Participation 
Participation in multilateral 
decision-making forums 
Little participation / governments make 
decisions 
Multiple stakeholder engagement Questionable water user’s representation 
Coherence 
Collaboration and coordination Fragmentation and sectorization 
Decentralization to the lowest 
viable level Centralized decision making 
Sufficient operational capacities Insufficient operational capacities 
Rule of Law 
Comprehensive rules and 
regulations Legislation gaps and overlaps 
Institutional structures for water 
management Inadequate institutional structures 
Law enforcement Little law enforcement 
Knowledge 
Efficient information systems Inefficient information systems 
Adequate education Insufficient education 
Dialogue and negotiation Lack of transparency 
Integration 
Basin planning and management Regional development planning and management 
Sustainability and Conservation Negative environmental impacts 
 
5.2 Response of participants applying assessment framework to interviews 
This section reports results that emerged from interviews conducted with various 
stakeholders in the LChB during the summer and early fall of 2008. The assessment 
framework proposed in this thesis is applied here to understand the condition of water 
governance on the ground. For the analysis, study participants interviewed were grouped 
into two broad clusters to help identify variations in accounts based on location and 
stakeholder type. The first grouping was meant to account for spatial variation in 
stakeholder experiences: hence it was based on the geographical locations of the informant 
relative to the basin (i.e., upriver and downriver states). Thus, these respondents were 
grouped by state (Figure 5.2). The second grouping was meant to reflect variations in 
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perspectives based on the type of stakeholders. It consisted of three categories: (a) water 
users18, (b) state officials, and (c) federal officials.  
 
Figure 5.2: Geographical Location of States in the Lerma-Chapala Basin 
When grouped by federal entity (i.e., states), results showed no striking difference 
in the percentage of occurrence of water governance principles (i.e., rule of law, 
participation, coherence, knowledge, and integration) within the interviews, among all five 
states in the basin (e.g., State of Mexico 83%, Michoacan 80%, Queretaro 84%, Guanajuato 
87%, and Jalisco 85% of repetition of themes in an pre-Rio context). This suggests that 
there are no major differences in the accounts between stakeholders interviewed in upriver 
states from those in downriver states. When grouped by type of stakeholder, results show 
a sharper contrast. These findings together suggest that stakeholder discordance may be 
more prominent among different stakeholder groups rather than being based on the physical 
location (i.e., state) of stakeholders. This comes as a surprise, since a stronger difference 
between up-river and down-river was expected, as suggested by conflicts associated with 
the allocation of surface water, and the issue of water pollution that tends to have greater 
impacts down-river. While the importance of analyzing stakeholder perspectives based on 
                                                            
18 Mexico began to change its top-down approach to water management in 1983, within a context of severe 
economic crisis. In this study, the municipal level is represented by domestic water service utilities. The law 
allows for these services to be privately or publicly managed, and this is probably why the law considers them 
as water users instead of local officials. However, in the present study all respondents for domestic water 
service utilities are local officials.  
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their geographical location is recognized, the above finding resulted in the decision to 
analyze stakeholder perspectives along the lines of stakeholder type.  
To achieve the third study objective (Section 1.8), it was necessary to identify key 
themes and the frequency with which they were discussed during the interviews. The 
accomplishments and constraints in the implementation of water governance in the LChB 
are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Results in Figure 5.3 show relative percentages 
of repetition of topics concerning the five water governance principles, in a pre-Rio 
contexts (below the dashed line) and a post-Rio contexts (above the dashed line). The levels 
of repetition are characterized based on stakeholder type.  
 
Figure 5.3: Dominance of water governance principles discussed by stakeholders 
(summer/fall 2008) 
Overall, results suggest that progress in the transition from an authoritarian-based 
approach (i.e., pre-Rio context) to a water governance-based approach (i.e., post-Rio 
context) in water management in the LChB has been slow. Interview results reveal that all 
five water governance principles were present in all interviews conducted to understand 
water governance in the LChB, whether in a pre-Rio or post-Rio context, or both (see 
Appendix VI). However, results display a predominance in the repetition of themes in a 
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pre-Rio context for all principles (Figure 5.3), in the responses of all three types of 
stakeholder groups, indicating that elements of centralized, hierarchical, state-centred, top-
down approaches to water management still prevail in the LChB fifteen years after the 
creation of the basin council. 
Results generally suggest that some level of progress has been achieved in the 
implementation of a viable water governance system on the ground, which is marked by 
the repetition of themes in a post-Rio context by interviewees (Figure 5.3). For example, 
within the Participation, Coherence, Integration and Knowledge principles in the post-Rio 
context, some government officials and water user representatives from Queretaro, 
Guanajuato and the State of Mexico commented on activities of COTAS19. These included 
conducting a census of existing deep-wells in the aquifer area, collecting piezometric data 
on dynamic and static levels of their aquifers, and identifying depletion cones in the aquifer. 
An example in this context was provided by a NWC official as follows:  
Little by little water users are getting more involved in water management. For example 
COTAS [name omitted for confidentiality purposes] are [now] doing the piezometric 
readings for their aquifer, […] now they know where their problem areas are [depletion 
cones] and they can discuss among themselves what they are going to do to solve their 
problems… It’s not easy [to achieve this], but that is what we are aiming for (R#39). 
This testimonial justifies the relevance of the proposed assessment framework. 
Firstly, it exemplifies the definition of Participation since it suggests inclusive and 
legitimate multi-stakeholder representation in water-related decision making forums. It 
also complies with the definition of Coherence, since the activities of water users in 
COTAS are encouraging coordinated actions and stakeholder collaborations (at the local 
scale) in order to deliver what is needed when and where it is needed. It also complies with 
the definition of Integration because it is rooted in local contexts and considers existing 
and future water demands. Finally, it also captures the definition of Knowledge which 
involves making relevant information accessible to all stakeholders for the purpose of 
decision making. 
Other examples were provided by state officials in Jalisco, Guanajuato, and State 
of Mexico. They reported some forms of progress such as the construction of wastewater 
                                                            
19 Spanish acronym. Authors use the same acronym for both the Technical Groundwater Committees and the 
Technical Water Councils. COTAS are water user organizations, which are supplementary organizations of 
the LChBC (see Chapter 2). 
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treatment facilities and pollution prevention programs aimed at reducing water pollution 
levels in the basin. These activities suggest a move towards embracing Integration, as they 
pertain to stakeholders collectively working towards the conservation and long-term 
sustainability of water resources. They further capture the definition integration, since the 
basin is utilized as the planning and management unit. For instance, a state water official 
provided insights in this regard:  
Pollution is a critical problem in the basin. We [state water commission] are talking with 
municipal governments and pushing forward the construction of wastewater treatment 
facilities. […] Many [municipalities] are reluctant, because of high operation costs 
(R#28).   
Also, federal officials in Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Mexico City informed on progress 
achieved by established programs like the National Micro-basin Program and the Green 
Ejido20 Program, which use a participatory methodology and address environmental, social 
and economic issues, in poor areas located in the higher portions of the watershed. The 
following quote by a federal official from the MENR highlights work that is being done in 
this context: 
The Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources and the University of [Name 
withheld for confidentiality purposes] developed a workshop to certify the technicians 
that work in the Micro-basin program. […] We are going to start with the second 
generation of trainees… the second generation of government employees dedicated to 
participatory planning. But this activity is completely independent from the Basin 
Council (R#49). 
These types of testimonials are associated with a water governance approach in a post-Rio 
context, and suggest that different groups of stakeholders are implementing programs and 
activities pertaining to groundwater, water quality, reforestation, soil conservation, among 
others, which are geared towards improving conditions in the LChB. 
Interviews also revealed that pre-Rio based perspectives remain persistent among 
stakeholders, which suggests that much remains to be done in the implementation of a 
viable water governance system in the LChB. For example, responses from all three 
stakeholder groups contained a significant amount of discussion in a pre-Rio context under 
all five principles. Themes associated with Participation, Knowledge and Coherence were 
                                                            
20 “Ejido” is a type of land tenure in Mexico that in general terms is commonly referred to as rural communal 
lands.  
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the ones most discussed by all three groups of informants (Figure 5.3). The following quote 
from a state water official demonstrates this: 
The National Water Commission still considers the Basin Council as a consultative and 
deliberative body that suggests or proposes actions or policies... But the NWC remains as 
the sole [water] authority. [From my point of view] That is a contradiction, since 
governance implies that the LChBC be managed with the participation of a variety of 
stakeholders. Furthermore, there are still no [mandatory] Regulations to the 2004 National 
Water Law, which complicates things because there are loopholes [...] the problem is that 
there are no clear rules on how civil society is to participate [...]. [Ideally,] Water users 
should negotiate, decide and make proposals on their own. But that requires that water 
users have at least some minimal knowledge. Knowledge that they don’t have, but they 
need in order to provide the Council with founded views and opinions (R#24).  
This testimonial also demonstrates the successful use of the framework proposed in 
this thesis. It demonstrates the lack of compliance (captured in a pre-Rio context) with the 
definition provided for Participation, since the Basin Council is not referred to as a water-
related decision making forum, and is described as a consultative and deliberative body. 
Also, this quote explicitly mentions that water users who participate in the Basin Council 
do not have the necessary information on which to base their opinions, which contrasts the 
definition for Knowledge (pre-Rio context) with regards to making relevant information 
accessible to all stakeholders for purposes of decision making, and to create a level ground 
for negotiations and quality collaboration. 
Themes associated with Rule of law and Integration were also discussed more often 
in a pre-Rio rather than in a post-Rio context. Pertaining to Rule of law in a pre-Rio context, 
respondents from all three groups pointed out the lack of law enforcement in the basin. 
Several respondents mentioned water pollution, while others referred to issues such as 
groundwater overdraft and the drilling of illegal wells which they associated with little or 
poor law enforcement. The following quote by a municipal water service provider best 
captures the diversity of responses in this context:  
There is a strong need for more enforcement in sanitation […]. There are many direct 
discharges into the River Lerma […] many from industry. […] Who treats the chemicals 
in the water? Nobody (R#17)! 
In this regard, a frustrated state water official commented “what is the point of having the 
best law in the world is you are not going to enforce it” (R#29). Not using the basin as the 
unit for planning and management was another issue associated with the definition of 
Integration (and captured in a pre-Rio context) that was mentioned by all three groups of 
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respondents. For example, some respondents made mention of wastewater treatment 
facilities being built without considering their location within the basin (i.e., up-river, 
down-river) and treated water being discharged into the River Lerma close the discharge 
centre for wastewater. The testimonial by an industrial water user illustrates this problem:  
We are required by law to treat our wastewater. We also understand that it is better for 
the environment, and for our children, so we treat our wastewater… You should see… 
[Says with sarcasm and proceeds to specify a particular location on the river] There you 
can see our drainage pipe with clean treated water being discharged to the river, but a few 
meters down river is the discharge from the municipality, and is all raw sewage. It doesn’t 
make sense… We clean our water only to become dirty again in just a few meters (R#11). 
These results suggest that the viability of the water governance in the LChB is questionable 
because of the impact of localized projects and actions, and their outcomes have been 
limited. Testimonials from key informants reveal that solutions to local problems are not 
having a tangible benefit from a basin perspective. These issues will be further discussed 
in the next Chapter. 
It must be noted that while discussions in the pre-Rio context were far more 
prominent than discussions in a post-Rio context (see Figure 5.3), there is some level of 
observable progress towards the implementation of specific water governance processes. 
This is because, in general terms, these testimonials presented in a post-Rio context reveal 
a step forward in the transition from a traditional state-centred top-down model (i.e., pre-
Rio context), which has characterized water management in Mexico for seven decades. For 
example, within the Participation, Coherence, Knowledge and Integration principles in the 
post-Rio context, informants mentioned that state governments are collaborating through 
the LChBC in negotiations with the Commission for Hydraulic Resources of Congress, and 
with the Ministry of the Treasury at the federal level. Some respondents mentioned that 
they are engaged as a group in ‘dialogue and negotiations’ to obtain a special electricity 
tariff “like the one for agriculture” (R#27), to reduce the high operational costs of 
wastewater treatment facilities. The following testimonials of two state officials from two 
major political parties that consistently oppose each other is significant, since both officials 
agreed about the importance of working together “as a Council” because it helps “eliminate 
bureaucratic barriers” and solve common problems. The testimonials are as follows: 
We have seen that many municipalities abandon wastewater treatment facilities that have 
been built by the state government and transferred to them, and one of the main causes 
for this problem has been high operation costs. In the [Lerma-Chapala] Basin Council we 
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decided to go and talk to members of [the national] Congress and ask them for a special 
tariff for the electricity used in wastewater treatment facilities (R#27). 
We have coordinated our efforts, and as a group we have appealed to the Commission for 
Hydraulic Resources of [the national] Congress, to the Federal Commission for 
Electricity, and to the Secretary of the Treasury […] This is a negotiation that still 
continues and we feel it is moving forward (R#36). 
The relevance of these accounts is that state governments are starting to grasp the 
advantages of collaborating with each other and coordinating their efforts, which has not 
always been the case. Additionally, they are beginning to think about solving water 
problems that go beyond their territorial and political boundaries. This suggests that they 
are starting to grasp key problems and potential solutions by trying to conform to the 
definition of the principle of Integration provided in this dissertation, since they are 
beginning to use the basin as the planning and management unit.  
5.2.1 Participant responses in a post-Rio context 
Among specific stakeholder groups, there were notable variations in the prominence 
of discussions in the post-Rio context. While 9% of discussions by water users touched on 
topics related to the water governance principles in a post-Rio context, 19% and 28% of 
state and federal officials’ discussions were supportive of a water governance-based 
approach (see Appendix VI). The main reason for this variation is that comments by 
participants (mainly state and federal officials) included accounts about government 
programs and activities like the National Micro-basin Program and Green Ejido, which are 
associated with IWRM. The themes that emerged in this discussion included the 
participation of multiple stakeholders in decision making (Participation) and the relevance 
of coordinating activities among agencies and organizations (Coherence).  
With regards to stakeholder participation in decision making in the LChBC in 
particular, respondents identified the 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement as a 
landmark achievement that marked a new way for decision-making in water management 
in the LChBC. The 1991 allocation agreement was negotiated and signed by governments, 
without the participation of water users (i.e., ‘little participation / governments make 
decisions’ - Participation). Hence, the 2004 allocation agreement ended the long-standing 
trend of government making decisions without the involvement of non-government 
stakeholders. A NWC official provided insights in this context, while providing an example 
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that captures the definition of the principle Participation as it involves multi-stakeholder 
representation in water-related decision making forums: 
The viability of River Basin Councils was put to the test in 2004 with the [Surface Water] 
Distribution Agreement. Traditionally, what the President [of Mexico] said or wanted 
done… It was a done deal. The 1991 [Surface Water] Allocation Agreement was 
completely done by government [at federal and state levels]. Just government!... [In 
contrast,] Water users were involved from the beginning in the negotiations for the 2004 
[Surface Water Allocation] Agreement. It took two years to achieve this agreement 
among all parties involved… because of the negotiation of the mathematical model… We 
finally got the Agreement, and that in part due to the contributions of the Board Member 
for the agricultural water use (R#44). 
According to Wester, Vargas-Velazquez, Mollard, and Silva-Ochoa (2008), the 
1991 agreement did not outline procedures for water transfers, which suggest a lack of 
transparency for solving conflicts in the LChBC. Regardless, three transfers were done 
from Solis dam to Lake Chapala during the 1994-2003 crisis, and these were an important 
reason for agricultural users from the irrigation districts to get involved in the Basin Council 
(Wester et al., 2008). Agriculture is the largest water consumer in the basin (77%). Before 
1999, there was no involvement of the leaders from the irrigation districts in making 
decisions that pertained to LChBC (Wester et al., 2003; Wester et al., 2009). Respondents 
generally remarked about the active water user representatives’ participation in the 
dialogue, negotiations and decision making which resulted in the signing of the 2004 
allocation agreement, which includes mechanisms for possible water transfers during times 
of prolonged drought. This is also reflective of stakeholders utilizing the Rule of Law (i.e., 
a treaty) to facilitate Integration (i.e., stakeholder decision making at the basin level). This 
is captured in the definition of these two principles as it depicts the existence of strong and 
clear regulatory and administrative frameworks that are rooted in the socio-cultural 
contexts within which they function (Rule of law) and the use of the basin as the planning 
and management unit, while being rooted in local contexts and considering existing and 
future demands of water resources (Integration). 
Regarding improvements in stakeholder engagement (Participation), some water 
users acknowledged their participation in COTAS21, while state and federal officials made 
mention of initiatives to promote participation such as the creation of Sub-basin 
Commissions. Sub-basin Commissions in Guanajuato and Michoacan were at an early 
                                                            
21 Spanish acronym for Technical Groundwater Committees or Technical Water Councils. 
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development phase during this fieldwork, and consequently participants had little to say 
about their outcomes. However, respondents generally acknowledged that COTAS, Sub-
basin Commissions and Micro-basin Committees, were being implemented in coordination 
with different institutions at different levels of government, which is captured in the 
definition of Coherence characterized by the facilitation of coordinated actions and 
stakeholder collaborations at all scales. A good example in this regard is provided by the 
testimonial of an official of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources: 
The creation of the Sub-basin Commission has been [product of] an initiative from the 
municipalities. They have invited us [the MENR] to join them in their meetings, as were 
other state and federal institutions. […] More institutions are slowly joining these 
meetings. […] They [the Sub-basin Commission] are setting their own goals and 
objectives, and compelling us [state and federal institutions] to coordinate our activities 
and programs to solve problems and issues identified by them (R#46). 
Respondents’ accounts of activities and actions such as those associated with the 2004 
Surface Water Allocation Agreement and with the three types of Auxiliary Organizations 
(i.e., Sub-basin Commissions, Micro-basin Committees, and COTAS) shows some 
progress in the principles of Integration, Participation and Coherence within a post-Rio 
context as suggested by Figure 5.3.  
5.2.2 Participant responses in a pre-Rio context 
Concerning the pre-Rio context, variations in the amount of attention given to 
different principles among stakeholder groups were observed. Specifically, while 
participation was the most discussed water governance principle by all participants in a 
pre-Rio context, there were variations in reoccurrence, as themes were more constantly 
mentioned by water users (33%) relative to state (21%) and federal officials (21%) (see 
Appendix VI). Respondent’s testimonials on participation in a pre-Rio context fell under 
two main themes ‘little participation/government making decisions’ and ‘questionable 
water user representation’ (Table 5.1). These two themes were discussed more persistently 
by water users than by the other two groups of participants. For example, most interviewees 
did not think that water user’s interests were being represented and/or defended by water 
user Board Members. They also mentioned that water user representatives are ill informed 
to make valuable contributions and hence do not participate in the discussions. This 
happens in part because water user Board Members do not exchange information with those 
they represent. In general, Board Members lack knowledge about the problems and 
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concerns of the water users they represent, consequently resulting in those being 
represented not having their needs met. This testimonial by a water user representative for 
‘other services’, who is not a Board Member, best captures the diversity of responses in 
this context: 
The day of the elections for Board Members at the Assembly [of Water User 
Representatives], we exchanged phone numbers, e-mails, and addresses among water 
users, and agreed that we were going to be in touch […]. After that, nothing has 
happened... No communication. No meeting. No nothing for over a year (R#19). 
This statement illustrates discordance with Participation and Knowledge principles 
and provides evidence of the usefulness of the proposed assessment framework. With 
regards to Participation, the definition establishes that stakeholder representatives should 
speak and/or act in the best interest of the groups they represent. Concerning Knowledge, 
the definition indicates that stakeholders should communicate in open and direct ways 
using simple and clear terminology, which would improve decision making, enhance 
stakeholder collaboration. However, this quote reflects discrepancy with the definitions of 
these two principles and hence was captured in a pre-Rio context.  
Results also show that participation is an area of concern for all three groups of 
stakeholders, and suggests that it represents an area of opportunities for improvement. 
During the interviews it was observed that most the water users are becoming frustrated 
because they do not see any tangible results or benefit in being part of the LChBC. The 
following quote by an aquaculture water user best reflects these problem:  
I’ve lost interest because they only talk and talk but there are no results […]. There is no 
real benefit. You cannot argue anything, and what is the point of wearing yourself out on 
things that have already been decided at the top by high ranking government officials 
(R#1). 
These findings conform with Wester and colleagues (2008, 2009b), who contend that the 
legitimacy of the Council as a water governance forum for dialogue, negotiation and 
conflict resolution was undermined after the LChBC approved the third water transferred 
from Solis dam to Lake Chapala in 2003, regardless of strong opposition from farmers and 
their representative to the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council’s Board of Governors. They 
mention that among water users, this landmark event created the impression that 
participating in the basin council was useless.  
It is worth noting that during the interviews, some agricultural representatives 
recognized it was valuable to be part of the Council. For example, one agricultural 
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representative stated that, though they don’t have much faith in the Council, they continue 
to engage in the ‘Arrangement and Allocation Workgroup’ and the ‘Evaluation and 
Monitoring Group’ of the LChBC, in order to be informed about what is happening in the 
LChBC, as well as to voice their concerns and defend their interests. In this respect, the 
following statement by another agricultural water user reiterates this view. 
I once told a high ranking official of the National Water Commission, ‘These [Basin 
Council] meetings are a lot of talk, a lot of noise, a lot of ^#*&%@$ [expletive], and a 
lot of politics’. There is no work being done in the LChBC. […] The NWC created the 
River Basin Councils because it is required by LAW… and has to give the appearance 
that it is complying with the [National Water] Law… It is only to keep appearances (R#8). 
Water users are also the single group who expressed more concerns related to the 
five water governance principles in a pre-Rio context, in comparison to other stakeholders. 
Respondents extensively discussed issues associated with the Knowledge principle. 
Specifically, they disclosed topics associated with the themes of ‘lack of transparency’, 
‘insufficient education’, and ‘inefficient information systems’ (Table 5.1). For example, 
several respondents mentioned that there is no training, workshop or similar forums to bring 
new council members up to speed with ongoing developments and activities. Accordingly, 
this was viewed as having a negative impact in the continuity, productivity and quality of 
the work done, because of regular changes to the people involved in the Council. In this 
regard, it is noteworthy that most municipal officials are changed every 3 years, while state 
and federal officials usually change every 6 years. Water user representatives on the other 
hand are changed every 2 years. This problem as discussed by general respondents is 
exemplified by the following statement that was made by an aquaculture water user: 
We are badly informed. […] Because those who are in charge of all this [the LChBC] 
should send us information. Well… they don’t seem to worry, because if they cared, they 
would have told us what can we do and how we can help. [...] If we were given a booklet, 
a magazine or something, then we would have something to guide us [...] but we cannot 
inform the water users we represent. What do we report to our people? The government 
do not give us training, support or advice about anything. [...] The meetings we go to are 
only when their [government] bosses instruct them: ‘we want answers’. It is only then 
that the government invites us to meetings (R#2). 
This statement exemplifies a discrepancy with the definition of Knowledge (captured in a 
pre-Rio context) since relevant information is not being made accessible to all stakeholders 
for the purposes of education, decision making, awareness, public scrutiny and capacity 
building. Several water user representatives stated that no one has provided them with any 
kind of information, and some even pointed out that they do not have an idea of their role 
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within the LChBC. In this respect, a livestock water user representative made an iconic 
comment, stating that: “no one has given me any information about anything. If I want to 
find out something about the Lerma-Chapala basin, I resort to Google” (R#13). This and 
other aspects are further discussed in the next Chapter. 
The relative dominance of themes discussed by various stakeholders provides a 
snapshot of the relative levels of attention they gave to various principles in the discussion 
of pre-Rio and post-Rio approaches to water management in the LChB. These findings 
together reflect real life concerns around the basin among various stakeholders and help 
unearth disconnects between stakeholder perspectives on the condition of water governance 
in the LChB.  
5.3 The implementation gap: a policy-practice disconnect 
An important finding of this dissertation is the existence of an implementation gap 
between Mexico’s water policies and the actual behaviour of the institutions responsible 
for the implementation of these policies in the Lerma-Chapala basin. There are major 
contrasts between the results obtained from the analysis of the three types of official water 
documents, and the results of the interviews with key informants. Applying the proposed 
assessment framework to the experience of LChB made it possible to identify differences 
between what ‘ought to be happening’ according to official water-based documents, and 
what ‘was happening’ on the ground based on stakeholder accounts.  
It is important to clarify here that only three official documents were used to 
compare the statements between official text and participants’ interviews. These three 
documents were the ones being enforced at the time interviews were conducted; that is, the 
2004 National Water Law, the 2006 Internal Regulations of the Ministry of the 
Environment and Natural Resources (which includes the National Water Commission), and 
the 2007-2012 National Hydraulic Program. This comparison was done to determine if the 
water governance systems established in official documents are well reflected in practice 
in the LChB.  
Results show that statements in all three documents are predominantly in a post-Rio 
context (Figure 5.4.), which suggests interest by the political elite in establishing an 
effective water governance process in Mexico, and hence in the Lerma-Chapala basin. 
Findings also suggest that Mexico’s policy makers recognize the importance of a viable 
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water governance system and (according to official texts findings in this thesis) appear to 
be committed to the implementation of such a system to help cope with existing water 
management problems. For example, Article 3, Section 15 of the 2004 National Water Law 
states that: 
Article 3. For the purposes of this Law, it would be understood for: 
[Section] XV. River Basin Council: A governing body that integrates mixed interests. 
They are forums for coordination and negotiation, support, consultation and counsel, 
between the [National Water] Commission, including the corresponding River Basin 
Organisms, and agencies of the federal, state or municipal governments, and 
representatives of water users and civil social organizations, of a given watershed or 
hydrological region (DOF, 2004). 
 
Figure 5.4: Dominance of Water Governance Principles Discusses in  
Official Documents 
However, results from the interviews show a situation that is reversed. Here findings 
indicate that the discussion with key informants were about themes predominantly in a pre-
Rio context (Figure 5.3). Particularly, these perspectives of key informants indicated that, 
to a large extent, a state-centred top-down systems of government is still being enforced in 
the LChB. For example, an official of the NWC stated that: 
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I think that it [the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council] has not been consolidated in such a way 
that it could have life of its own, and I think that the National Water Commission has not 
done enough to achieve this [consolidation]. […] It [the Council] is a forum with little 
operability where the Monitoring and Evaluation Group, which is supposed to be where 
most of the [Council’s] work gets done, doesn’t do anything tangible because no decisions 
are being made there. And even less [decisions are made] in the Basin Council. [… Water] 
Users have no information or knowledge of many things. Then, the decisions that are 
made [in the Monitoring and Evaluation Group or in the Basin Council] are more or less 
what the National Water Commission wants to bring to the table. I see it [the Council] as 
a way to legitimize the National Water Commission’s policies in the basin (R#40). 
As evident in the above quote and other results that emerged in the current study, there is 
an implementation gap in the LChB, as ‘what ought to be happening’ according to the 
official water management rhetoric is not ‘what was happening in practice’ in the basin. 
For example, regarding the Participation principle, water user participation in water 
management in Mexico has been implemented since the enactment of the 1992 NWL, and 
was corroborated and strengthened in the 2004 NWL. Public participation is recognized in 
official documents as an important component in water governance, and River Basin 
Councils are the main forum for this engagement to occur through representatives from 
different civil social organizations (Chapter IV of the 2004 NWL). Article 13 of the NWL 
provides a good example of ‘what ought to be happening’ in this context: 
The [National Water] Commission, with the agreement of its Technical Council, will 
establish River Basin Councils, which are governing bodies that integrate mixed interests, 
as established in Section XV of Article 3 of this Law. Coordination, negotiation, support, 
consultation and counsel referred to by the already mentioned Section are intended to 
develop and implement programs and activities to improve water management, the 
development of water infrastructure and the respective services, and the preservation of 
the resources of the river basin, as well as others [programs and activities] provided in 
this Chapter [IV] and in the respective Regulations. River Basin Councils are not 
subordinate to the [National Water] Commission or to the River Basin Organizations 
(DOF, 2004). 
As demonstrated above, Article 3 Section XV (cited in the previous page) and Article 13 
of the 2004 NWL consider RBCs as governing bodies of mixed interests where negotiations 
among multiple stakeholders take place, in order to develop and implement coordinated 
programs and activities to improve water management, and to preserve the resources of 
the river basin (DOF, 2004). However, present study findings indicate that there is an 
implementation gap, as results from interviews indicate that there are low levels of 
stakeholder engagement in decision making in the LChBC. This is reflected in the voice of 
an irritated industrial water user when he remarked, “I'm telling you, we are ‘Councilors’ 
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in name only” (R#10)! Likewise, many respondents mentioned that all important decisions 
concerning infrastructure planning, development and management are made outside the 
LChBC. The following testimonials by a water user from ‘other services’ demonstrates 
this: 
There may be some kind of vote taken in the Council, but all decisions have been made 
beforehand. The National Water Commission negotiates everything outside the Basin 
Council and the vote is just a requirement (R#21).  
Concerning the Coherence principle, the discrepancy between what ‘ought to be 
happening’ according to official texts and what ‘was happening’ in the basin, is revealed 
by the persistence of a centralized approach to water management and the lack of 
implementation of the subsidiarity principle. According to the literature, Mexico started its 
decentralization process in the 1980s and grew stronger during the 1990s (see sections 3.3 
and 3.6). The 2004 NWL continued with these efforts and decentralized some of the 
National Water Commission’s authority and responsibilities from its headquarters in 
Mexico City to its River Basin Organizations (RBO) and Local Management Offices. This 
decentralizing effort is illustrated in Article 12bis1 of the 2004 NWL, when it states: 
River Basin Organizations, within the hydrological regions, are technically, 
administratively and legally specialized autonomous units, assigned directly to the 
National Water Commission’s Director General’s office, whose powers, nature and 
territorial area of influence is set in this Law and is detailed in its [mandatory] regulations 
(DOF, 2004).  
But, interview findings reveal an implementation gap, disclosed by a policy-practice 
disconnect. As expressed by several interviewees and in this case an industrial water user, 
“all important decisions are still made in Mexico City. There is only a virtual 
decentralization” (R#9). Similarly, many respondents commented on discrepancies around 
the issue of ‘virtual decentralization’. For example, according to the 2004 NWL water 
planning is to take place at the basin level and “Hydraulic Programs shall be elaborated, 
agreed upon and implemented by River Basin Organizations and River Basin Councils [… 
and] these programs will be incorporated into the hydraulic programing process by river 
basin and hydrological regions” (DOF, 2004: Article 15, Section II). But findings from the 
interviews reveal an implementation gap, since the National Hydraulic Program 2007-2012 
was formed without any input from locals, including the Lerma-Santiago-Pacific RBO and 
the LChBC. In this context, a NWC officer commented with some surprise and disbelief: 
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I do not know what criteria [the NWC] headquarters used for putting together the National 
Hydraulic Program 2007-2012. […] That was another squabble... There was a [national] 
videoconference between the NWC’s headquarters and local offices where many states 
asked: ‘Hey, where did you [headquarters] get all these information [for the NHP 2007-
2012]? You [headquarters] never asked me [local office]!’ The staff from the area of 
Programming [at our office] was very upset […]. ‘Why didn’t you send us the document 
[NHP 2007-2012] so we could give you our feedback or enrich it? Who told you 
[headquarters] to put those goals? How do you expect me [at the local office] to meet 
these goals?’ The goals that headquarters established in the NHP 2007-2012 for everyone 
at the local offices are going to be very hard to achieve (R#39). 
Concerning the Rule of law principle, results from official documents indicate that 
Mexico has a comprehensive set of rules and regulations to govern the country’s water 
resources22. However, interviews reveal a gap in key legislation. According to the Third 
Transitory Article of the 2004 NWL, the mandatory Regulations to the NWL were to be 
published in the Official Diary of the Federation “within a period not exceeding twelve 
months from the entry in force of this [National Water] law” (DOF, 2004). In this context, 
findings revealed another implementation gap, as expressed in the voice of a NWC official 
who recognized that “The [mandatory] Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law have 
not been published yet” (R#44). Similarly, several respondents (mainly federal and state 
officials) mentioned that not having the mandatory Regulations to the 2004 NWL has 
created levels of uncertainty left by gaps and loopholes in the federal water legislation. The 
following quote by a state water official illustrates frustration in this respect: 
In practical terms, the previous [mandatory] Regulations of the NWL are still being 
applied […] and the 2004 National Water Law was enacted four years ago […]. Let’s be 
clear, the [mandatory] Regulations of the 1992 NWL are not consistent with the 2004 
NWL. […] The federal government establishes its water policy very well in all its official 
documents, but water policy is not being fully implemented, and that brings forward 
contradictions and uncertainty. […] It has been four years and we still don’t have the 
[mandatory] Regulations to the 2004 NWL (R#25). 
Results also revealed an implementation gap concerning information availability, 
which pertain to the Knowledge principle. Mexico’s official rhetoric recognizes that 
information pertaining water quality and quantity, water uses and water concessions and 
other relevant topics related to water resources have to be widely distributed. In this context 
Article 13bis 3, Section XVI of the 2004 NWL states that: 
                                                            
22 Other supporting water regulations include the Federal Tax Law, which was amended in 1983 to include 
water tariffs, and is updated every year. Also, since 1994, several Official Mexican Rules have been enacted 
to regulate a variety of technical aspects associated with water management.  
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With support from the River Basin Organizations and their integrated monitoring and 
information systems, [members of] River Basin Councils are responsible for knowing, in 
a timely and truthful manner, the information and documentation concerning the quantity 
and quality of water available, as well as the existing water uses and registered water 
rights, and the topics and factors of greater relevance concerning water resources and their 
management [in the basin]. The information and documents referred to shall be widely 
disseminated among RBC’s members and to the inhabitants of the basin [in general], 
enriched with the perspectives and orientations determined by the Basin Council (DOF, 
2004: Article 13bis 3, Section XVI). 
Despite these claims in the NWL, findings from the interviews disclose a policy-practice 
disconnect. Results show that not much information is being shared in practice, as reflected 
in the voice of a state water official who stated that “we [the LChBC] do have a fault in 
that respect. […] We [Board Members] have not agreed on a single information 
compilation and dispersion system. In that sense we do have a significant backlog” (R#27). 
Likewise, the testimonials of many stakeholders reveal that this gap between what ‘ought 
to be happening’ according to official water-based documents and ‘what was actually 
happening’ in practice in the LChB has left many stakeholders uninformed. In response to 
information about issues pertaining to policies and programs in the LChBC, respondents 
often answered with statements such as “I do not know” (R#10), “I have no idea” (R#13), 
and “I am clueless” (R#21). These responses clearly reveal the depth of the implementation 
gap reflected in information dissemination problems that indicate deficiencies in 
knowledge. The following statement by an aquaculture water user representative further 
this implementation gap:  
No one has approached me, no one has told me what is it that I am supposed to do. No 
one has given me any information about anything. I do not even know what my role in 
the LChBC is (R#4). 
This implementation gap concerning the dissemination of relevant information is 
also having a negative impacts on stakeholder participation in the basin council. Results 
show that water users are growing impatient and frustrated, and several even indicated that 
they do not want to be part of the LChBC anymore. This finding illustrates the interaction 
between water governance principles, which in this case involves the lack of Knowledge 
and impacting the desire of Participation. The following quote by a water user 
representative of ‘other uses’ provides an excellent example in this context: 
At first I struggled a lot with the National Water Commission, asking them to give me 
information about the basin, to help me become more aware about water problems in the 
basin, to give me tools so I could do more as a representative for my [water] use. I had 
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high expectations about all this work in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council… Now, I don’t 
care anymore. Now, I am tired of all these. Now, I don’t go to meetings anymore. Now, 
if they want to send me [the] information [I requested], the only thing I’ll do [with it] is 
toss it in the garbage (R#22). 
Finally, concerning the Integration principle, results also reveal a gap between what 
government policies indicate and ‘what was happening’ in practice within LChB, according 
to interviews with key informants. Findings from official documents (Section 5.1) confirm 
that Mexico has followed an IWRM approach to cope with water problems since the 
publication of the 1992 NWL. Then, Mexico corroborated and strengthened its 
commitment to implementing and IWRM process, as illustrated in Article 13bis 3, Section 
I of the 2004 NWL, as follows:  
Article 13bis 3. River Basin Councils shall be responsible for: 
[Section] I. Contributing to [an] integrated water resource management [process] in their 
respective hydrological basin or basins, contributing to re-establish or maintain a balance 
between availability and use of water resources, taking into account the different water 
uses and users, and favouring sustainable development in relation to water and its 
management (DOF, 2004). 
However, findings from the interviews reveal that in practice, no associated resources (e.g., 
forests and soils) are even being discussed in the LChBC, as expressed by an agricultural 
state official who recognised that “in the LChBC we only discuss water… and only surface 
water for that matter” (R#35). Concerning the topic of sustainability, state and federal 
officials mentioned that the LChBC has a Sustainability Workgroup. When questioned 
further about this group, they indicated that it was in its infancy. These findings provide 
more support for the work of several researchers (e.g., WMO & CONAGUA, 2011; Estrada 
Godoy et al., 2013; Preciado-Jimenez et al., 2013; Bautista-Avalos et al., 2014; Delgado-
Galvan et al., 2014) who have reported that problems associated with groundwater over-
exploitation, water pollution, and environmental degradation still prevail in the LChB. 
Lastly, many respondents mentioned the basin is not being used as a planning and 
management unit (Integration), and that no one is promoting the vision (Knowledge) of the 
basin as a unit, as illustrated by the testimonial of an agricultural water user who explained 
that “most people [in the LChB] don’t know what a basin is” (R#8). This was particularly 
shocking because the emphasis on using the basin as a planning unit in various policy and 
planning documents. In this context, Article 13bis 3 (above) states that RBC’s shall 
contribute to IWRM “in their respective hydrological basin or basins”, and Article 13 of 
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the 2004 NWL (cited earlier) states that RBCs “are intended to develop and implement 
programs and activities to improve water management, […] and the preservation of the 
resources of the river basin” (DOF, 2004). Similarly, the 2007-2012 National Hydraulic 
Program establishes as its third objective the promotion of an integrated and sustainable 
management of water resources in river basins and aquifers, and states that: 
It is important to emphasize that to preserve the aquifers and rivers of the country, it is 
necessary to regulate [1] the use and allocation of their waters based on their availability 
and considering as basic premises the [pre-established] order of priority of water uses in 
the basin, [2] the efficient use of extracted [ground]water, [3] the gradual reduction of the 
[groundwater] extractions, [4] the progressive increase of the recharge for the case of the 
aquifers and [5] the need to maintain the minimum [ecological water] flows that must run 
through the rivers to guarantee the survival of the flora and fauna of each river basin. 
(CONAGUA, 2008a:69). 
The use of the basin as a planning and management unit is latent in these three passages. 
This unit of management and planning is needed for “the preservation of the resources of 
the river basin”, to contribute in the implementation of an IWRM process “in their 
respective hydrological basin”, as well as to establish a comprehensive allocation of water 
resources in the basin. Nonetheless, interview findings reveal that in general the basin is 
not being used as a planning and management unit, as revealed in the testimonial of several 
state and federal officers who indicated that they still use political boundaries as the main 
planning and management unit. Hence, the existence of an implementation gap. The 
following quote by a state water official best illustrates this context: 
Our infrastructure programs are developed by us [state government]. […] We also 
participate in federal programs for infrastructure development. […] We select our projects 
and then we negotiate the NWC. […] Several factors are taken into account, like population 
size, budget available, if the municipality is going to contribute with funding, and similar 
factors. […] No, we do not consider [geographical] location in the basin as a factor (R#27). 
Based on these results it is possible to conclude that while some progress has been 
achieved in the LChB, there is still much to be done to establish a viable water governance 
system. In synthesis, findings in this dissertation identified the existence of an 
implementation gap between Mexico’s water policies and the actual behaviour of the 
institutions responsible for the implementation of these policies, which involve all five 
water governance principles that make up the proposed assessment framework. Results 
reveal that there is a policy-practice disconnect concerning: (1) the participation of 
stakeholders in decision making (Participation); (2) the collaboration of institutions and 
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organizations working in the basin (Coherence); (3) the existence of a strong legal and 
administrative framework (Rule of law); (4) the dissemination of relevant information to 
stakeholders (Knowledge); and (5) the use of the basin as a planning and management unit 
(Integration), among others. A summary of various achievements and constraints to the 
implementation of a viable water governance system in the Lerma-Chapala basin is 
provided in Table 5.2. The implications of these results are discussed in more detail in the 
next Chapter. 
 Table 5.2: Achievement and constraints in the implementation of a viable 
water governance system in the Lerma-Chapala basin 
Key Findings 
Achievement Negotiations and signing of the 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement. 
Constraint 
Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder 
group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.  
A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management that limits the 
potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the Lerma-
Chapala basin. 
Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context. 
Not having the mandatory Regulations to the 2004 National Water Law creates a 
significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation. 
Deficiencies in the structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity 
to function efficiently. 
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Chapter Six 
6 Discussion 
6.1 Strengths and opportunities for improvement of the water governance system 
in the Lerma-Chapala basin 
This chapter analyses and discusses the constraints and the accomplishment in the 
implementation of a viable water governance system in the Lerma-Chapala basin. It 
presents the actual issues that were discussed in the interviews and compares them with 
what is reflected in various documents that were enforced at the time of the study. The 
proposed water governance principles represent a range of interrelated conditions that 
should be evident in an ideal water governance system. It is important to clarify that the 
constraints discussed here also represent opportunities for improving the water governance 
system.  
To allow for easy reading, the occurrence of the five principles (i.e., Participation, 
Coherence, Rule of law, Knowledge, Integration) are explicitly identified within this 
discussion. Similarly, the occurrence of the themes that emerged from the data (i.e., 
‘questionable water user’s representation’, ‘fragmentation and sectoralization’, and ‘lack 
of transparency’), which are hierarchically subordinate to the principles (see Table 5.1), are 
also discussed. The discussion is placed in context by integrating the study outcomes with 
relevant clusters of literature. Additionally, attention is paid to understanding how theory 
(i.e., water governance principles evident in policies) translate to practice within the LChB. 
Finally, a reflection on the value of the assessment framework used in the study is 
discussed.  
6.2 Stakeholder engagement in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council 
The findings of the current study reveal that there is a distinct lack of stakeholder 
engagement in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council. Findings show major disconnects 
between what is established in laws, policies and institutional structures, and what was 
happening in the LChB. Specifically, these findings disclose problems with legitimate 
stakeholder representation, communication among stakeholder representatives, and 
stakeholder participation. These gaps in implementation point towards a failure of LChBC 
to fully establish and facilitate a viable water governance system.  
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A multi-stakeholder decision-making process lies at the core of an effective water 
governance system. From a theoretical perspective, the water governance literature 
establishes that an effective water governance system creates an open and inclusive 
multilateral decision-making process that involves the participation of a wide range of 
stakeholders while minimizing stakeholder conflicts (Rogers, 2002; Moench et al., 2003; 
Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Ashton et al., 2005; WGF, 2012).  
Within literature, it is also established that for a water governance process to be 
viable it is necessary to have vertical and horizontal networks for stakeholders and their 
representatives to share information and address matters that emerge at different scales 
across the basin (Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Batcheor, 2007; Tortajada, 2010a; WWAP, 
2015). Informed stakeholder engagement, among other things, allows for decisions to be 
more in tune with the context in which issues present themselves (Peña & Solanes, 2003; 
WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Conca, 2006). Water governance forums for decision making 
are considered essential, as they create a platform for stakeholders share information, 
brainstorm the most appropriate actions, reach common understanding, and coordinate their 
actions, aimed at improving water management at the basin level (Rogers & Hall, 2003; 
Lemos & Farias de Oliveira, 2004; Parrado Diez, 2004; Tortajada, 2010a).  
On paper, Mexico’s water management policies comply with these aforementioned 
issues, acknowledging the importance of participatory approaches to solve water related 
problems. This rhetoric is largely present in legislation and guiding documents such as the 
2004 NWL, the 2007-2012 NHP and the 2006 Internal Regulations of the NWC. For 
example, the 2004 NWL establishes the following parameters around participation: 
[River Basin Councils are responsible for:] Promoting the participation of state and 
municipal governments, and ensure the implementation of mechanisms for the 
participation of the basin's water users and civil social organizations, in formulating, 
approving, monitoring, updating, and evaluating the water plan for the basin or basins in 
question, in terms of law (DOF, 2004: Article13bis 3, Section V). 
In Article 13bis 1 of the 2004 NWL, an explicit structure for River Basin Councils 
is provided. It establishes that RBCs are subdivided into smaller administrative units at 
different scales; thus, establishing spatial components that attempt to bring decision making 
to the most appropriate level of social aggregation. These administrative units are the 
Auxiliary Organizations described the 2000 Basin Council Organization and Operation 
Rules (i.e., Sub-basin Commissions, Miro-basin Committees, and COTAS). 
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In the testimonials of most23 respondents, they indicated that what was happening 
in practice did not follow what was established in these existing policies on multiple 
stakeholder engagement. These respondents often considered the legitimacy of water user 
representation in the LChBC as questionable. Testimonials suggest that some water user 
representatives were not elected by their peers. Rather, they were in some cases personally 
and randomly invited to participate by government officials. Several respondents even 
stated that water user representation in the Council is only as good as a state corporate vote 
for the allocation surface water, and a common statement was that water user 
representatives to the Board of Governors of the LChBC “only defend the interest of their 
state” and not of those they represent (R#4, R#8, R#16, R#30, R#43).  
Article 13bis 3 Section I of the 2004 NWL establishes that water user Board 
Members will be elected in the Water User Representatives Assembly, but does not 
establish a mechanism for the election. During fieldwork in 2008, the LChBC did not have 
the foundation to comply with the structure provided in the 2004 NWL because of gaps in 
legislation (i.e., Rule of law). A state water official made the following remark to this effect: 
“The structures that the river basin councils have today are not the ones mentioned in the 
2004 NWL” (R#26). By 2008, the LChBC still had previous structures in place, and elected 
its water user representatives to the Board of Governors as established in the Basin Council 
Organization and Operation Rules (BCOOR) enacted in the year 2000. Nonetheless, 
Articles 5 and 48 of the BCOOR are unprecise when it comes to the process that should be 
followed in electing these board members. Due to the absence of clear ‘rules’ and 
procedures for electing water user representatives, the Board of Governors tend to 
undermine the legitimacy of water user members. This in turn contravenes what is 
established in Rule of law principle.  
Three main groups of water user representatives were identified based on the 
interviews that were conducted including (1) legitimate representatives, (2) representatives 
invited by government officials and (3) politically motivated individuals. The first group 
appears to have been chosen by their peers and may be considered as legitimate 
representatives. For example, the presidents of the irrigation districts, who are also water 
                                                            
23 In this thesis when it states that most participants commented, it refers that 80% or more made that 
comment, many stands for 50 to 80%, several from 30 to 50% and few less than 30%. 
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user representatives for the agricultural water use in the LChBC. These leaders were elected 
according to their civil social organization guidelines and thus represent thousands of 
farmers. The second group, which includes more than a third of water user representatives 
interviewed, indicated that they were ‘invited’ to participate by state or federal officials. 
For example, an aquaculture water user responded that he became the representative for his 
water use because “the authorities always saw me as a person who knows about the issues 
related to my sector [aquaculture] and that is why they invited me to participate in the 
[Lerma-Chapala Basin] Council as representative for my use” (R#3). The third group could 
be described as being composed of self-promoting and politically motivated individuals. 
These were generally individuals who took advantage of their political affiliations and 
friendships to become representatives for their water use within their state. In general, these 
individuals had specific goals they sought to achieve. They also saw this role as an 
opportunity to advance their careers as politicians. During the fieldwork, it was observed 
that all water user representatives to the Board of Governors of the LChBC seemed to 
belong to the last group; thus, deviating from the principle of participation and various 
policies and regulations around water governance that were in place. 
These findings point to the idea that a number of water user representatives’ 
(including those in the Board of Governors of the LChBC), do not necessarily represent the 
interest of their water use group, indicating a major failure in their role. The theme 
‘questionable water user’s representation’ (Table 5.1) was one of the most prominent 
among water users, who commonly made statements like “I do not feel my interests are 
being represented in the [Lerma-Chapala Basin] Council” (R#8). This issue was also 
recognized by several government officials, as depicted in the following account by a NWC 
official who acknowledged that water user representatives seldom stand for the needs of 
those they represent:  
I believe that in general, water user representatives who are Board Members in the Lerma-
Chapala Basin Council only represent their state’s interests, and sometimes they only 
represent their own interest (R#43). 
This lack of legitimacy of stakeholder representatives has a negative impact on the 
credibility of the LChBC as water governance forum. Further implications of this state of 
affairs include the silencing of voices and the neglect of stakeholder interests and concerns. 
This has a greater impact on women and marginalized groups who are underrepresented in 
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the LChBC. It is important to note that there were no women among the water user 
representatives to the LChBC. Overall, several respondents see the LChBC as a key to 
achieving the goals of the National Water Commission and an opportunity “to justify the 
implementation of its policies in the basin” (R#2, R#25, R#32; R#40).  
Another important issue that was discussed by several respondents was the problem 
of water user representatives not getting enough information from their peers and 
government officials. As a result, representatives were unable to provide sufficient and 
relevant information (Knowledge) to those they represent about the activities of the LChBC. 
The Evaluation and Monitoring Group (see Figure 3.8), which is where most of the work 
done by the Council takes place, usually meets bimonthly. A one page invitation to the 
meeting is the only information sent to stakeholders before each meeting. This meetings 
usually follow the same format which include confirming and officially declaring that there 
is quorum. They then review progress on agreements reached from the previous meeting, 
after which seven specialized workgroups provide information about progress made by 
their group (if any). It is worth noting here that many participants reported that the only 
workgroup that is operating on a regular basis is the Arrangement and Allocation 
Workgroup, which is the one overseeing work related to the 2004 Surface Water Allocation 
Agreement. Next, the meeting involves a follow-up session on issues related to the Surface 
Water Allocation Agreement (which according to most participants is the utmost important 
issue handled by the Council), then there are presentations about government programs like 
the “Clean Basin Program”. A sample meeting invitation is documented in Appendix X. 
Findings from the interviews disclosed that most stakeholders who do not partake 
in the meetings only get meeting minutes, which tend to be vague and contain only basic 
information about the agreements reached. Respondents also indicated that stakeholders 
who assist in the Evaluation and Monitoring Group tend to piece together information to 
make sense of meetings. An example of this claim is evident in the following agricultural 
user statements about requesting electronic copies of presentations and/or documents after 
the meetings:  
… the only reason we are informed is because we go to all the meetings of the Evaluation 
and Monitoring Group and the Arrangement and Allocation Workgroup. Regrettably, 
other water user representatives usually do not go to the meetings and consequently they 
are not well informed. […] To be well informed, we also need to go an extra mile of 
requesting for further information from the meetings, otherwise, we leave with 
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[information overload and] no resources that clearly articulate important aspects of the 
meetings (R#6). 
Participants agreed that most water user representatives are ill-prepared to defend 
the interests of those they represent, and that their contributions to water management in 
the LChBC are limited because they only have partial information available to them. Hence, 
the theme ‘insufficient education’ (Table 5.1) was a major point of emphasis among all 
three groups of participants. Pertaining this theme, water users indicated that “no one tells 
you anything… If you want to know something, you have to find out by yourself… it’s 
hectic, it’s stressful” (R#17). This lack of knowledge is further worsened by the fact that 
several water users do not have a sufficient understanding of their role. For instance, water 
users stated that “I have no idea what my role is” within the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council 
(R#3, R#13, R#16, R#23). With respect to information exchange among water user 
representatives in particular, there were claims that there have been no meetings and no 
communication between Board Members and their representees since elections. A 
representative from the municipal water services use expressed his disappointment when 
he said: 
You [the researcher] are the first person that comes to see me about the Lerma-Chapala 
Basin Council in over a year. […] I have no clue of what goes on in the Basin Council. 
Things are literally dead around here [with regards to the LChBC]… We went to a 
meeting [at the Water User Representative Assembly] and elected a representative [Board 
Member] for our water use. But after that NOTHING, I mean NOTHING has happened! 
It’s crazy, I don’t know anything (R#16)! 
These findings reveal deficiencies in stakeholder networks (Coherence) in the 
LChBC and further highlight the fact that information in general was not reaching those 
involved in negotiations and decision making. In a nutshell, it is sufficient to say that there 
exist deficiencies in Knowledge, which represents one of the principles used in this study 
to capture ‘information systems’ or thereof (refer to Table 5.1). The implications of this 
lack of communication is an uninformed stakeholder participation in the LChBC. Water 
user Board Members are not bringing forward the issues that concern their stakeholder 
group, mainly because they have no communication with their representees. Hence, the 
LChBC is out of tune with the issues that concern stakeholders at lower scales in the basin 
(e.g., Sub-basin Commissions, Micro-basin Committees and COTAS), and water problems 
at those levels are not being addressed by the basin council. Another effect of this lack of 
communication is that stakeholders do not know about the LChBC or its activities, and 
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sometimes respondents expressed their dismay when they recognized that “most people in 
the basin do not know that the LChBC exists” (R#4, R#8, R#12, R#26, R#50). Which raises 
the question of how stakeholders can become part of a participatory scheme if they are not 
even aware that this forum exists?  
The above discussed issue also illustrates the integrated and multifaceted nature of 
water governance. It captures three core principles used in this study, which include 
Participation, Coherence and Knowledge. Pertaining the participation principle, the water 
governance literature indicates that decision making should involve multiple stakeholders 
(Rogers, 2002; Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Ashton et al., 2005), and 
that voicing their concerns and defending their rights and interests through legitimate 
representation (WWAP, 2003, 2006; Falkenmark et al., 2004; Saravanan et al., 2009). 
Concerning the coherence principle, the literature suggests that vertical and horizontal 
information exchange networks can provide a water governance process with legitimacy, 
transparency, credibility, and trust, and consequently could also encourage stakeholder 
participation (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Batcheor, 2007; WWAP, 
2015).  
Finally with regards to knowledge, the literature considers that informed stakeholder 
participation can yield negotiations that are more fruitful in the definition of collaborative 
objectives and solutions to water management concerns (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Solanes & 
Jouravlev, 2006; Dore et al., 2012; WWAP, 2015). In this regard, Article 9 of the 2004 
NWL agrees with these principles when it establishes that the National Water Commission 
has the responsibility: 
To promote, organize, recognize, and support water user participation at the national 
level, and when it is appropriate rely on state governments to do the same at state and 
municipal levels, with the objective of improving water resources management, as well 
as to encourage wide and informed water user participation, with the capacity for making 
decisions and taking on commitments, in terms of Law (DOF, 2004: Article 9 Section 
XIX). 
Findings reveal a discrepancy between what it is established in the law and what 
was happening on the ground. The 2004 NWL establishes that the NWC has to organize 
water users so they can participate in water management, and sees wide and informed water 
user participation as something to be encouraged. But evidence shows that there is 
‘questionable representation’ (Participation), that there is a ‘lack of transparency’ 
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(Knowledge) because water users are ill informed about the activities of the LChBC. 
Consequently, the interaction of multiple principles point to the failure of water user 
representatives in their role in helping to implement a viable water governance system in 
the LChCB. These findings are best reflected in the words of an aquaculture water user:  
Look, they [government] have not explained a lot. We are asked to participate in the 
[Lerma-Chapala Basin] Council only to fulfill a requirement… There has not been any of 
the meetings mentioned there [at the Water User Representative Assembly]. It is as if the 
government just put us there [at the Assembly] to justify their work. […] Sometimes my 
colleagues [representees] ask me questions and the only answer I can provide is that ‘I 
will ask the authorities because I do not know the answer’… [I believe that] In reality, 
the government has only considered us [water users] to fulfill a requirement. I feel 
helpless… Sometimes I think about quitting [as a representative] because I am 
[disempowered and] not helping my people (R#2). 
The above quote further highlights deficiencies in the way theory translates to practice in 
the LChBC. While existing policies acknowledge the importance of multiple stakeholder 
engagement, one group of stakeholders (i.e., water users) are merely invited to passively 
participate with the aim of fulfilling these policy requirements, without the opportunity to 
introduce any change in the decision-making process. Water user representatives are poorly 
engaged and informed about ongoing developments and have little or no say in water 
management decisions. 
Most respondents also indicated that participation in the LChBC takes place only 
as consultation, and that the Council is just a forum to provide information about progress 
in different government programs. These results contrast with what is stated in Article 13bis 
3 of the 2004 NWL, which establishes the responsibilities of RBCs, including: 
[Section] VI. To develop, revise, reach the necessary compromises, and propose to its 
members, a draft of the Hydraulic Program for the basin, along with the intervention of 
the corresponding River Basin Organization in conformity with its authority. This draft 
will contain investment priorities and specific subprograms by sub-basins, micro-basins, 
aquifers, and vital ecosystems, within their territorial delimitation. It shall be presented 
as a proposal to the Council members for approval, and if necessary also for the approval 
of the regulatory authority. The River Basin Council will promote the implementation, 
monitoring, evaluation of results and feedback for the basin’s Hydraulic Program (DOF, 
2004: Article 13bis 3, Section VI). 
This quote suggest that the type and level of participation considered by Mexican 
water policy allows for high levels of power sharing. Based on Arnstein’s latter of citizen 
participation (Arnstein, 1969), the 2004 NWL considers that “trade-offs are negotiated, and 
there are no unilateral changes” which correspond to the third highest rug of participation 
in the ladder (i.e., partnership) (see Table 2.1). It also involves joint analysis of information 
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and shared decision-making power to achieve common objectives, suggesting interactive 
stakeholder involvement (Mitchell, 2002; Gomez & Nakatt, 2002). Nonetheless, interview 
results differ from what is stated in official texts and reveal that many respondents consider 
that negotiations about important issues, like financing and infrastructure development, are 
made beforehand by NWC and state governments, rather than through discussions and 
negotiations in the basin council. This issue is best depicted by the words of a NWC official 
when he acknowledged: 
All important decisions are made outside the [Lerma-Chapala] Basin Council. All 
negotiations and decisions involving programs by the National Water Commission and 
projects take place in a bilateral manner… [that is] between state governments and the 
NWC. […] In this regard it is hard not to question the role and importance of the council 
(R#43).  
However, it is also important to point out that respondents also mentioned that there is only 
one relevant decision that is made in the LChBC, and that is the yearly allocation of surface 
water. Issues pertaining transparency in the allocation of surface water were raised by 
several stakeholders, which is best captured in the voice of a state water official who 
acknowledged “the allocation of [surface water] volumes is done based on the information 
provided by the National Water Commission, and no one else has the means to verify these 
numbers” (R#27). This issue concerning decisions being made outside the basin council is 
associated with the theme ‘little participation/governments make decisions’ captured in 
Table 5.1, and is reflected in the following statement by a baffled industrial water user: 
Why do they take water users to vote in the Basin Council if everything has been decided 
already? So we [water users] can’t say we were not included? I’m telling you, it’s all a 
PRI24 style democracy, an autocratic rule [by the NWC] in the Basin Council (R#9). 
This finding reveals that almost all important decisions were being made 
independent of the LChBC. According to Arstein’s (1969) ladder of citizen participation, 
what takes place in the LChBC is ‘non-participation’, which indicates manipulation and is 
described as a ‘rubberstamp advisory committee” (Table 2.1). This kind of decision making 
follows the traditional state-centred top-down approach to water governance (i.e., the pre-
Rio context). Likewise, more than half of all respondents were under the impression that 
the Council is used to validate the federal government’s water policy, while many water 
                                                            
24 The Institutional Revolutionary Party, or “PRI” for its Spanish anachronism, was in power for over 70 
years in Mexico, and applied a centralized state-centred top-down approach. 
115 
 
 
users expressed their frustration saying that they feel they are being ‘played’ with by the 
NWC. These aforementioned challenges of water governance are captured in the following 
statement by an ‘other services’ water user representative who was frustrated with the poor 
state of stakeholder engagement:  
I see the Basin Council as a kind of regulating body for NWC […] public officials control 
the River Basin Council […]. All decisions are finalized prior to stakeholder engagement, 
and the vote is just a requirement. If the government is going to continue making decision 
in such manner, why invite me to be part of the Council?… I think my presence at such 
meetings is useless. For us [water users] it is a waste of time, a waste of money, OUR 
MONEY. Heck! I even lose money because I do not go to work when I have to attend 
these meetings… It is all a puppet show, a charade… It seems that the only reason we are 
in the LChBC is to fill a requirement… (R#21). 
The concerns echoed in the above quote were also evident in the perspective of multiple 
stakeholders who felt they were merely a number in the decision-making process and had 
no bearing on eventual outcomes. The significance of this issue is that water users feel they 
are being used to justify the government’s policies. Several water users mentioned that they 
feel as if they were “just part of a checklist” (R#2, R#5, R#10, R#12, R#16, R#21), which 
in turn discourages stakeholders to continue or be part of this participatory scheme (i.e., the 
LChBC).  
Applying the proposed framework in the analysis made it possible to conclude that 
most respondents are concerned with the low levels of participation in decision making in 
the LChBC. Another major benefit of the proposed framework is its ability to reveal 
interrelationships between different water governance principles, and their associated 
themes. For instance, key constraints to a viable water governance system in the LChB 
which emerged from the analysis of stakeholder perspectives included: (a) ‘questionable 
water user’s representation’ and ‘little participation/governments make decisions’ 
(Participation), (b) ‘legislation gaps’ (Rule of law), (c) ‘insufficient education’ and ‘lack 
of transparency’ (Knowledge), and (d) ‘fragmentation and sectorization’ (Coherence). That 
is, findings indicate that there is no clear legislation for electing water user representatives, 
which results in a lack of transparency, and thereby compromising the legitimacy of water 
user’s representatives. This study concludes that a key constraint in the implementation of 
a viable water governance system is the failure of water user representatives to advance 
issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council. 
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This constraint has been confirmed by other researchers. For example, Wester, 
Vargas-Velazquez, Mollard, and Silva-Ochoa (2008), found that effective water user 
representation in the LChBC has been challenging, and that the selection of water user 
representatives to the Council’s Board of Governors has been questionable. The findings 
of the present study clarify the questionable nature of these water user representatives, as 
it recognizes that there is no clear mechanism for the election of water user representatives 
to the LChBC, because of the lack of communication among most water user 
representatives and their representees, and because a minority seem to be legitimate 
representatives. Findings also confirm that water user participation in the decision-making 
process is nascent, based on deficiencies in rule of law, participation, knowledge and 
coherence. While the approach adopted by Wester and collaborators (Wester et al., 2008) 
focuses on the negotiations on surface water allocation mechanisms, mainly through the 
lens of the agricultural water use, this thesis takes a more comprehensive approach and 
goes beyond surface allocation conflicts and considers all water uses. Thus, the current 
study contributes to the existing literature of the LChB as it reveals that these problems are 
not limited to agricultural water users alone, or just to one state in the basin. 
6.3 Collaboration and cooperation to solve common water problems in the Lerma-
Chapala basin 
Political, institutional and occupational silos continue to support a sectoral approach 
(i.e., pre-Rio context) to water governance in the LChB. Findings indicate that information 
and collaboration networks are weak in the LChB, and consequently, there is no awareness 
about water issues involving the different water uses or about existing water-related 
problems in other states. As well it is clear that a fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated 
approach to water management persists in the Lerma-Chapala basin, thus constraining the 
implementation of a viable water governance system. Results also disclose that there is no 
institution nor organization promoting the idea of the basin as a planning and management 
unit, resulting in the absence of a management plan for the basin.  
Water resources management cuts across many sectors, and involves numerous and 
often conflicting interests and demands. As discussed in previous chapters, there have been 
calls for water governance systems that eliminate barriers that encourage 
compartmentalization and polarities among interest groups involved in water management 
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(Mitchell, 2013; Giordano & Shah, 2014; Grigg, 2014). Information sharing (Knowledge) 
and collaborative efforts (Coherence) are important pieces that could help eliminate these 
barriers (i.e., hindrances to Integration). The literature also contends that knowledge and 
information should be shared both vertically and horizontally to enable the coordination of 
collaborative activities (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Tortajada, 
2010a). Sharing knowledge and information also helps establish networks, raise awareness, 
and build empathy among stakeholders (Moench et al., 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2012, 2015; 
Biswas & Tortajada, 2010a; FAO, 2013). Also, informed participation at all levels permits 
more fruitful negotiations for the establishment of collaborative efforts (Participation), 
which in turn support the integrated management of water resources and an effective water 
governance process (Rogers & Hall, 2003; Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; WWAP, 2015). 
Results in Section 5.3, confirm that an enabling policy environment has been 
established in Mexico for the implementation of water governance system and the 
application of an IWRM approach. In this sense, a participatory collaborative and 
coordinated approach is considered as the best way forward in the narrative contained in 
the official documents (i.e., 2004 NWL, in the 2007-2012 NHP and in the 2006 Internal 
Regulations of the NWC). Article 5 Section I of the 2004 NWL captures the diversity of 
statements that have been made in this context by establishing the following guiding 
principles: 
Article 5. For compliance and enforcement of this Law, the Federal Executive branch 
[through the National Water Commission]: 
[Section] I. Will promote the coordination of actions with state and municipal 
governments, without infringing their authority and within the range of their respective 
responsibilities. The coordination of actions concerning planning, implementation and 
management of water resources by river basin or hydrological region will be through the 
River Basin Councils, where the three levels of government converge, and water users, 
citizens and civil social organizations participate and assume commitments, under the 
provisions of this Law and its regulations (DOF, 2004). 
In contrast to the narrative in official documents, most respondents commented 
about the existence of fractures that divide stakeholders and limit the impact of 
collaborative efforts in the Lerma-Chapala basin. This refers to the ‘fragmentation and 
sectorization’ theme that pertains to the Coherence principle. Through the interviews, it 
was possible to observe that most respondents look at the basin’s water management 
problems from their own personal perspective, influenced by their political, institutional, 
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occupational, and professional biases and interests. For example, government officials at 
all three levels25 often made comments based on their affiliation to the three main political 
parties (i.e., federal government – National Action Party, state government – Party of the 
Democratic Revolution, and municipal government – Institutional Revolutionary Party), or 
on the government agency they work under (e.g., agriculture, environment, water, or public 
works).  
Also, it was observed that many respondents were familiar only with water 
management issues within their own state and/or line of work. Some participants had a 
vague idea of specific issues in neighbouring states or other water uses, while a few were 
familiar with the main water related issues in the basin. Answers like “maybe some issues” 
(R#11) or “I assume they have the same problems that we do” (R#3), were not uncommon. 
This ‘lack of education’ and information (Knowledge) has resulted in a ‘fragmented and 
sectoral’ approach to water planning and management in the basin. The significance is that 
this fragmented vision of the basin has done little to promote empathy among stakeholders, 
and in turn has limited the opportunities for the establishment of ‘cooperation and 
collaboration’ activities geared towards a common goal (Coherence). In this context, 
several respondents commented that everyone in the LChBC looks after their own interest, 
and defends their turf. In the words of an agricultural state official for instance, “all 
activities are independent of each member of the [Lerma-Chapala Basin] Council. We do 
not work as a group” (R#35). Clearly such disconnects do not create an enabling 
environment for an integrated approach to water governance. 
Likewise, participants indicated that some stakeholders even consider that they 
must compete with other states and secure more surface water for their state (R#6, R#28, 
R#36, R#42). This suggests that stakeholders in the LChBC do not plan or think of the 
basin as a management unit (Integration), because they only protect their state’s interests. 
Evidence of this fragmentation and their implications for knowledge, coherence and 
integration are exemplified in this quote from a state water official who claimed that “when 
we go to the meetings [of the basin council], our main duty is to defend our state’s rights, 
and that of our water users, to [surface] water resources” (R#28).  
                                                            
25 The great majority (if not all) drinking water and sanitation service utilities in the Lerma-Chapala Basin 
are managed by the municipal government; hence, the use of the term municipal water services to label this 
water use in Appendix VIII.  
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Similar claims related to the ‘fragmentation and sectorization’ theme (Coherence) 
were made by other participants such as NWC officials (R#39, R#40, R#42), state 
environmental officials (R#30, R#33), and agricultural, industrial, aquaculture water users 
(R#1, R#3, R#6, R#8, R#9, R#11). These fractures together show another theory-practice 
disconnect in which existing policies aimed at creating effective collaboration networks 
and stakeholder integration, are not reflected in practice because of the self-interested 
behaviour of stakeholders which, in part, stems from the lack of information.  
Maganda (2003) confirmed the presence of fractures or silos when she 
acknowledges institutional rivalries between national, state and local water authorities, 
triggered by institutional reforms that resulted in lack of clarity pertaining institutional roles 
within the LChB. She also argues that this competition among water institutions has 
negatively affect water planning and management in the LChB. However, her study only 
shows a partial picture of the basin because the focus of her research was on water politics 
in Guanajuato, and the institutional conflict with the NWC (see Section 3.5). This thesis 
expands on existing knowledge because it includes all five states in the basin and shows 
that ‘fragmentation and sectorization’ is a problem exists at multiple levels and manifests 
itself within and among different stakeholder groups across the basin. 
Many respondents also talked about existing programs and activities associated with 
water governance forums that are being implemented in the LChB by different institutions 
and organizations with their own budgets and personnel26. However, fragmentation is a 
major limitation in the establishment of collaborative efforts in the basin (Coherence). This 
is in part caused by the lack of a single plan of action for the basin (Integration), which was 
an issue mentioned by several respondents. The following quote by a state water official 
best captures the diversity of responses in this respect: 
There have been some efforts made to put together a plan [for the basin]… I believe that 
the best attempt to put together information about the basin was made by Helena Colter 
with her ‘Atlas’. She provides very valuable information, but it is an atlas… not a plan. 
[…] Someone should sit down and talk to people [stakeholders] and put together a plan 
                                                            
26 The National Micro-basin Program (Programa Nacional de Microcuencas) in MALRDFF, and the Green 
Farm Program (Programa Ejido Verde) in MENR, and the establishment of Sub-basin Committees in 
Michoacan are examples provided by respondents regarding established programs in the LChB that use water 
governance forums to cope with environmental, social and economic issues and rehabilitate the higher 
portions of the watershed. 
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that considers the entire basin. […] It would probably have to be the [LChB] Council… 
Ha, ha, ha [satirical laugh]! And who would that be?... The NWC (R#25)?  
Without a plan for the entire basin, the impact of programs, budgets and activities of 
institutions and organizations is dispersed. Some respondents recognised that these isolated 
efforts of institutions and organizations have little impact on solving present problems. 
Some respondents also talked about collaborative activities that are not linked with the 
LChBC that have been established to improve water conditions in the basin. The common 
denominator in these collaborative networks (Coherence) was that they have been 
established because of good working relationships between individuals in decision-making 
positions. The following quote by an official of the Ministry of the Environment and 
Natural Resources provides an excellent example in this context: 
We have a collaborative program between the municipality, PROFEPA27 and the NWC. 
[…] This are coordinated visits to [different] industries and we avoid problems with lack 
of clarity [gaps and overlaps] concerning institutional roles and authority. Before the 
industrialist would question who had authority and argue that it was someone else’s role. 
Now we go together and we can cover all angles. […] What happened is that my boss is 
very well connected and knows a lot of people, so she talked with some people and now 
we have a collaboration agreement (R#48). 
The present framework made it possible to identify aspects of informal systems creating 
synergies, conjugating actions, and having a greater impact in benefit of the basin. 
Nonetheless, from the formal perspective, these informal networks are not complementing 
the efforts of the Council. This is interpreted here as a lack of coherence due to the 
‘fragmentation and sectorization’ of water related activities in the LChB. 
‘Fragmentation and sectorization’ also restrains vertical and horizontal information 
flows. With regards to the LChBC, almost all respondents acknowledged that information 
that is provided during meetings (to those who request it), does not flow beyond its Board 
Members and the state and federal officials directly involved in the Council. Thus, there 
exist differences in Knowledge dissemination. Officials from the NWC stated that they 
send the Minutes of the meetings via email to the members of the Council. However, most 
water users (who are not Board Members) indicated that they do not get any information 
or that they do not read the Minutes. Consequently, a common answer during the interviews 
was “I do not know” (R#2, R#13, R#19). These findings together show that the top-down 
                                                            
27 Spanish acronym for the Federal Attorney’s Office for Environmental Protection. 
121 
 
 
and bottom-up flow of information (which is considered as central to a successful water 
governance system) are very weak at best. This further discloses deficiencies in 
transparency (i.e., the principle of Knowledge). Stakeholders involved in the Council tend 
to work and act independent of each other, which results in the structure of the LChBC 
being fragmented (Coherence) and no synergies being created. In line with the 
aforementioned problems of ‘fragmentation and sectorization’ and ‘lack of transparency’, 
a frustrated livestock water user remarked: 
It is WRONG! Information is not reaching any water users. It’s getting to NOBODY! For 
instance, none of us [in the livestock association] knew about the existence of COTAS 
nor of the River Basin Council... (R#12). 
Many respondents stated that water users in the LChB do not understand the concept 
of a “basin”. Several respondents also indicated that there are awareness campaigns in the 
basin. However, these awareness activities are carried out by state and municipal 
institutions and are aimed at addressing local problems, activities and programs. But they 
do not promote awareness about water resources issues beyond the institution’s area of 
influence. In this respect, a water user representative for municipal water services 
commented that: 
Here, at the municipal level, we work on raising awareness through our ‘water culture’ 
program, which we finance with our own budget. […] Combining efforts with the state 
government is not possible. There is the issue that we belong to different political parties. 
Also, our awareness campaigns have different messages… even slogans and logos are 
different. […] Collaborative efforts with the state government are considered taboo, by 
both sides. We finance our ‘water culture’ programs and we cover topics that are of our 
interest (R#18). 
Most respondents agreed that there are no awareness activities concerning the basin, or 
platforms promoting the basin as a management unit. There are no activities informing the 
population that there is a River Basin Council, its purpose, associated participants, and 
related activities and achievements. In this respect a NWC official stated that: 
No, there is no one promoting the idea of the basin as a unit. That is something we are 
still missing in the basin. There hasn’t been anyone that says ‘let’s look at things from an 
integrated water resource management perspective.’ […] We still do not see a situation 
[in the LChBC] in which state representatives see the problem and the solution through 
the standpoint of a basin. Each one of the representatives still go to the meetings with a 
local perspective [or point of view] (R#42). 
Findings from implementing the framework presented in this thesis led to the conclusion 
that ‘fragmentation and sectorization’ does not allow stakeholders to visualize the basin as 
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unit, resulting in one dimensional activities which only serve their respective interests. For 
example, a NWC official reflected on this problem as follows: 
You have to make people aware that they are part of the basin. They do not even know 
what a basin is. [...] The basin concept does not exist for them. So then, how are we [the 
National Water Commission] going to take action at the basin level if those living within 
the basin do not know they have common problems and that they are part of common 
solutions? So much work needs to be done… starting at the grassroots level. Work that 
hasn’t been done since the beginning [when the LChBC was created]… We [the NWC] 
have lagged behind and we are still not raising awareness about the basin. We are still 
not increasing awareness and it is still not considered to be important by those making 
decisions (R#40). 
By applying the proposed water governance framework in a content analysis of 
interviews, it became evident that most respondents expressed disappointment about the 
lack of coordination and collaboration among stakeholders (Coherence), and the slow rate 
of progress in solving water management problems in the basin. This is illustrated by the 
testimonial of a state water official who indicated that:  
Progress is too slow and we grew anxious very quickly, so we asked ourselves: ‘What do 
we need the Basin Council for?’ We are doing everything with our own programs and 
resources anyway (R#26).  
Other key constraint that emerged from the analysis of interrelationships between several 
water governance principles in the interviews included: (a) ‘fragmentation and 
sectorization’ (Coherence), (b) ‘insufficient education’ and ‘lack of transparency’ 
(Knowledge), and (c) ‘regional development’ as opposed to ‘basin planning and 
management’ (Integration), which expose key constraints to the implementation of a viable 
water governance system. This helps build on the pioneering work of Ashton, Patrick, 
MacKay, and Weaver (2005:452), who were the first to emphasise that “it is the integration 
and inclusion of all these principles that underpins the definition of good governance”.  
Findings reveal that stakeholders are not aware of the problems that afflict other 
water uses in their state or other states, and this does not allow them to appreciate the need 
for collaborative actions to solve common problems. The implication is that their partial 
knowledge of the water problems of the basin limits their options because they are not 
aware that the solution to some problems present in one part of the basin could be found in 
other parts of the basin; hence the lack of a holistic approach to problem solving. Findings 
show that the LChBC does not properly inform its stakeholders (or the general population 
of the basin) about existing management problems, about its initiatives aimed at solving 
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these problems, or promote the idea of the basin, and therefore does not promote the 
potential of the water governance forum as a tool to implement an IWRM process. This 
study concludes that another key constraint to the implementation of a viable water 
governance system is the presence of a fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach 
to water management that limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are 
being implemented in the Lerma-Chapala basin. Although the value of well-coordinated 
approaches to water governance are acknowledged within existing policies and plans, they 
manifest poorly in practice. 
6.4 Decentralization policies for the water sector 
Power and authority remains concentrated in Mexico City. Findings reveal an 
implementation gap between what is stated in official documents and what was happening 
in practice in the LChB. Results from the interviews indicate that decentralization has been 
achieved only partially, and that decision making in the water sector remains for the most 
part centralized. This implies that local context is not considered in decision making, 
planning, and management of water resources in the LChB.  
The transfer of power and authority to lower levels of authority (basin level) 
involves the principle of subsidiarity. For a water governance system to be viable it is 
necessary to plan and transfer management authority to several administrative and 
geographical scales (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006, 2015; Tortajada, 2010a). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, water governance calls for the elimination of high-handed 
decisions, with the aim of ensuring that decisions and actions are more in tune with the 
context and scale in which issues present themselves (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 
2006, 2015; Conca, 2006). An effective and efficient water governance process should 
adequately respond to local issues, and consequently, be able to deliver what is needed, 
where it is needed, and when it is needed (Peña & Solanes, 2003; Rogers & Hall, 2003; 
WWAP, 2003, 2006). Therefore, the theme decentralization to the lowest relevant scale, 
associated with the subsidiarity principle, is considered an important element for 
establishing an effective water governance process. 
In that sense, Mexico has followed decentralization policies since the 1980s 
(Rodriguez, 1997), and the narrative in the 2004 NWL, the 2006 Internal Regulations of 
the NWL and the 2007-2012 NHP follow the same pattern for the water sector. The official 
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narrative mainly revolves around improving water efficiency and water services through 
the transfer of responsibilities to local levels of government and civil social organizations. 
It also encompasses the consolidation of institutions and organizations involved in 
planning, developing, managing and conservation of water resources, which is a process 
that (in theory) began two decades earlier (see sections 3.3 and 3.6). For example, the 2007-
2012 National Hydraulic Program (NHP) states that: 
Regarding the decentralization of power, we [the federal government] will continue with 
the transfer of authority, roles, programs, responsibilities and resources from the 
federation to state governments, municipalities and water users, to bring government and 
citizens closer together, to improve outcomes in the sustainable management of water 
resources, to expand joint responsibility of all three levels of government, to strengthen 
management capacities and to increase administrative efficiency of the government as a 
whole (CONAGUA, 2008a:76). 
In contrast, most respondents interviewed contended that decentralization has not 
been complete, stressing that it has been partially achieved, or that it only exists on paper. 
They mentioned that decisions regarding water policy, planning, development and 
management are still being made at the NWC’s headquarters. For example, a state water 
official emphasized that “things are still done in the same way. […] They are decentralizing 
the National Water Commission, but decisions are still made in Mexico City” (R#24). 
Similar claims were echoed by all three groups of participants. Some interviewees indicated 
that the headquarters still provides the final approval for most federal programs like those 
for the construction or maintenance of water related infrastructure; even when the programs 
have been transferred to state governments. A few respondents stressed that this happens 
mainly because headquarters still authorizes and releases the federal funds assigned to those 
programs. Further insight into this process is detailed by a state water official in the 
following quote: 
It depends on the way the project is funded. If the money comes from the state treasury, 
then the negotiation is between the municipality and the state government. […] Now, 
when projects are [partly or fully] funded by federal programs […] then negotiations 
involve municipal, state and federal governments. […] Once we have everything 
approved by the NWC’s Local Office, then the entire package [for each program] is sent 
to Mexico City [NWC headquarters] for [final] approval (R#26).  
Consequently, in 2008, there were areas within NWC that were still carrying out activities 
that should have been already transferred to state governments, municipalities or water user 
organizations. This problem is captured in the following statement by an official of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (MALRDFF). 
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All irrigation districts where supposed to be transferred completely to Water User 
Organizations by now… that was the idea. But [areas working on] irrigation districts 
continue to exist within the structure of the National Water Commission. Today there is 
in the NWC the office of the Chief of Operations, and the office of the Chief of Irrigation 
and Drainage Engineering. What was transferred [to Water User Organizations] was the 
operational part, but the government still keeps control of irrigation systems. [...] Planning 
for the irrigation systems is still carried out by NWC. There is no real transfer still (R#51). 
Another form of decentralization contained in Mexico’s policies pertain to River 
Basin Organizations (RBOs). The 13 Regional Management Offices (see Section 3.6) 
created with the publication of the Internal Regulations of the National Water Commission 
in 1993 (SARH, 1993), were transformed into RBOs by the 2004 National Water Law. 
RBOs are defined in Chapter III Bis of the 2004 NWL as technically, administratively and 
legally specialized autonomous units assigned directly to the Director General’s Office of 
the National Water Commission, and are not subordinated to any other areas at NWC’s 
headquarters (DOF, 2004). This means that RBOs are mandated to follow the subsidiarity 
principle by bringing decision making closer to the basin level. However, many 
respondents acknowledge that centralized-bureaucratic top-down systems remain 
persistent. As an industrial water user representative remarked “… decentralization has 
occurred in structure but not in decision making…” (R#9). Many respondents also agreed 
that water policy and programs are not developed at the basin level. These statements are 
in opposition with what is established in the 2004 NWL and the 2006 Internal Regulations 
of the NWC. For example, several respondents indicated that even simple decisions like 
granting or renewing water concession certificates, which according to the 2004 NWL 
should be done by the RBOs (Article 12bis 6, Section XIII), are still being executed at the 
NWC’s headquarters in Mexico City. The following testimonial by a NWC official 
provides further insight to this regard:  
Water concession certificates are made here and then they are validated Mexico City. [...] 
The main argument is the workload, and headquarters has more staff. But in an IWRM 
approach, we would have to manage water concession certificates at the basin level, and 
that is the spirit of the [2004 National Water] Law [...] I suppose it is part of a process, 
and we would need a change in mentality (R#43). 
The concentration of simple activities at the NWC headquarters has been creating 
administrative and management problems in the water sector. The irony is that by 
complying with the law by decentralizing responsibilities to lower levels of authority (i.e., 
RBO), the NWC could mitigate a number of problems, while making the institution more 
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responsive to local needs. For example, the inefficiency of a centralized water concession 
renewal process was creating problems at the NWC’s Local Management Offices, mainly 
because of delays in issuing certificates which typically take many years. A water user 
representative for ‘other services’ provides further insight in this regard when he comments 
in disbelief: 
I went to a big political event with the Mayor, NWC officials, and other prominent 
personalities, to deliver groundwater concession certificates […] what made me laugh 
was that we got our certificates eight years late […]. The big deal was that at the event 
we were told [by the NWC] to start the renewal process because the concessions are for 
ten years. […] There was an important number of wells that got their certificates delivered 
that day, and there were people [water users] that got their concessions and these had 
already expired […]. It is then when you tell yourself: ‘Eight, ten years late? Things move 
very slowly in the NWC!’ (R#20). 
Based on these findings, this thesis concludes that the centralization of decision making at 
the NWC’s headquarters opposes the subsidiarity principle, thus presenting a challenge for 
the establishment of a viable water governance process. The following quote by a NWC 
official captures the diversity of responses in this context.  
Supposedly, with the decentralization [of NWC], River Basin Organization would gain 
strength managing their own budgets and work their programs at a basin level, and in 
theory Local Offices would be dependent from the River Basin Organization and not from 
Headquarters […] But in reality IT DOESN’T HAPPEN THAT WAY! Because decision 
making and water policy are still marked by [NWC’s] headquarters (R#40). 
The creation of River Basin Councils (RBCs), such as the LChBC, is also part of Mexico’s 
decentralisation policy in the water sector. RBCs are to exercise their functions through 
Auxiliary Organizations that work at different scales (Figure 3.9), which in essence 
complies with the subsidiarity principle. This study found a major inconsistency between 
the official documents and what was happening on the ground. This policy-practice 
disconnect tends to constrain progress in the consolidation of the LChBC. In this respect, 
most respondents agree that there has been no decentralization of responsibilities from the 
NWC to the LChBC or its’ Auxiliary Organizations. Participants also consider that 
decentralization has not diffused from Mexico City to the Basin Council.  
Some progress has been made with regards to public participation in water 
management and the creation of several COTAS and some Sub-Basin Commissions in the 
LChB. However, most respondents stated that these water user organizations are not linked 
with the Basin Council (Coherence). All work in the LChBC is restricted to issues at the 
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basin level (i.e., allocation of surface water) and does nothing related to smaller scales 
which would involve its Auxiliary Organizations. This thesis exposes the existence of 
limited collaboration and coordination activities between the LChBC and its Auxiliary 
Organizations. The following quote by an official of the NWC best captures this challenge: 
There is no link… There is no strategy… [Sub-] Basin Commissions and COTAS are part 
of local initiatives. There is no line of action provided by [NWC’s] headquarters. 
Headquarters support the creation of [Sub-] Basin Commissions and COTAS, but there 
is no strategy… At least I do not think there is [a strategy]! … Headquarters have not 
addressed the issue of how to link the Basin Council with the [Sub-] Basin Commissions, 
or with COTAS. […] I believe that the NWC does not know what to make of the River 
Basin Councils… It’s a bit like Alice [a character from Lewis Carroll novel]… If you 
don’t know where you are going, it doesn’t much matter which way you go (R#39). 
There is evidence that progress has been slow because of the inherent constraints placed by 
traditional autocratic forces within the NWC that do not see water user engagement as an 
essential component in a viable water governance system. The following quote by a state 
water official illustrates the context in which water user participation has developed in 
Mexico and the LChBC since the enactment of the NWL in 1992: 
I believe that in the beginning there was an intention to establish public participation in 
decision making. The Basin Council project design was put together [before 1992] by 
Eduardo Mestre, based on French and Spanish examples. In 1997, Mestre is replaced by 
Guillermo Chavez Zarate and he puts into practice what the 1992 National Water Law 
established. […] Internal resistance did exist within the National Water Commission, 
from strong and traditional sectors where the style of government is unilateral 
[authoritarian], ‘I do not need to allow others to participate, especially not water users,’ 
thus was perceived. […] Of course, they never put it in writing (R#24). 
This thesis reinforces the idea that institutional organizational legacies have a dominant 
role during regime change (i.e., from pre-Rio to post-Rio), and consequently, they have the 
potential to facilitate or restrict progress in the transition from the old to the new water 
management model (i.e., IWRM). This idea is also supported by the work of various 
researchers who consider that the legacy of institutional arrangements can facilitate or 
restrict the role played by stakeholders; thus, determining the (un)successful 
implementation of a viable water governance system (Farrelly & Brown, 2011; Horlemann 
& Dombrowsky, 2012; Oliveira et al., 2012; Franzen et al., 2015; Boer et al.,2016). 
Similar finding emerged in the work of Wilder (2010), who states that Mexico’s 
decentralization agenda has been only partial and very incomplete, stressing that water 
policy appears stuck in a transitional phase for almost twenty years. Wilder (2010) also 
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points to related issues such as political fragmentation, potential challenges to the status 
quo and at the lack of strong political will as possible explanations for policies and laws 
not being effectively implemented. Her research is different in the sense that it uses a policy 
science approach. The present study validates Wilder’s work by including a more diverse 
set of voices to this research context. Specifically, while Wilder’s study relied on the voices 
of irrigation districts and water institutions, the current study includes the voices of various 
water uses, environmental and agricultural officials, as well as state and federal executives. 
Also, while Wilder focused on efficiency, decentralization and sustainability principles, the 
present study looks at a broader scope of issues in the context of the five proposed water 
governance principles. 
Most participants agreed that policy and decision making remains largely 
centralized at the National Water Commission’s headquarters. Results confirm what has 
been previously established, that there is an interaction among principles and their 
associated themes, which point to the existence of a constraint for the implementation of a 
viable water governance system. In this case, the themes which were mentioned by most 
participants are related to: (a) ‘centralized decision making’ (Coherence), (b) ‘regional 
development planning and management’ (Integration), (c) ‘lack of transparency’ 
(Knowledge), and (d) ‘little participation/governments make decisions’ (Participation). 
Findings also show that the NWC has not decentralized authority to its River Basin 
Organizations nor does to the River Basin Councils. Decisions continue to be made in a 
top-down manner by the NWC’s headquarters, since the authorization of federal fuds are 
still controlled from Mexico City. This finding also suggests that the 2004 NWL is being 
partially applied at best, which raises questions regarding transparency and accountability. 
This thesis concludes that the key constraint in this case is that decision making remains 
centralized and does not consider local context. 
6.5 The rules for managing water resources in the Lerma-Chapala basin 
There is a noticeable gap in key water legislation in Mexico. Findings disclose 
management and structural issues such unregulated water banks, and uncertainty in the 
roles and authority of RBOs and RBCs, due to the lack of detailed regulations. Not having 
the mandatory Regulations to the 2004 National Water Law has left a significant gap in 
129 
 
 
Mexico’s water legislation, which represents another constraint to a viable water 
governance system. 
The literature specifies that a strong legal and administrative framework is a 
cornerstone in the establishment of an effective water governance system (Moench et al., 
2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006; UNDP, 2004; Grigg, 2011). Consequently, it is important that 
the ‘rules of the game’ and the roles of stakeholders are clearly defined and publicly 
disclosed, and that authority is exercised and enforced impartially and in accordance with 
established rules (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2003, 2006). From a theoretical 
perspective, a strong legal and administrative framework should bring legitimacy, clarity, 
transparency, order and credibility to a water governance process while reducing arbitrary 
actions and decisions. 
The literature acknowledges that Mexico has been supported by a strong legal and 
institutional framework for over eight decades (Dourojeanni & Jouravlev, 2001; Mestre, 
2001a; Dourojeanni et al., 2002). The existence of a legal and institutional framework is 
confirmed by the eighteen documents analysed in Section 5.1, which span over three 
decades and include laws, policies and institutional structures for the water sector. Also, 
results in Section 5.3, establishes that the content of the 2004 NWL, the 2007-2012 NHP, 
and the 2006 Internal Regulations of the National Water Commission, have are enough 
elements (on paper) to establish a viable water governance system in the LChB. The 
following quote illustrates how the general objectives of the 2004 NWL allude to the rule 
of law. 
ARTICLE 1. This Law regulates Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution [of 1917] in 
matter of the nation’s waters, and is of general abidance throughout the entire national 
territory. Its provisions are of public order and social interest and its purpose is to regulate 
the exploitation, use or utilization of the nation’s waters, their distribution and control, as 
well as the preservation of their quantity and quality to achieve their sustainable 
development (DOF, 2004). 
However, there is a discrepancy between theory and practice, as many respondents 
identified existing legislation enforcement deficiencies (Rule of law). In its transitory 
articles, the 2004 NWL state that its mandatory Regulations should be enacted “within a 
period not exceeding twelve months from the entry into force of” the reforms to the NWL 
(DOF, 2004: Third Transitory Article). Nonetheless, many respondents acknowledged that 
the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law had not been published. 
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Consequently, the 2004 NWL law cannot be fully enforced in the LChB, nor in any other 
basin in Mexico. The Regulations being enforced during fieldwork (July-October 2008) 
were the Regulations of the 1992 NWL, which according to several respondents have 
become for the most part obsolete28. A NWC official provided further insight and reiterated 
the above view when stating: 
The Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law have not been published yet, but we 
still have the previous ones. […] We thought that the Regulations of the 2004 NWL would 
come out shortly after the publication of the Law. […] With regards to river basin 
councils, […] we have consulted with the legal areas [of the NWC’s headquarters,] and 
there are parts that are not ruled by the Regulations of the 1992 NWL. There are also 
many problems with ‘Water Banks’ […]. There is a great gap in water legislation that the 
legal areas of the National Water Commission are trying to substantiate through legal 
processes, without transgressing the [National Water] Law (R#44). 
There are several topics considered in the 2004 NWL that were going to be further 
addressed in its mandatory Regulations. However, this ‘legislation gap’ (Rule of law) has 
left an assortment of topics without detailed regulations; thus, creating a variety of 
challenges related with water management. Among the topics that were discussed by 
respondents were ‘water banks,’ the roles and responsibilities of RBOs, and the 
restructuring and operation of River Basin Councils.  
Groundwater overdraft is one of the main water management problems in the in the 
LChB. Nonetheless, water users and state government officials complained about the lack 
of control in the extraction of groundwater resources. They referred to existing issues like 
the arbitrary allotment of groundwater volumes (‘lack of transparency’ - Knowledge) and 
the unreliability of the data in the Public Registry of Water Concessions (‘inefficient 
information systems’ - Knowledge). Water banks are described in the 2004 NWL as bodies 
“in which the regulated operations for the transfer of water rights will be managed, and 
whose functions will be established by the respective regulations” (DOF, 2004: Article 
37bis). The law provides for the application of water banks, but no mechanism had been 
institutionalised to regulate them because of the ‘legal gap’. Several water users and 
government officials mentioned that there is an urgent need for detailed regulations on 
                                                            
28 The Regulations of the NWL available on line, accessed on April, 11, 2017 from the Chamber of Deputies 
of the Congress of the Union Web Page 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/regley/Reg_LAN_250814.pdf are those published on January 12 
1994, and the last reform to this legal document is dated as August 25, 2014. It important to note that the last 
reforms to Chapter III on River Basin Councils are the ones made in 1997.  
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water banks. They commented about irregularities and abuses, as volumes were being 
bought, sold and transferred in an unregulated market. Pertaining these issue water users 
indicated that “volumes [of water] are being bought and sold, but there is no one checking 
them...” (R#9), and no agent “who keeps records of all these transactions” (R#19)? or “how 
do [potential] buyers know who has [excess] volumes to sell.” (R#15) Some respondents 
even suggested problems concerning corruption, exemplified in the following quote from 
an agricultural state official’s discourse: 
Supposedly there is no more water available to allocate [in the LChB]… But in practice, 
you realize that there are groundwater concessions with volumes that are not being used, 
that they have been allocated more water than they need, and that in some cases these 
excess volumes are being used to do business […]. The National Water Commission says 
that the only option if you want more [ground] water [in the Lerma-Chapala basin] is to 
purchase water rights through the water banks… But, there is no regulation for these water 
banks. Where are this water banks? How do I buy or sell volumes?... The recognition that 
you can buy water means that somebody is not using all the water allocated in their 
concessions, otherwise why would they sell it (R#38). 
Several respondents also voiced their concern about the activities of the unregulated 
water banks and the transference of volumes is being used to drill new wells in aquifers 
that were already being overexploited. They questioned the legitimacy of the water 
concessions and the transfer of volumes, and mentioned that the NWC does not monitor 
the existence of illegal wells, or that the volumes authorised in legitimate concessions are 
the ones that are being extracted (Rule of law). Many respondents explained that the 
information in the Public Registry of Water Concessions (PRWC) is inaccurate and/or 
unreliable (Knowledge), and this situation seems to be worsening due to the unregulated 
activities of the water banks. The following quote by a representative of municipal water 
services captures these diversity of responses: 
I have found many surprises in the PRWC… For example, there have been new 
subdivisions in residential areas [in the city], and we request from them [developers] a 
copy of the authorization of the National Water Commission for a certain volume of 
water, before we approve construction… The developers brought us a Groundwater 
Concession Certificate granted by the NWC… We then checked the concession number 
in the PRWC, and it turns out that the Certificate the developers gave us is already 
registered in the State of Nuevo Leon [almost a thousand kilometers away]… Someone 
had already made a transference of the Concession on the side, or something like that! 
How did this happen?… We don’t know!... The people who do this transferences are so 
cunning that they are capable of much (R#17). 
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The assessment framework proposed in this study made it possible to identify that not 
having the mandatory Regulations (i.e., deficiencies in the Rule of law) is making it harder 
to have accurate information about groundwater (Knowledge), and making the management 
of groundwater resources more difficult; thus, resulting in a negative impact on water 
resources (Integration). In the case of the LChBC, this gap in key legislation could be 
making the problem of groundwater depletion even more complex and critical. Findings 
reveal that a gap in key legislation has translated into a lack of transparency, clarity, and 
credibility, and even results in doubts around the legacy of the governance process.  
Many respondents also acknowledged that the absence of the mandatory 
Regulations of the 2004 NWL has created structural problems related to the authority and 
roles of RBOs and RBCs. The previous section discussed how the 2004 NWL gives more 
autonomy, new roles, and new powers to RBOs, and ways in which the decentralization of 
authority from the NWC headquarter to RBO has not taken place. A partial explanation lies 
in the ‘legislation gap’ (Rule of law) identified through the proposed framework. In 
repeated occasions, the 2004 NWL states that the authority of RBOs will be “established 
in this Law and its [mandatory] regulations”. On occasion, this document makes reference 
to the Internal Regulations29 of the NWC. Some certainty concerning the authority and 
responsibilities of officials overseeing different priority areas within the commission was 
provided within the Internal Regulations of the National Water Commission in 2006. While 
this helped narrow legislation gaps, some gaps continue to persist. This finding exposes the 
‘lack of transparency’ (Knowledge) and accountability (Rule of law) in policy 
implementation. Several respondents were of the view that modifications to the structure, 
role and authority of the RBO have not been implemented, as echoed by the testimonial of 
a state water official indicated that: 
Apparently River Basin Organizations have new powers and new roles, they also have 
new job appointments and titles. [...] However, as time goes by it is becoming clear that 
not everything has been transferred to the RBOs …. There are still gray areas [in the 
legislation] that create confusion regarding who is responsible for what (R#25).  
This finding shows that a gap in the regulatory framework has an impact on several 
aspects of a water governance system. In the case of the LChB, the lack of detailed 
                                                            
29 Internal Regulations are official documents that also referred to as ‘institutional structure documents’ in 
the current study. 
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regulations created issues with water management activities such those related to water 
banks, as well as structural problems such as the ones with RBOs and RBCs. The 2004 
NWL established guidelines for a new RBC structure, specifically for’ Board of Governors. 
However the structure could not be implemented because there were not mandatory 
regulations established to do so. Because of this gap in key legislation, the LChBC had not 
been restructured to comply with the 2004 NWL. Consequently, the structure of the basin 
council during the fieldwork was the one established in the mandatory Regulations of the 
1992 NWL, and in the BCOOR. The present study concludes that another constraint in the 
implementation of a viable water governance system in the Lerma-Chapala basin rests on 
not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law. 
6.6 Institutional roles and capacities for water management 
The study findings suggest that the National Water Commission does not have the 
structures in place to fulfill its roles and enforce its authority effectively in the LChB. 
Findings show major discrepancies between what is established in official documents and 
what was happening in practice. This section discusses how the institutional structure of 
the NWC constrain the implementation of a viable water governance system in the LChB. 
Literature suggests that it is important to match institutional roles with relevant 
authorities to ensure the proper functioning of water governance systems (WWAP, 2003; 
Solanes & Jouravlev, 2006; Batcheor, 2007). Having roles and responsibilities clearly 
defined and establishing systems of checks and balances brings transparency to water 
governance systems and allow for government officials and institutions to be held 
accountable for their actions, decisions and/or omissions (WWAP, 2003; Tortajada, 2010a; 
WGF, 2012).  
The NWC is Mexico’s sole water authority. According to Article 6 of the Internal 
Regulations of the NWC, the water authority is spatially organised in two levels (i.e., 
national and regional) with administrative units that are hierarchically subordinated to the 
Director General’s Office of the NWC (SEMARNAT, 2006). RBOs and Local 
Management Offices are important pieces in the NWC’s decentralization strategy (Wilder, 
2010), as this structure is intended to allow the federal institution to be more responsive to 
local issues, thus complying with the subsidiarity principle (Coherence). Article 86 of the 
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2006 Internal Regulations of the NWC, articulates this point by listing the functions of 
Local Management Offices as follows: 
In support River Basin Organizations, Local Management Offices are to exercise its 
authority and its operational, executive, administrative and legal activities, with regards 
to integrated water resources management and the public goods under its care 
(SEMARNAT, 2006: Article 86, Section III). 
The assessment framework proposed in this thesis was able to identify structural 
problems associated with the theme of ‘insufficient operational capacities’ (Coherence). 
Most respondents indicated that the NWC does not have enough staff at the local level to 
fulfill their duties around the supervision of infrastructure development, overseeing various 
programs, and enforcing various laws and pieces of legislation. Many respondents 
mentioned that the NWC has a very strong structure at the headquarters and a weak one at 
the local level. Evidence of these nationally strong and locally weak structures are captured 
in the following statement made by a NWC official: 
If you look at the structure of the River Basin Organizations, they are not the same as 
those in Headquarters. Headquarters have more areas to carry out their work. […] RBO 
do not have the strength and structure they have in Mexico City; and it is even worse at 
the Local Office… We have an Inverted Pyramid Structure! The Local Office is the one 
that has less personnel and has the weakest structure. Here [at the local office] many areas 
have been merged. The work that is carried out by two sub-directions at the RBO, is done 
here by only one (R#41). 
The NWC’s limited operational capacity was cited by water users and government officials 
as being the root cause of most water management problems such as water pollution, the 
existence of an unknown number of illegal wells, the drilling of new wells without 
concessions, and groundwater extraction without supervision among other issues. The 
following testimonial by a livestock water user reflects some of these concerns that were 
expressed by a variety of stakeholders: 
Not having enough staff is a big problem when it comes to enforcing the law […] The 
government has applied an irrational criteria to reduce its bureaucratic burden and they 
have cut it too thin. There is only little staff left and the National Water Commission has 
stopped doing acts of authority. They don’t act as authority any more. They have no 
ability to operate and enforce their authority (R#9).  
According to Sandoval (2004) and Castro (2006), budget restrictions and personnel 
cuts that occurred during the 1990s reduced the capacity of the federal authority to monitor, 
measure, regulate and manage water resources effectively. This pattern continued, and it 
was reported that the labour force of the NWC, which stood 38,188 employees in 1989 
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dropped to as low as 13,406 in 2008, with most layoffs taking place at the local level 
(CONAGUA, 2011a, 2014a). This provides further explanation for the NWC’s limited 
operational capacity at the local scale. Respondents acknowledged that though the NWC 
has highly qualified staff, it is impossible for them to fulfill all their administrative, 
operative, and enforcement duties effectively due to its limited labour force. The following 
quote by a NWC official captures the diversity of responses in this context: 
Honestly, we do not have the human capacity for regulatory oversight… How many 
projects can you oversee when you have only one engineer and over fifty projects to 
supervise? We do not have the capacity to see if contractors or municipalities actually did 
what they told us they were going to do. We do not have the capacity to monitor and 
oversee... and supervising construction projects is not the only thing he does. We know 
exactly what we should be doing. However, we don’t have enough staff to do it. We are 
trying our best [at the local level], but we need more staff to be successful (R#39). 
Findings from implementing the proposed assessment framework led to the 
conclusion the ‘insufficient operational capacities’ (Coherence), the ‘lack of law 
enforcement’ (Rule of law), and the interaction of these themes and principles, represent 
major problems that have negatively impacted water resources management (i.e., water 
pollution and overexploitation of groundwater resources), the credibility of the NWC, and 
the establishment of a viable water governance system in the LChB. 
This study also found disconnects between policy and practice regarding the role of 
the NWC. From the policy perspective, the literature encourages the avoidance of 
conditions in which management and regulatory roles are merged under a single authority, 
since that creates operational and credibility problems (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 
2006; Batchelor, 2007; Grigg, 2011). However, in practice the NWC is the sole water 
authority in Mexico and is responsible for development, management and regulatory 
activities associated with water resources. This condition is reflected in Article 9 of the 
2004 NWL establishes that:  
The purpose of the National Water Commission is to exercise the powers conferred to the 
water authority and establish itself as the Federation’s Governing Body with technical, 
regulatory and advisory status, in matters of integrated water resources management, 
including the administration, regulation, control and protection of the public water 
domain (DOF, 2004). 
In this context, several respondents remarked that the NWC administers water resources, 
enforces the law, and sanctions those who do not comply with the law, and that this 
institutional structure has led to situations of abuse, corruption and negligence. Some 
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respondents indicated that water users are afraid to present complaints about irregularities 
or corruption, because they are fearful of potential reprisals, including the cancellation of 
their water concessions by the NWC (R#13, R#19, R#25, R#28, R#41). There were a few 
respondents who pointed out that the NWC is fulfilling the roles of ‘judge, jury and 
executioner’; hence the feeling that credible systems of checks and balances had to be 
established. An excellent example of this discussion is provided by a NWC official who 
remarked that: 
The National Water Commission is playing the role of judge and jury. […] No, I don’t 
think that there is any interest nor vision to change the structure of the institution... The 
NWC’s failure to act, or to do as little as possible, is because there is no one forcefully 
demanding us [NWC] to change… The NWC is not enforcing the law, and until someone 
comes and demands that we change and enforce the law, we are going to continue as we 
are: laying low, taking it easy, without hassle (R#42).  
Findings from implementing the framework further revealed that most respondents 
are concerned about ‘inadequate institutional structures’ (Rule of law) that often stem from 
the sole water authority having contradictory roles. For example, the same authorities hold 
administrative and enforcement roles. Accordingly, study respondents alluded to the fact 
that this results in ‘insufficient operational capacities’ (i.e., the lack of Coherence) 
particularly at the local level. The interaction of these principles and associated themes are 
in part responsible for the slow progress towards improving water management in the 
LChB, as manifested in the prevalence of problems such as the overexploitation of 
groundwater resources, the pollution levels in rivers and lakes, and the conflicts for over-
allocated surface water resources. This study concludes that a constraint in the 
implementation of a viable water governance system in the Lerma-Chapala basin is directly 
linked to deficiencies in the structure of the National Water Commission.   
6.7 Water allocation mechanisms in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council 
A major accomplishment in the LChBC has been the successful negotiation of a 
treaty for the allocation of scarce water resources. Findings disclose that stakeholders 
successfully engaged in a deliberative decision-making process that resulted in this treaty. 
Legally binding agreements such as water resource allocation treaties represent an 
important aspect of water governance regulatory frameworks that reduce arbitrary 
decisions and actions, help mitigate conflicts, and provide legitimacy, clarity, transparency 
and credibility to the water governance process (Rogers & Hall, 2003; WWAP, 2006, 
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2015). Mexico’s official water management documents recognize the relevance of 
including water users in negotiations to reach widely acceptable solutions to water 
management problems. Article 13bis 4 of the 2004 NWL provides a good example in this 
regard.  
In conformity with this Law and its regulations, the National Water Commission, through 
River Basin Organizations and within the scope of River Basin Councils, will consult 
with water users and civil social organizations to solve potential temporary limitations to 
existing water rights, in order to cope with emergencies, extreme scarcity, hydrological 
imbalance, overexploitation, [water] reserves, pollution, and risk, or when the 
sustainability of vital ecosystems is compromised; by the same token, [the NWC] will 
solve the limitations arising from the existence or declaration and implementation of 
regulated zones, reserve zones and prohibition zones. In these cases, domestic and 
municipal water uses will have priority [over other uses] (DOF, 2004: Article 13bis 4). 
Findings in this thesis reveal that the 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement 
was praised by several respondents as the greatest achievement of the Lerma-Chapala Basin 
Council. A common reflection was expressed by a NWC official when he said, “the [surface 
water] Allocation Agreement […] took a lot of work and time, but it is a great achievement” 
(R#43). Similarly, participants made it clear that this is the only case where negotiations 
and decisions pertaining an important conflict have been made in the LChBC, and in 
particular within the ‘Arrangement and Allocation Workgroup’ (Figure 3.8). In contrast to 
the constraints already discussed in this chapter, this achievement complies with what is 
established in Mexico’s water policy (i.e., Article 13bis 4 of the 2004 NWL). This reflects 
a good example of successful policy-practice connection. Hence, this study acknowledges 
the 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement as a major achievement. 
The main conflict in the LChB is the allocation of surface water, which resulted into 
the signing of the 1991 ‘Agreement on Availability, Distribution and Water Uses’ by 
government representatives from the five states in the basin and the National Water 
Commission without the participation of water users. But this agreement proved to be 
inadequate in mitigating conflicts, evident in the continuous decline of lake water levels 
during the second Lake Chapala Crisis (1994-2003), leading to a revision of the treaty 
(Wester et al., 2008). Participants in the present study indicated that water users, state 
government and NWC officials participated and contributed as equals in negotiations that 
took approximately two years before reaching this landmark agreement which a state water 
official acknowledged as “the first time we [multiple stakeholders] witnessed this level of 
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water user involvement in decision making in the [Lerma-Chapala] basin and in Mexico as 
a whole” (R#25). The present study suggests that this allocation agreement marks a 
successful step in water management decision-making within the LChB, which is notably 
different from the previous state-centred top-down approach (i.e., pre-Rio context). This 
success was likely driven by the Lake Chapala crisis between 1994 and 2003, which likely 
acted as a wakeup call for all stakeholders. 
While the agreement was successful, some respondents still pointed out some 
disagreements that emerged in the negotiations, the most significant of which concerned 
determining which mathematical model that was most appropriate for determining surface 
water allocation in the basin. In this context, the federal government and the State of 
Guanajuato presented two conflicting models, each arguing that their model was more 
relevant based on the local context. After heated discussions and debates, the federal model 
ended up being used. The established agreement details the technical elements that guide 
the allocation of surface water for competing uses along the basin, and sets up minimum 
volumes that should remain in the reservoirs to guarantee the supply of authorized water 
concession while reducing the risk of floods. It was described as a complex negotiation 
because the agreement attempts to provide security to water users while at the same time, 
limiting their rights to avoid water over-allocation during times of drought. Results indicate 
that there exists an orderly allocation of surface water to each state through the 
establishment of mutually agreed rules that bring transparency into the water governance 
process and aid in mitigating potential stakeholder conflicts and conflicts between states 
(specifically, the states of Jalisco and Guanajuato), especially during periods of drought. In 
this context, a state water official made the following statement: 
It was a very long process. […] Discussions and negotiations revolved around two 
different mathematical models. One model was put forward by the Mexican Institute of 
Water Technology and the other one by the State Water Commission of Guanajuato. […] 
There were many people involved and the negotiations that took two years. Both sides 
brought in experts to explain their models and no question went unanswered. In the end, 
the decision was to use the model proposed by the National Water Commission and the 
Mexican Institute of Water Technology. Guanajuato was not very happy… But, Hey! 
That’s the thing about democracy, you don’t always get your way (R#24). 
The impact of the 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement on water governance is 
significant. This is because it provides an empirical example that a viable water governance 
process can be implemented in the LChBC.  
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Wester, Vargas-Velazques, Mollard and Silva-Ochoa (2008) have acknowledged 
the complexity of surface water allocation in the LChB and confirm the above mentioned 
finding that the 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement was product of a series of 
negotiations that lasted years, which involved the active participation of the five states in 
the basin, the National Water Commission, and water user representatives. However, their 
study differs from this thesis because their analysis focused on negotiation processes in the 
context of surface water allocation through a descriptive approach. They also acknowledge 
that the LChB is in a complicated transition from a centralized to a multi-stakeholder 
approach to water management. This research builds on their study by emphasising that the 
decision-making process that resulted in the 2004 agreement marked a new approach to 
decision making manifested in a policy successfully translating into practice within 
Mexico’s water policy environment. As well, this approach indicates some progress in the 
transition from a state-centred top-down model (i.e., pre-Rio context) to a water 
governance-based approach (i.e., post-Rio context) to water management. Wester and 
colleagues provide valuable research that focuses on the difficulties of renegotiating water 
allocation in overcommitted basins, especially when attempting to secure environmental 
flows. Hence, this thesis considers it important to emphasise this achievement in response 
to Biswas’ and Tortajada’s (2010) call for examples of good practice in water governance 
and IWRM within jurisdictions aiming to make progress.  
6.8 Final Remarks 
The framework presented in this thesis resulted in the identification of several 
themes that relate to the way water is governed in the LChB. It also made it possible to 
identify strengths and constraints in the assessed water governance, even in cases where 
multiple principles within the framework were intertwined in complex ways. The strengths 
and constraints presented here have the potential to enhance or limit the viability of any 
water governance system.  
A major benefit of this framework rests in the simplicity of the five core principles 
that were utilized. This refinement made it possible to compare guiding principles in 
existing policies and official documents to the practice of water governance on the ground 
within the LChB. A clear finding that emanates from the analysis is the existence of major 
disconnects between existing policies and the actual practice of water management. Thus, 
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while policy documents reflect a shift from a state-centred top-down approach to a water 
governance-based model, interviews reveal that the opposite is happening in the Lerma-
Chapala basin. The testimonials of two federal officials, from the National Water 
Commission and the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources, provide a 
contextual summary of these findings: 
I can see fear in the National Water Commission. Fear to lose control to some extent… 
to lose Power. [...] I do not think we [the NWC] have overcome that part yet... That fear 
has not been surpassed. However, I think we are seeing a little less than before. […] I am 
not saying that public participation is not taking place, but it is necessary that participation 
be more effective. But, there is still some fear remaining within the NWC: ‘And if we 
lose control?’ [They ask themselves.] I believe that we are headed to a real aperture of the 
Basin Council and decisions will start to be made there, and we will leave behind meetings 
in dark corners (R#41). 
Evidently there is a lack of a participatory culture in Mexico… in the general population. 
And there is no culture of delegating tasks, at all levels of government. There is an 
inexplicable fear to let others participate in water management. I do not know why… 
There is a lot of fear of losing power... There is much fear. Exaggerated fear. But I think 
it has a lot to do with the issue of political parties and the political system [in Mexico]. 
[…] I think we have to review all that… All that is influencing water governance (R # 
49). 
It is noteworthy that a benefit of the proposed framework also lies in the breath of 
issues that were unearthed around water policy, planning and management in the LChB. 
The scope of these issues transcends the current thesis. Therefore, a summary of the 
findings discussed in this Chapter are outlined in Table 6.1. The table also shows the 
interplay of various water governance principles, demonstrating the multifaceted nature of 
water governance. Because of the broad scope of issues that emerged from the analysis, 
not all micro-level details are captured in this discussion. A more comprehensive 
documentation of the broad range of themes that were discussed by respondents are 
captured in Appendix VII.
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Table 6.1: Summary of findings by water governance principles and themes 
Principle Context Theme Constraints Achievement FWUR1 FSUA2 DMRC3 NHMR4 SNWC5 SWAA6 
Participation 
Post-Rio Participation in multilateral decision-making forums I   D  I Multiple stakeholder engagement I     I 
Pre-Rio Little participation / governments make decisions I  I    Questionable water user’s representation I      
Coherence 
Post-Rio 
Collaboration and coordination  D, I     
Decentralization to the lowest viable level D  D, I   I 
Operational capacities       
Pre-Rio 
Fragmentation and sectorization I I I    
Centralized decision making   I I   
Insufficient operational capacities     I  
Rule of Law 
Post-Rio 
Comprehensive rules and regulations D   D  D 
Institutional structures for water management D  D D D D, I 
Law enforcement       
Pre-Rio 
Legislation gaps and overlaps I   I   
Inadequate institutional structures I  I  I  
Little law enforcement   I I I  
Knowledge 
Post-Rio 
Information systems      I 
Education      I 
Dialogue and negotiation    D  I 
Pre-Rio 
Inefficient information systems  I  I   
Insufficient education I I     
Lack of transparency I I I I   
Integration 
Post-Rio Basin planning and management   D   I Sustainability and Conservation       
Pre-Rio Regional development planning and management  I I    Negative environmental impacts    I I  
1 (FWUR) Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.  
2 (FSUA) A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management that limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the 
Lerma-Chapala basin.  
3 (DMRC) Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context.  
4 (NHMR) Not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law creates a significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation.  
5 (SNWC) Deficiencies in the structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity to function efficiently.  
6 (SWAA) 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement.  
(D) Findings from official document analysis. 
(I) Findings from interview analysis. 
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Chapter Seven 
7 Conclusions 
This chapter concludes the dissertation by providing a summary of major findings. 
It also discusses the conceptual and practical contributions of the thesis, proposes some 
directions future research, and provides recommendations to improve water governance 
and management practices in the Lerma-Chapala basin. 
7.1 Summary of findings 
This thesis commenced by acknowledging the challenges that emerge when 
addressing water governance. Specifically, it pointed out the lack of a strong consensus on 
a single definition of the concept of water governance itself (Biswas & Tortajada, 2010; 
Varis et al., 2014). Following an in-depth review of water governance and management 
literature, the current study also found that there exist no standard framework for assessing 
the effectiveness of water governance systems. Thus, while a wide range of frameworks 
have been used to assess various aspects of water governance, the disparate nature of these 
frameworks makes it difficult to compare study findings or holistically understand how 
multiple factors impact water governance systems. 
To address these complexities, this dissertation sought to find common ground and 
consolidate various frameworks into a holistic but simplified framework that could be 
applied to assess water governance systems, strengthen debates on water governance and 
holistically value spatial and temporal variations in water governance. Drawing insights 
from existing literature the study developed a framework with five core water governance 
principles (i.e., Participation, Coherence, Rule of law, Knowledge and Integration). The 
proposed framework was then tested by applying it in a content analysis of water-based 
policy and planning documents in Mexico and interviews with various stakeholders in 
Mexico’s Lerma-Chapala basin. Finally, findings from the document analysis and 
interviews were compared to understand the extent to which existing policies around water 
manifest themselves in practice. 
Overall, the study finds that, while a drastic evolution in water policy from more 
to-down to a bottom-up approach can be observed, the practice of water governance within 
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the LChB largely remains centralized, hierarchic and state-centred. Thus, at best, a 
participatory water governance approach for the most part exists in theory.  
First objective: To develop a water governance assessment framework by refining 
normative attributes that best conceptualize water governance in the 
existing research literature.  
This thesis determined that the abundance of water governance principles offered 
in the literature represents a challenge for researchers. However, this dissertation finds that 
some of these principles have overlapping meanings; hence the attempt to reduce the 
existing set of principles into a refined, simplified and holistic group that is suitable for 
assessing water governance in multiple contexts. The refinement process resulted in five 
key principles: participation, coherence, rule of law, knowledge and integration. These 
principles represent structures that are required for a water governance system to function 
effectively. 
Following the application of the proposed framework to the case of the Lerma-
Chapala basin in Mexico, this thesis finds it allows for a better conceptualization and makes 
it easier to cluster related topics into related themes that allow for effective analysis and the 
comparison of multiple data sources. In this case, interviews and policy documents were 
analyzed to reveal connections between policy and practice in water governance. Because 
of the holistic nature of the developed framework and its effectiveness, it could be applied 
to compare conditions across multiple scales (e.g., local, national and international) and 
monitor the evolution of water governance over time. The proposed framework could also 
be applied to a critical literature review, as it captures multiple contexts within which issues 
of water governance could emerge. In a nutshell, the framework proposed in this 
dissertation effectively serves the purpose for which it was developed.  
Of note is the ability of the developed framework to capture the interplay among 
water governance principles and their associated themes. This made it possible to identify 
constraints and achievements (see Table 6.1) associated with water governance in the 
LChB, which leads the current dissertation to conclude that the proposed framework serves 
the purpose of identifying needed changes within water governance systems. However, this 
interplay also reveals a potential shortcoming in the framework, as it does not clearly 
differentiate between water governance and management. For example, issues related to 
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water management such as water pollution or groundwater overexploitation, could be the 
result of lack of enforcement or a gap in legislation, which are more closely related to water 
governance. Thus, gaining detailed understanding would require an in-depth analysis of 
management and governance issues and their interactions. In this context, the present study 
agrees with Tortajada (2010a) that describes water governance and water management as 
being interdependent, but it also agrees with Mitchell (2013) regarding the need for more 
research to understand the interaction between these two concepts.  
Second objective: Apply the developed water governance assessment framework to 
official water policy documents with the aim of understanding pre-
/post-Rio water governance transitions in Mexico. 
The proposed framework was applied to existing water related policy and planning 
documents in Mexico. This analysis confirmed a transition from a state-centred top-down 
approach to a water governance-based mode to a more participatory approach, which was 
evident in the orientation of various policy documents. These shifts have been partially 
identified by several studies on water policy in Mexico (see González-Villarreal & 
Garduño, 1994; Dourojeanni, 2001; Mestre, 2001; Wester et al., 2009b; Wilder, 2010). 
Hence, the ability to expose these shifts using the proposed framework adds more 
credibility to its effectiveness. The observed trends led this dissertation to conclude that 
there have been significant shifts in water management paradigms in Mexico since 1992. 
This is evident in the noticeable increase in the use of water governance-based terminology 
in official documents. These terminologies were classified using the five principles in the 
proposed framework.  
The pattern resulting from applying the proposed framework to official documents 
suggest that Mexico did not follow an evolutionary pattern that progressed through years 
(or even decades) of engagement to achieve policies for integrated water resources 
management. Finding reveal a noticeable change over a short period of time, which was 
driven by a top-down approach. Wilder (2010) explains that Mexico was under pressure to 
modernize its water policy framework during the negotiations of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), in 1992. Also, Buchenau (2008) mentions that President 
Salinas (1988-1994) considered NAFTA a key piece in his neoliberal economic strategy, 
and the crowning achievement of his administration. Consequently, it is likely that in 1992 
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President Salinas was highly motivated to approve a new water law, which complied with 
the requirements of the NAFTA negotiations, while embracing IWRM as a new paradigm 
for solving water resource management and governance issues in Mexico.  
Findings also show that significant changes in the institutional structures of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (MAHR) took place after the creation of 
the National Water Commission in 1989 (SARH, 1989), and the publication of the NWL 
in December 1992 (SARH, 1993). However, it was not until 1996 that the NWC created 
mechanisms aimed at facilitating inclusive water user participation within its structure. It 
also needs to be considered that the political and economic context in Mexico changed 
radically between 1993 and 1996. For example, Mexico experienced a major financial crisis 
in December 1994, a few weeks into a new presidential administration (i.e., Ernesto 
Zedillo, 1994-2000), and consequently, Mexico had to comply with the “good governance” 
and IWRM requirements placed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
in order to gain access to funds that would help work its way out of the crisis (Hamnett, 
2006; Wider & Romero Lankao, 2006; Wilder, 2010).  
This suggests a strong pressure on Mexico’s political officials to implement water 
governance reforms, which in part explains the creation of the Coordination of River Basin 
Councils within the structure of the NWC and the reforms to Article 15 of the RNWL in 
1997, which allows water users to participate in equal numbers as government 
representatives in the LChBC (DOF, 1997). Therefore, findings also suggest a level of 
reluctance of the politicians in fully implementing water governance reforms, possibly 
because it represented a revolutionary change in the status quo. It is noteworthy that the 
outcomes of this policy analysis were compared to interview data to understand how these 
changes to political structures impacted water governance on the ground.  
Third objective: Apply the developed water governance assessment framework to 
stakeholder interviews to understand the state of water governance in 
the Lerma-Chapala basin, and how these conditions relate to policy 
and the overall creation of a viable IWRM process. 
The implementation of the proposed framework to the LChB made it possible to 
identify discordances between the formal and informal systems. For example, informal 
practices such as the clientelistic and paternalistic attitudes rooted in Mexico’s socio-
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political context stem from state-centred top-down system that prevailed in Mexico for 
several decades. These problematic practices have resulted in the existence of: (1) 
government officials who do not value stakeholder engagement and participation in 
decision making processes, and (2) water users who are not used to being engaged with 
government officials and other stakeholders in decision making. These deeply rooted 
traditional structures are limiting the implementation of water governance policies. The 
application of the framework also allowed for the identification of operational gaps in the 
Lerma-Chapala basin regarding the implementation of laws and policies. The persistence 
of a silo approach to water governance and management, which is a remnant from the 
previous social order, reflects the lack of multi-stakeholder coordination and engagement.  
Further, the interview findings reveal that in 2008 the NWC did not have enough 
staff on the ground to fulfill their duties pertaining to supervision, oversight and 
enforcement, which were described as having ripple effects on pollution and 
overexploitation of water resources because of porous law enforcement. In this context, 
findings show that the implementation of neoliberal national policies drastically reduced 
federal water bureaucracies (Sandoval, 2004; Castro, 2006; Wider & Romero Lankao, 
2006). However, a by-product of these policies was the emergence of operational problems 
for the NWC at the local level. The concurrent analysis of official document and interviews 
depict the discordance between what ought to be happening (according to laws and policies) 
and what was happening on the ground (based on key informant testimonials).  
However, findings reveal that some progress has been achieved in the 
implementation of water governance. For example, the 2004 Surface Water Allocation 
Agreement demonstrates the viability of implementing a multi-stakeholder decision-
making process to reach agreements that mitigate conflicts and solve sensitive issues in the 
LChB. The proposed framework made it possible to identify progress in the implementation 
of water governance principles in the basin, and it would be a mistake to dismiss this 
progress as something without significance, because though minimal, they mark a step 
forward in the implementation of a viable water governance system in the basin. Based on 
these interviews with stakeholders who are directly engaged in water use, management and 
governance, the current thesis concludes that progress in water governance and IWRM has 
been slow, with much more work remaining to be done. 
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7.2 Contributions of the study 
7.2.1 Conceptual contributions 
The most significant conceptual contribution of this research, which adds to the 
existing literature, lies in the creation of a holistic water governance assessment framework. 
This research refines seventeen dominant water governance principles in the existing 
literature among other themes and contextually consolidates them into five coherent and 
well defined principles. These five core water governance principles were applied in the 
current study to textual and interview data to gain an understanding of water governance 
within the Lerma-Chapala basin of Mexico. The framework proposed here represents a 
consolidation of at least fourteen years of constantly evolving water governance principles. 
The successful application of these principles to compare interviews and policy documents 
and reveal policy-practice disconnects provides evidence for the effectiveness of the 
developed framework. Because the principles consolidate varying ideas in the literature, it 
is also an all-encompassing framework that could be utilized for systematic literature 
reviews and the assessment of spatio-temporal variations in water governance in various 
jurisdictions.  
Studies like Van Leeuwen and Sjerps (2016), Van Leeuwen and Sjerps (2015), 
Hurlbert and Diaz (2013), Oliveira et al (2012), da Costa Silva (2011), Engle and Lemos 
(2010), and Lautze et al (2011), address some conceptual aspects of water governance, but 
they focus on three or four principles (included in the seventeen principles offered in the 
literature) and thus, do not paint a full picture of the range of principles that could be 
assessed. This dissertation addresses the need to reconceptualise principles by proposing a 
refined set and meanings of water governance principles; thus, creating opportunities for 
researchers that ensure they (1) avoid repeating similar or related principles in their work, 
(2) identify themes that stem from the data relating to water governance and understand 
how various aspects of water governance are interrelated, and (3) identify strengths and 
constraints of water governance systems, using their functionality as the main criterion.  
A second conceptual contribution of the thesis resides in better definition of 
hierarchic concepts pertaining to water governance. Subordinated to the concept of the five 
principles described above, this thesis proposes a series of themes (Table 5.1). These 
themes encapsulate indicators that emerged from the data. More specifically, this thesis 
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contributes to the understanding of how these themes interplay and outlines to determine 
the viability of water governance systems. Understanding this interplay is becoming crucial 
because of increasing water demands and potential conflicts. These concerns are addressed 
in this thesis by identifying the implementation gap through the concurrent analysis of 
official documents and interviews, which point towards strengths and opportunities for 
improvement in a specific water governance system. It is noteworthy that, despite using 
only five principles, the proposed framework is not opposed to emergence of new themes. 
The framework presented in this thesis is not set in stone, but rather, marks a new move 
towards the creation of an all-encompassing framework for assessing water governance. 
7.2.2 Methodological contributions 
The current study demonstrates the value of content analysis in testing newly 
developed frameworks. In the context of the current study, a water governance framework 
was developed by integrating ideas from multiple clusters of literature on water governance 
and management. Content analysis requires the development of an analytical codebook 
with well-defined themes to help guide the coding (Krippendorff, 2013). In the context of 
this thesis, the methodology therefore added more rigor to the development of the 
framework by requiring the researcher to come up with well-defined principles that could 
be superimposed on the data. The content analysis also made it possible to superimpose the 
five principles on the interviews and policy documents to understand water governance 
within specific geographical contexts. Due to the structured nature of the analysis, it was 
possible to compare the practice of governance based on stakeholder interviews to existing 
water governance policies. Although studies of water governance have used content 
analysis (e.g., Gillet et al., 2014; Kuzdas et al., 2015), the current study specifically 
highlights the value of the methodology for creating a well structure framework, testing the 
framework on different clusters of data and comparing outcomes in different data sources 
to understand how water governance policies manifest in practice.  
Since content analysis of documents and interviews has been applied in studies on 
water governance (Baumgartne & Pahl-Wostl, 2013; Grecksch, 2015), the current study is 
a confirmation that the methodology is indeed useful for the study of water governance, 
which is often multifaceted and complicated. It reveals the value of the methodology in 
capturing broad themes pertaining to water governance, organizing them under specific 
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clusters (i.e., principles) and quantifying their prominence to tease out the most recurrent 
topics across different clusters of data. For example, the quantification of key topics in 
water policy documents and stakeholder interviews made it possible to visualize these 
trends through graphs and visually compare the prominence of different themes.  
This thesis advances the understanding of the relationship between formal and 
informal systems in water governance. For example, interinstitutional collaboration and the 
coordination of efforts is formally established in Mexico’s water policies. However, 
progress in the establishment of collaboration networks is slow because of informal 
structures such as sectoral inertias that remain in institutional memory. Research has been 
conducted on institutional fragmentation (Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk; 2015), the impacts 
of water reforms on local contexts (Olivieira et al., 2012; Hornidge et al., 2013; Mapedza 
et al., 2016; Rola et al., 2016), networks (Kuzdas et al., 2015), conflict and cooperation 
(Funder et al., 2010) and legitimacy (Wood, 2015) in an attempt to further understanding 
of the relationships between formal and informal systems. This thesis builds on research in 
this domain by confirming the importance of considering local context when developing 
water policy reforms, and shows that local context has the capacity to support or restrain 
the implementation of water governance.  
7.2.3 Recommendations for policy and practice 
Based on the development and application of a framework for assessing water 
governance, the current study was able to identify multiple situations where local 
knowledge provided potential solutions for addressing common problems at the basin level. 
It is noteworthy to emphasise that there is no quick fix or single solution to improve water 
governance in the Lerma-Chapala basin, and that any improvements in the water 
governance system will require time, dedication and ongoing adjustments. As observed in 
the water governance literature, the establishment of a viable water governance system is 
not a one-time event, but rather a long evolutionary process. 
Based on the study findings, three major recommendations that emerged from key 
informants’ perspectives on improving water governance in the Lerma-Chapala basin are 
discussed. Though the complexity of the issues that emerge reveal that a lot of work 
remains, this section attempts to recommend some practical actions that could potentially 
150 
 
  
enhance the experience of water governance and management in the LChB. These three 
suggested mechanisms for improving water governance in LChB are discussed as follows:  
1. The federal government should provide integrated water resource management 
training and education programs at all levels through the River Basin Council’s 
structures. 
It is imperative to change the mentality of government officials and water users to 
facilitate the transition from a traditional state-centred top-down practices, to a more water 
governance-based approaches. People should be aware of the importance of having the 
basin as a management unit and informed of the problems that exist in their basin, with an 
emphasis on the ones present in their sub- and micro-basin (i.e., local scale). As revealed 
in the current study, the most significant changes in water governance occurred when the 
LChB underwent some of its greatest challenges. People need to become familiar with the 
problems and potential solutions to water-related problems at the local and basin levels. 
They also have to become more aware of what is at stake if they fail to play part in water 
governance forums. It is necessary to make water users and the general public aware that 
there is a basin council with established frameworks (i.e., Auxiliary Organizations) for 
them to be participate in decision making and in the implementation of collaborative 
measures to achieve common goals. They also need to know that there are water user 
representatives in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council who are to voice their concerns, as 
well as the mechanisms through which they can participate in the election of their 
representatives. Overall, the education and empowerment of water users could potentially 
result in water users demanding more accountability from their representatives. 
Training and education on integrated water resource management at all levels of the 
basin, should also be required for all NWC officials (headquarters, RBOs and Local 
Management Offices) to help facilitate cultural change. This is necessary because existing 
traditional structures are deeply engrained in the practice of water governance and 
management. As such, transformative education is needed to help stakeholders rethink their 
approaches. Loucks (2000:5) observes that “changing the social and institutional 
components of water resource management systems is often the most challenging because 
this involves changing the way individuals think and act”. Much work and political will is 
required to implement a viable water governance process in the Lerma-Chapala basin. In 
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this regard, Biswas and Tortajada (2010a) provide an example of the transformation of the 
institutional culture. 
A major finding of the current study is the existence of fractures in stakeholder 
coordination and collaboration. An additional recommendation is to carry out educational 
programs that bring together multiple stakeholders in forums (i.e., Auxiliary Organizations) 
where their role and responsibilities can be discussed in-depth, and where stakeholders can 
brainstorm about problems and potential solutions, while attempting to come up with 
management plans for the sub- or micro-basin, or aquifer, and establish legally binding 
agreements on collaborative activities. This actions would ensure that legal frameworks for 
collaboration are established at the local level and minimize arbitrary or poorly coordinated 
decision making. Without this mechanisms in place, existing fractures will likely remain 
persistent. 
2. Strengthen water user participation and representation in the LChBC. 
The federal and state governments have to support user participation and help water 
users in the establishment and consolidation of civil social organizations (i.e., Sub-basin 
Commissions, Micro-basin Committees, and COTAS). It is necessary to let stakeholders 
participate in planning, implementation and management of water resources at all scales 
(i.e., aquifer, sub- and micro-basin, and river basin). This will contribute to the 
establishment of a more viable water governance system. Representation can be 
strengthened through the formation of Auxiliary Organizations at different levels, which 
could provide the opportunity for various representatives (e.g., representatives from 
aquifers, sub- and micro-basins) to be part of the election process for water user Board 
Members to the LChBC. Building communication and collaboration networks between 
Auxiliary Organizations could help provide more rigorous and balanced solutions to 
problems identified by stakeholders at the local level. This could also aid in informing water 
users and the population within the basin about the activities of the basin council, and how 
the council copes with the problems that are brought forward. If user participation is equally 
supported in all states, it will be possible to improve the democratic process. Several 
researchers have provided examples in multiple contexts were these kinds of informed 
participation are that are lacking in the LChB have yielded positive transformative results 
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(for examples, see Norman et al., 2013; Gallego-Ayala and Juizo, 2014; and Dell'Angelo 
et al., 2016). 
3. Strengthen legislative and administrative frameworks to improve water governance 
systems. 
Findings in the present study revealed that the mandatory Regulations to the 2004 
National Water Law have not been enacted, and consequently, the 2004 NWL cannot be 
fully applied. They disclose management and structural issues such unregulated water 
banks, and uncertainty in the roles and authority of RBOs and RBCs, due to the lack of 
detailed regulations that define how the system should work as a whole, and who should 
do what and to what extent. Thus the rule of law cannot be established effectively when 
key legislation is lacking. Consequently, it is imperative that this legal gap be closed.  
Findings also show that it is imperative that agencies and organizations have staff 
who are well trained, appropriately equipped and sufficient in numbers to carry out their 
assigned duties effectively, especially at the local scale. A strong legislative and 
administrative framework is considered in the literature as a cornerstone in the 
implementation of an effective water governance system; however, the capacity to enforce 
the law is also an important factor in the successful implementation of the rule of law. 
Therefore, this thesis recommends that the operational capacities of water related 
institutions and organizations, especially concerning enforcement duties be strengthened 
particularly at the local scale. The reasoning behind this recommendation are well echoed 
in state water official’s claims as follows: “what is the point of having the best law in the 
world is you are not going to enforce it” (R#29). Laws that are not enforced become dead 
letters. 
Another major recommendation of this thesis is that the administrative and law 
enforcement activities around water should be carried out by different institutions. 
According to the National Water Law, the National Water Commission is not only 
responsible for implementing administrative and normative functions of water governance. 
It is also responsible for enforcing and interpreting the NWL and its regulations, and for 
applying sanctions regarding water. To avoid a conflict of interest it is necessary to separate 
the administrative and normative functions from enforcement and sanctioning ones. This 
could be done by separating these functions into two independent institutions. Mexico has 
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experience in this regard. In 1996 Mexico’s federal government separated the 
administrative functions in the forestry and fishery sectors and place them under the newly 
created Ministry of the Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries, while placing the 
enforcement functions under the Federal Attorney’s Office for Environmental Protection. 
These separation of functions and powers also establishes a system of checks and balances, 
as the activities of one agency requires the other one to function effectively. This success 
has, to a large extent, been achieved in Mexico’s forestry and fisheries sectors should serve 
as a useful lesson for the governance of water. 
Finally, a major area of deficiency in governing Mexico’s water lies in the lack of 
state-funded research that monitors the system and provides evidence-based insights on 
existing deficiencies and potential improvements. For example the framework developed 
in the current study could be applied to monitor systemic and practical aspects of water 
governance in the LChB and help identify deficiencies on a variety of themes, including 
stakeholder relations, policy and planning, and water management practices on the ground. 
As such, this thesis strongly recommends the establishment of a third-party research body 
responsible for monitoring policy and practice in governance and use of water resources 
over time and provide feedback on potential improvements that could be made. 
7.3 Study limitations 
The current study is not without its limitations. The first limitation is that this 
research focuses on the basin level and does not apply the water governance assessment 
framework to smaller scales (i.e., sub-basin, micro-basin, or aquifer levels). Not all 
challenges and strengths can be observed at a large scale; consequently, the assessment of 
water governance could be improved by including smaller scales in such studies. 
Additionally, this thesis does not focus comprehensively on Auxiliary Organizations, the 
interplay among these organizations and the basin council. All these factors constitute key 
aspects of water governance systems that were beyond the scope of the current study. 
However, such analysis would have yielded more detailed results on the practice of water 
governance on the ground. Applying the assessment framework to these subsidiary 
organizations could provide further insight on themes, constraints, achievements and 
opportunities that could together contribute to improvements in the water governance 
system of the Lerma-Chapala basin.  
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A second limitation concerns language differences acknowledged earlier. This 
limitation was minimised by working in the source language (i.e., Spanish) for as long as 
possible (Van Nes et al., 2010), which proved to be useful by helping the researcher 
preserve original meaning to the full extent possible. Nonetheless, the translation of quotes 
proved to be challenging, as it was often difficult to find English words that perfectly 
depicted what the texts and/or respondents were saying. Although the researcher sought to 
preserve original meanings in the translation process, it is worth noting that literal 
translations from one language to another (i.e., Spanish to English) may not always be very 
clear (Van Nes et al., 2010). To avoid confusion, some grammatical corrections were made 
to literal translations to make readings in English easier, while maintaining original 
meanings to the best extent possible.  
7.4 Directions for future research 
There are at least three directions for future research that emerge from this thesis. 
First, future research could further test the water governance assessment framework in 
different basins in Mexico and in other jurisdictions. Research should also be carried out at 
various scales, including lower tier governance forums (i.e., Auxiliary Organizations) using 
the same assessment framework. It is desirable to study vertical and horizontal interactions 
among water governance forums at various scales. 
A second direction for future research involves international development and 
financial institutions. Most, if not all the constraints identified by this study are associated 
with the ‘good governance’ principles used by international financial institutions who 
significantly impacted Mexico’s water governance trajectory. Having a strong legal and 
administrative framework, decentralization policies, public participation in decision 
making, and the sustainability of natural resources (including water), are all part of the 
preconditions imposed by international financial institutions to client nations who desire 
funding. Consequently, future research could seek to answer the following questions: “Why 
do international financial institutions fail to put more pressure on governments to fulfill 
funding preconditions?”, “Why do international financial institutions continue to provide 
funding to countries that partially implement structural adjustment programs?”, “How are 
international financial institutions assessing progress in the implementation of structural 
adjustment programs?” 
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A final direction for future research would be to focus on the impact of 
bureaucracies in the implementation of reform processes and their outcome. Constraints 
identified in this research indicate that the Mexican water bureaucracy plays an important 
role with regards to the pace by which reforms are implemented. Changes that threaten the 
prevailing status quo are often met with different levels of resistance from the ruling 
bureaucracy, and may result on an unnecessarily long and slow process. Outcomes of the 
study also indicate that this very long transition from one water management paradigm to 
the next has not solved the serious management related problems that were present in the 
basin since the 1980s. New research is beginning to address such issues. The current study 
encourages more research in this regard. 
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Water governance principles defined by researchers 
Proposed Meta-principle Participation 
Principle 
in 
literature 
Rogers, 2002 Rogers and Hall, 2003 WWAP, 2003 Ashton et al., 2005 Ashton et al., 2006 WWAP, 2006 Batchelor, 2007 Refined definition Merged definition Meta-Principle 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
iv
e 
 
The quality, relevance and effectiveness 
of government policies depend on 
ensuring wide participation throughout 
the policy chain -from conception to 
implementation. Improved participation 
is likely create more confidence in the 
end result and in the Institutions which 
deliver policies. Participation crucially 
depends on all levels of government 
following an inclusive approach when 
developing and implementing policies. 
  
All citizens, both men 
and women, should have 
a voice – directly or 
through intermediate 
organizations 
representing their 
interests – throughout 
processes of policy- and 
decision-making. Broad 
participation hinges 
upon national and local 
governments following 
an inclusive approach. 
The quality, relevance and 
effectiveness of policies, 
legislation, regulation and 
practice, depend on ensuring 
wide participation throughout 
the policy chain – from 
conception to 
implementation. Improved 
participation is likely to 
create more conﬁdence in the 
end result and in the 
institutions which deliver and 
implement policies 
Where the quality, 
relevance, and 
effectiveness of policies, 
legislation, regulation, 
and practice depend on 
public participation from 
conception to 
implementation, to 
create greater confidence 
in the institutions of 
governance and the 
outcomes of policy 
All citizens, both men 
and women, should have 
a voice, directly or 
through intermediate 
organizations 
representing their 
interests, throughout 
processes of policy- and 
decision-making. Broad-
based participation 
hinges upon national and 
local governments 
following an inclusive 
approach.   
The quality, relevance and 
effectiveness of government 
policies, legislation, regulation 
and practice, depend on ensuring 
a wide, inclusive and informed 
participation of stakeholders 
(both men and women) and civil 
society, throughout the policy and 
decision-making processes, from 
conception, through 
implementation, to evaluation. 
Broad-based and engaged 
participation can legitimize policy 
and decision making processes, 
thus improving the efficiency in 
the implementation of policies 
and programs, and their 
outcomes. 
Values associated with 
power sharing, 
representation and 
participation are essential 
in water governance. The 
quality, relevance and 
effectiveness of 
government policies, 
legislation, regulation and 
practice, depend on 
ensuring a wide, inclusive 
and informed participation 
of stakeholders (both men 
and women) and civil 
society, throughout the 
policy and decision-
making processes, from 
conception, through 
implementation, to 
evaluation. Water 
governance has to provide 
opportunities for the 
participation of all men 
and women, regardless of 
their social, ethnical or 
religious conditions. 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
In
cl
us
iv
e 
  
The quality, relevance and 
effectiveness of government 
policies depend on ensuring wide 
participation throughout the policy 
chain – from conception to 
implementation. Improved 
participation is likely to create more 
confidence in the end result and in 
the institutions that deliver policies 
[legitimization]. Participation 
crucially depends on all levels of 
government following an inclusive 
approach when developing and 
implementing policies. Broad 
participation is built on social 
mobilization and freedom of 
association and speech, as well as 
capacities to participate 
constructively. 
        
Wide participation 
should be ensured 
throughout the water 
policy chain, from 
conception to 
implementation and 
evaluation 
Eq
ui
ta
bl
e 
 
Equity between and among the various 
interest groups, stakeholders, and 
consumer-voters needs to carefully 
monitor throughout the process of 
policy development and 
implementation. It is essential that the 
penalties for malfeasance be, and be 
seen to be, equitably applied  
All men and women should have 
opportunities to improve or 
maintain their well-being. Equity 
between and among the various 
interest groups, stakeholders, and 
consumer-voters needs to be 
carefully monitored throughout the 
process of policy development and 
implementation. It is essential that 
the penalties for malfeasance are, 
and are seen to be, equitably applied 
All groups in society, 
both men and women, 
should have 
opportunities to improve 
their well-being. 
    
All groups in society, 
both men and women, 
should have 
opportunities to improve 
their well-being. 
Equity between and 
among various water 
interest groups, 
stakeholders and 
consumers should be 
carefully monitored 
throughout the policy 
development and 
implementation 
process;  
Water governance has to provide 
opportunities for men and women 
to improve their well-being, and 
make safe drinking water 
available to all people regardless 
of their social, ethnic or religious 
conditions.  Equity between and 
among the various interest 
groups, stakeholders, and civil 
society need to be carefully 
monitored throughout the policy 
development and implementation 
processes, applying a system of 
checks and balances. 
D
em
oc
ra
tic
 
      
Democratic values in respect 
of the sharing of power, 
representation and 
participation are essential. 
      
Democratic values with respect of 
the sharing of power, 
representation and participation 
are essential 
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Water governance principles defined by researchers 
Proposed Meta-principle Coherence 
Principle 
in 
literature 
Rogers, 2002 Rogers and Hall, 2003 WWAP, 2003 Ashton et al., 2005 Ashton et al., 2006 WWAP, 2006 Batchelor, 2007 Refined definition Merged definition Meta-Principle 
C
oh
er
en
t  
Policies and action must be coherent and 
easily understood. The need for coherence in 
governance is increasing: the range of tasks 
has grown; and so has diversity; challenges 
such as climate and demographic change 
cross the boundaries of the sectoral policies 
on which the government has been built; 
regional and local authorities are 
increasingly involved in water policies. 
Coherence requires political leadership and a 
strong responsibility on the part of the 
institutions to ensure a consistent approach 
within a complex system. 
Policies and action must be coherent. 
The need for harmony and coherence 
in governance is increasing as the 
range of tasks has grown and become 
more diverse. Challenges such as 
climate and demographic change cross 
the boundaries of the sectoral policies 
on which the government has been 
built. Coherence requires political 
leadership and a strong responsibility 
on the part of the institutions at 
different levels to ensure a consistent 
approach within a complex system. 
 The increasing 
complexity of water 
resource issues, 
appropriate policies 
and actions must be 
taken into account so 
that they become 
coherent, consistent 
and easily understood. 
Policies and actions must 
be coherent and easily 
understood. Coherence 
requires political 
leadership and a strong 
responsibility on the part 
of the institutions to ensure 
a consistent approach 
within a complex system. 
Where policies and 
implementation 
actions are 
consistent with other 
initiatives, and are 
clearly aligned and 
well understood by 
all participants. 
Taking into account 
the increasing 
complexity of water 
resources issues, 
appropriate policies 
and actions must be 
coherent, consistent 
and easily understood. 
Water policies and 
actions must be 
coherent, with 
political leadership 
and a strong 
responsibility taken 
by institutions at 
different levels 
Decision makers have to ensure that 
policies, programs, regulations and 
actions in the water sector are 
coherent, consistent and clearly 
aligned with other initiatives, and 
are easy to follow and understand 
by all participants. Within a 
complex integrative system it is 
important that roles and 
responsibilities are clearly defined, 
in order to avoid conditions in 
which institutions and organizations 
at different scales, or at the same 
level, oppose or nullify each other.  
Governance systems have to 
ensure that policies, programs, 
regulations and actions in the 
water sector are coherent, 
consistent and clearly aligned 
with other initiatives. It is 
important that roles and 
responsibilities of all 
institutions. Organizations and 
actors are clearly defined, in 
order to avoid conditions in 
which institutions, 
organizations and actors at 
different scales, or at the same 
level, oppose or nullify each 
other's programs and activities. 
Policies, programs, regulations 
and roles should be easy to 
follow and understand, in order 
to facilitate collaborative 
actions and activities, and 
create synergies among 
stakeholders. Decisions should 
be made and policies 
implemented at the most 
appropriate level, in order for 
policies and programs to be 
effective and timely, delivering 
what is needed where and when 
it is needed, while making the 
best use of resources and 
improving outcomes.                     
C
oh
er
en
ce
 
Ef
fic
ie
nt
  
Classical economic theory demands 
efficiency in terms of economic efficiency, 
but there are also concepts of political, 
social, and environmental efficiency which 
need to be balanced against simple economic 
efficiency.  For example, minimizing 
transaction costs will go a long way toward 
political efficiency. 
Classical economic theory demands 
efficiency in terms of economic 
efficiency, but there are also concepts 
of political, social, and environmental 
efficiency which need to be balanced 
against simple economic efficiency. It 
is also essential that governance 
systems do not impede action, for 
example, minimizing transaction costs 
will go a long way toward political 
and economic efficiency. 
        
Concepts of 
political, social, and 
environmental 
efficiency related to 
water resources 
must be balanced 
against simple 
economic 
efficiency; 
governmental 
systems should not 
impede needed 
actions.  
Water governance systems should 
not impede or obstruct action, and 
should aim to balance the concepts 
of political, social, environmental 
and economic efficiency.  
R
es
po
ns
iv
e 
  
Policies must deliver what is needed 
on the basis of demand, clear 
objectives, an evaluation of future 
impact and, where available, of past 
experience. Responsiveness also 
requires policies to be implemented in 
a proportionate manner and decisions 
to be taken at the most appropriate 
level. Most importantly, the policies 
should be incentive-based. This will 
ensure that there is a clear social or 
economic gain to be achieved by 
following the policy. 
Institutions and 
processes should serve 
all stakeholders and 
respond properly to 
changes in demand 
and preferences, or 
other new 
circumstances. 
    
Institutions and 
processes should serve 
all stakeholders and 
respond properly to 
changes in demand 
and preferences, or 
other new 
circumstances. 
Water demands, 
evaluation of future 
water impacts and 
past experiences 
should be the basis 
for water policy; 
policies should be 
implemented, and 
decisions made, at 
the most appropriate 
level 
Decisions should be made and 
policies implemented at the most 
appropriate level, in order for 
policies and programs to deliver 
what is needed, when it is needed, 
and where is needed. 
Ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
 
Policies must be effective and timely, 
delivering what is needed on the basis of 
clear objectives, an evaluation of future 
impact and, where available, of past 
experience. Effectiveness also depends on 
implementing policies in a proportionate 
manner and on taking decisions at the most 
appropriate level.  Most importantly, the 
policies should be incentive-based. This will 
ensure that there is a clear social or 
economic gain achievable by following the 
policy. 
    
Policies must be effective 
and timely, delivering what 
is needed on the basis of 
clear objectives, an 
evaluation of future impact 
and, where available, of 
past experience. 
Effectiveness also depends 
on implementing policies 
in a proportionate manner 
and on taking decisions at 
the most appropriate level. 
Where policies are 
timely and 
appropriate, 
delivering what is 
needed, based on 
decisions made 
during participative 
decision-making 
processes  
Processes and 
institutions should 
produce results that 
meet needs while 
making the best use of 
resources. 
  
Policies must be effective and 
timely, delivering what is needed, 
when it is needed. This depends on 
the ability of stakeholders to make 
informed decisions and implement 
policies at the most appropriate 
level, while making the best use of 
resources. 
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Water governance principles defined by researchers 
Proposed Meta-principle Rule of law 
Principle 
in 
literature 
Rogers, 2002 Rogers and Hall, 2003 WWAP, 2003 Ashton et al., 2005 Ashton et al., 2006 WWAP, 2006 Batchelor, 2007 Refined definition Merged definition Meta-Principle 
Et
hi
ca
l  
Above all, water governance has to be 
strongly based upon the ethical 
principles of the society in which it 
functions. This manifests itself most 
strongly in the issue of property rights 
for use, access, and ownership of water. 
Above all, water governance has to 
be strongly based upon the ethical 
principles of the society in which it 
functions and based on the rule of 
law. This manifests itself most 
strongly in the issue of justice, 
property rights for use, access, and 
ownership of water. Legal and 
regulatory frameworks should be 
fair and enforced impartially. 
Water governance has 
to be based on the 
ethical principles of 
the societies in which 
they function, for 
example by respecting 
traditional water rights 
    
Water governance has 
to be based on the 
ethical principles of 
the societies in which 
it functions, for 
example, by respecting 
traditional water 
rights. 
Penalties for corrupt 
behavior or sharp 
practices should be 
applied equitably – water 
governance must be 
strongly based on the 
ethical principles of the 
society in which it 
functions and on the rule 
of law.  
Water governance has to be 
strongly based upon the ethical 
principles and context of the society 
in which it functions and on the rule 
of law. Legal and regulatory 
frameworks should be fair and 
applied impartially. 
Water governance has to 
establish an enabling 
environment that is strongly 
based upon the ethical 
principles and context of the 
society in which it functions 
and on the rule of law. The 
“rules of the game” and the 
consequences for violation of 
those rules need to be clearly 
spelled out. The roles and 
responsibilities of all the 
institutions, organizations 
and actors involved in 
developing and 
implementing policy at all 
levels need to be clearly 
established, and they should 
be held accountable for their 
decisions and actions. It is 
necessary to have a built-in 
arbitration mechanisms to 
ensure that satisfactory 
solutions to water issues can 
be reached. Authority has to 
be legitimately exercised and 
in accordance to publically 
disclosed rules, and enforced 
in accordance with 
established procedure. 
Penalties for not complying 
with the rules or with 
responsibilities should be 
fair, clearly established, and 
applied impartially. A system 
of checks and balances 
should be established in 
order to monitor compliance 
with the law and with 
responsibilities, thus bringing 
clarity, transparency, 
legitimacy, and credibility to 
the water governance system. 
R
ul
e o
f  
la
w
 
In
te
gr
ity
 
      
Leadership that is honest, 
faithful and diligent, and 
that protects human rights 
and freedoms, is critical. 
  
    
Leadership that is honest, faithful 
and diligent, and that protects 
human rights and freedoms, is 
critical. 
A
cc
ou
nt
ab
le
  
 Roles in the legislative and executive 
processes need to be clearer. Each of the 
institutions must explain and take 
responsibility for what it does. But there 
is also a need for greater clarity and 
responsibility from all those involved in 
developing and implementing policy at 
whatever level. The “rules of the game” 
need to be clearly spelled out, as should 
the consequences for violation of the 
rules, and have built-in arbitration 
enforcing mechanisms to ensure that 
satisfactory solutions can still be 
reached when seemingly irreconcilable 
conflicts arise among the stakeholders. 
Roles in the legislative and 
executive processes need to be 
clear. Each institution must explain 
and take responsibility for what it 
does. But there is also a need for 
greater clarity and responsibility 
from all those involved in 
developing and implementing 
policy at any level. The “rules of 
the game” need to be clearly spelled 
out, as should the consequences for 
violation of the rules, and have 
built-in arbitration enforcing 
mechanisms to ensure that 
satisfactory solutions can still be 
reached when seemingly 
irreconcilable conflicts arise among 
the stakeholders. Decision-makers 
in government, the private sector 
and civil society organizations are 
accountable to the public, as well as 
to institutional stakeholders. This 
accountability differs depending on 
the organization and whether the 
decision is internal or external to an 
organization. 
Governments, the 
private sector and civil 
society organizations 
should be accountable 
to the public or interest 
they are representing 
Roles in the legislative and 
executive processes need 
to be clear. Each institution 
must deﬁne and take 
responsibility for what it 
does. There is also a need 
for greater clarity and 
responsibility from all 
those involved in 
developing and 
implementing policy at 
whatever level. 
Where every role in the 
legislative, 
administrative, and 
executive processes is 
made clear, and where 
there is appropriate 
clarity and responsibility 
from everyone who is 
involved in developing 
and implementing policy 
at every level 
Governments, the 
private sector and civil 
society organizations 
should be accountable 
to the public or the 
interests they are 
representing. 
The rules of the game, as 
well as legislative roles 
and executive processes, 
must be clear; each 
water-related institution 
must explain and take 
responsibility for its 
actions; penalties for 
violating the rules and 
arbitration-enforcing 
mechanisms must exist 
to ensure that 
satisfactory solutions to 
water issues can be 
reached. 
There is a need for greater clarity 
with regards to the roles and 
responsibilities of all the 
institutions, organizations and 
actors involved in developing and 
implementing policy at all levels. 
This is particularly important in the 
case of the legislative and 
administrative roles, and executive 
processes. The “rules of the game” 
and the consequences for violation 
of those rules need to be clearly 
spelled out. Penalties for not 
complying with the rules should be 
equally applied. Government, 
private sector and civil social 
organization, have to be 
accountable for their decisions and 
actions. Built-in arbitration 
enforcing mechanisms needs to be 
established to ensure that 
satisfactory solutions to water 
issues can be reached.  
R
ul
e o
f l
aw
 
          
Legal frameworks 
should be fair and 
enforced impartially, 
especially laws on 
human rights. 
  
Legal frameworks should be fair 
and enforced impartially, especially 
laws on human rights. 
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Water governance principles defined by researchers 
Proposed Meta-principle Knowledge 
Principle 
in 
literature 
Rogers, 2002 Rogers and Hall, 2003 WWAP, 2003 Ashton et al., 2005 Ashton et al., 2006 WWAP, 2006 Batchelor, 2007 Refined definition Merged definition Meta-Principle 
O
pe
n 
 
Institutions should work in an open 
manner. Together with the government 
agencies and private companies, they 
should actively communicate about 
what the institutions and the 
government do and the decisions they 
take. They should use language that is 
accessible and understandable for the 
general public. This is of particular 
importance in order to improve the 
confidence in complex institutions. 
Institutions should work in an 
open manner. They should use 
language that is accessible and 
understandable for the general 
public to increase confidence in 
complex institutions. In addition 
to being open, good governance 
requires that all policy decisions 
are transparent so that both 
insiders and outsiders can easily 
follow the steps taken in the 
policy formulation. This is 
particularly important with regard 
to financial transactions. 
  
Governance institutions 
should work in an open 
manner. They should 
actively communicate 
about what they do and the 
decisions that are taken. 
They should use language 
that is accessible and 
understandable for the 
general public. 
Where governance 
institutions are transparent 
and inclusive, 
communicating freely 
about what they do and the 
decisions that are taken, 
using language that is 
accessible and 
understandable to all 
stakeholders. 
  Water institutions 
should work in an 
open and transparent 
manner, using 
language 
understandable to the 
general public; water 
policy decisions 
should be transparent, 
particularly regarding 
financial transactions.  
Public, social, private and multilateral 
institutions should work in an open 
manner, actively communicating 
about what they do and the decisions 
they take, in a language that is 
understandable to all stake holders 
and the general public. This actions 
increase confidence in complex 
institutions. 
Governance forums, 
networks and systems need 
actors and stakeholders to 
communicate in very direct 
ways. They should work in 
a clear and open manner, 
actively communicating 
about what they do and the 
decisions that are taken. 
All policy formulation 
processes and decisions 
should be made accessible 
and easy to follow by both 
insiders and outsiders. 
Information should flow 
freely (vertically and 
horizontally) in a language 
that is understandable to all 
stakeholders and the 
general public, and should 
be made readily available 
for public scrutiny. 
Information in the water 
sector can also be used for 
educational purposes, and 
for awareness campaigns. 
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
Tr
an
sp
ar
en
t  
In addition to being open, good 
governance requires that all policy 
decisions are transparent so that both 
insiders and outsiders can easily follow 
the steps taken in the policy 
formulation. This is particularly 
important with regard to financial 
transactions, which should discourage 
suspicious or illegal transactions. 
Information should flow 
freely within a society. 
The various processes 
and decisions should be 
transparent and open for 
scrutiny by the public. 
    
Information should 
flow freely in society. 
Processes, institutions 
and information must 
be directly accessible 
to those concerned. 
All policy formulation processes and 
decisions should be made accessible 
and easy to follow by both insiders 
and outsiders. Information has to flow 
freely in society, and made available 
for public scrutiny, thus providing 
transparency, credibility, and social 
accountability. 
C
om
m
un
ic
at
iv
e 
 Governance institutions and systems need to communicate among the actors 
and stakeholders in very direct ways. 
Correctly done, this will lead civil 
society to be socialized into governance 
over a wide range of issues. Governance 
in the water sector can be used as an 
education model for all other sectors 
and vice-versa. 
Transparency and accountability 
are built on the free flow of 
information. Governance 
institutions and systems need to 
communicate among the actors 
and stakeholders in very direct 
ways. Correctly done, this will 
lead civil society to be socialized 
into governance over a wide 
range of issues. 
        
Governance 
institutions must 
communicate among 
water stakeholders 
both horizontally at 
the same levels and 
vertically between 
levels 
Institutions, organizations, actors and 
stakeholders need to communicate in 
very direct ways. Information has to 
flow freely, both vertically and 
horizontally. Information can also be 
used for educational purposes and 
awareness campaigns. 
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Water governance principles defined by researchers 
Proposed Meta-principle Integration 
Principle 
in 
literature 
Rogers, 2002 Rogers and Hall, 2003 WWAP, 2003 Ashton et al., 2005 Ashton et al., 2006 WWAP, 2006 Batchelor, 2007 Refined definition Merged definition Meta-Principle 
In
te
gr
at
iv
e 
 
Water governance should enhance the 
effectiveness of Integrated Water 
Resources Management (IWRM). The 
institutions will have to consider all uses 
and users within the traditional water 
sector and also their interconnections 
with and impacts upon all other 
potential users and sectors. 
Water governance should 
enhance the effectiveness of 
Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM). The 
institutions will have to consider 
all uses and users within the 
traditional water sector and also 
their interconnections with and 
impacts upon all other potential 
users and sectors. 
Water governance 
should enhance and 
promote integrated and 
holistic approaches 
    
Water governance 
should enhance and 
promote integrated and 
holistic approaches 
Water institutions should 
consider all potential water 
users and sectors and their 
linkages with, and impacts 
on, the traditional water 
sector. 
Water governance should promote an 
enabling environment that induces 
institutions and decision-makers to 
consider all uses and users within the 
traditional water sector, as well as the 
prevailing conditions at the local 
context. They should also take into 
account their existing and possible 
interconnections, and their impacts 
upon all other potential users and 
sectors, following an integrated and 
holistic approach. 
During the policy and decision 
making processes, decision-
makers have to consider 
present and future freshwater 
uses and users, including 
aquatic and terrestrial 
ecosystems, and aim towards 
the long-term sustainability of 
water resources. Decisions 
should be strongly based upon 
local traditions and context, and 
take into account existing and 
possible interconnections and 
their impacts upon all other 
potential users and sectors, 
following an integrated and 
holistic approach. 
In
te
gr
at
io
n 
Su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
Water governance must serve future as 
well as present users of water services. 
The institutions should also be 
built with an eye toward long-
term sustainability. Water 
governance must serve future as 
well as present users of water 
services. 
        
Water policies should be 
incentive-based, to ensure 
clear social or economic 
gain if the policy is 
followed; long-term 
sustainability of water 
resources should be the 
guiding principle 
Water governance must serve future 
as well as present users of water 
services, and aim towards long-term 
sustainability of water resources. 
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Appendix III: Content Analysis Code Book 
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Principle Governance Context Autocracy Context 
Rule of law 
The existence of a comprehensive set of 
laws, norms, rules and regulations (formal 
and/or informal) that govern over water 
resources. 
The presence of authority that is 
legitimately exercised and in agreement 
with publicly disclosed norms and rules 
(formal and/or informal). 
The establishment of institutional roles 
that distribute power effectively with 
existing checks and balances. 
The existence of arbitration forums for 
conflict resolution and management. 
The establishment of legal stakeholder 
roles (both formal or informal). 
Deficiencies in legislation such as the 
existence of gaps, overlaps or contradictory 
laws, norms, rules and/or regulations 
(formal and/or informal). 
Deficiencies in law enforcement. 
Administrative, operative, normative, 
enforcement and sanction roles being 
dominated by individual institutions. 
Arbitrary actions and decisions, abuses and 
corruption. 
Lack of accountability among stakeholders. 
Participation 
The engagement of multiple stakeholders 
(e.g., governments, civil social 
organizations and private sector) in 
decision making. 
Stakeholders engaged in decision-making 
at various scales (from basin to local 
levels) within water governance forums. 
Effective top-down and bottom-up 
networks. 
Legitimate multi-stakeholder and multi-
sectorial representation including 
minorities or marginalized groups. 
Stakeholder participation limited to 
consultation.  
Important negotiations and decisions are 
made by top politicians, outside water 
governance forums. 
No clear guidelines for the election of 
representatives.  
Failure of representatives to adequately 
cater to the needs of their respective 
stakeholder groups 
 
Coherence 
Decentralization of authority and 
responsibility to the most appropriate level 
of social aggregation. 
Stakeholders' collaborative activities (both 
formal and informal) are coordinated to 
achieve common goals and objectives. 
Clearly established institutional roles and 
responsibilities. 
The available of sufficient resources (e.g., 
financial, staff, equipment) that make it 
possible for stakeholders to be 
administratively and operationally 
functional, and fulfill their duties 
effectively. 
Centralization of authority and decision 
making (top-down approach). 
Uncoordinated sectoral approach to policy, 
planning, and management of water 
resources. 
Stakeholder roles and responsibilities are 
not clearly established. 
Stakeholders are poorly funded, staffed 
and/or equipped to fulfill their duties 
effectively. 
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Principle Governance Context Autocracy Context 
Knowledge 
Stakeholder negotiations is characterized 
by equality, transparency, open dialogue 
and direct communication. 
Up-to-date information is shared and 
accessible for decision making, awareness 
raising, and public scrutiny, in clear and 
simple terminology. 
The presence of capacity building 
programs and activities for staff and 
stakeholders.  
The presence of forums and awareness 
campaigns/activities for the general 
population. 
Information is collected independently by 
stockholders and shared under specific 
conditions or on a need to know basis.  
Reliability of available information is 
questionable, or too technical and difficult 
to understand by non-experts. 
Insufficient capacity building programs and 
activities. 
Awareness campaigns are localized or have 
a sectoral focus. 
Integration 
The use of the basin as a unit for water 
resources planning and management to 
enhance hazard mitigation, water source 
protection, water pollution controls and 
other activities that sustain water resources 
in an effective manner.  
Decision making takes into account 
present and future demands of water users, 
aiming towards long-term sustainability 
(e.g., conservation of vital aquatic and 
terrestrial ecosystems). 
Uses political boundaries for planning and 
managing water resources instead of using 
the basin scale. 
Economic development is the priority, 
regardless of anthropogenic induced scarcity 
and negative environmental impacts, 
including pollution. 
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Appendix IV: Checklist for in-depth interviews 
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Interview Guide 
 
Topic 1 The role played by all three levels of government and water users in governance 
forums and networks.  
• What is your (or your institution’s) role in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council (could 
be direct or indirect)? 
• Do you know who are the other members of the LChBC and what are their roles? 
If yes, who are they and what do they do? 
• What roles do the three levels of government play with regards to investment in 
drinking water and sanitation infrastructure today (at present times)? What role do 
the social and private sector play in decision-making with regards to this type of 
investment today? Are you familiar with the processes to get these investments 
selected and approved today? If yes, what is this process? Who approves these 
investments? 
• What kinds of decisions are made by the municipal and state governments with 
regards to water management? 
 
Topic 2 The type of issues and concerns brought forward and discussed within the 
LChBC. 
• What kind of issues and concerns are brought forward and discussed in the LChBC? 
Examples? 
• What mechanisms are applied to incorporate water user representatives into 
decision-making processes? Examples? 
• What mechanisms are used by the LChBC to inform stakeholders about the 
problems present in the basin and about the “hot spots” that require immediate 
attention? 
• How does the LChBC inform stakeholders (and the population in general) about the 
issues addressed by the Council, about the resolutions reached to alleviate these 
issues, about the implementation or enforcement activities, about progress 
regarding resolutions, and about the results obtained through the actions taken to 
solve such issues? 
 
Topic 3 Stakeholders’ role the LChBC, their engagement in decision making, and in the 
execution of agreements (if any). 
• Who are the stakeholders that are engaged in decision-making processes in the 
LChBC? What type of decisions are they engaged in? 
• In what kind (or type) of issues do you (or your institution) are engaged in? 
• How are stakeholders concerns brought to the attention of the LChBC and how are 
they addressed? 
• How does the LChBC make sure that stakeholders comply with the implementation 
of agreements reached by the Council? 
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• How do you (or your institution) visualize stakeholder engagement taking place in 
the LChBC? 
 
Topic 4 The role of the LChBC in the implementation of an IWRM process;  
• Is there a management plan for the LChB elaborated by the Council? If yes, how 
was plan developed? Who were the stakeholders engaged in its development? How 
was it approved? 
• How does the LChBC addresses problems that threaten the conservation and 
sustainability of water resources (quality and quantity of surface and groundwater) 
in the basin? 
• Do stakeholders get involved (directly or indirectly) in solving problems that are 
generated outside their state or municipality (up-river, down-river)? What 
mechanisms or forums are available to address these problems? 
• Does the LChBC deal with issues that involve resources different than water (forest 
and soil)? If yes, Examples? 
• Who speaks for the natural environment in the LChBC (the environment is 
considered a water user in Mexican legislation)? 
• What mechanisms are available to address controversial issues (conflicts) in the 
LChBC? 
 
Topic 5 The degree of cooperation and coordination among institutions, organizations 
and water users in the implementation of policies, plans and programs.  
• What mechanisms (or processes – if any) are used by the LChBC to stimulate 
dialogue and negotiations and the coordination of collaborative activities? If yes, 
what kind of collaborative activities are there in the LChBC? Who are the 
stakeholders usually involved in these type of negotiations and activities? 
• Are you aware of other water governance forums that address relevant water issues 
in the basin (state, municipal, sub-or micro-basin, or aquifer levels)? If yes, which 
one? What kind of issues does this forum address? Who are the stakeholders 
engaged in the governance forum? How are stakeholder representatives elected (or 
chosen)? 
• Is the work of these water governance forums linked with the activities of the 
LChBC? 
 
Topic 6 The capacities of the LChBC and of its members (where applicable) with regards 
to human resources, professional profiles, equipment, funding, training, and 
information flow and availability. 
• What strengths does your institution (organization) have to offer to improve water 
problems in the LChB? How are these strengths contributing to the LChB with the 
present governance system? 
• Do you think your institution (organization) could contribute more than it does at 
present? If yes, how? What is preventing you from contributing more? 
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• Do you think that the different institutions and organizations in the LChBC have 
the capacities required to implement an effective IWRM process in the basin? Why? 
• Do you think there are enough institutional capacities (financial, human resources, 
equipment, etc.) in the LChBC to implement an IWRM process? If no, what 
capacities need to be improved upon and in what institutions or organizations? 
 
Topic 7  Limitations and opportunities to establish an effective water governance system 
in the LChB. 
• What kind of information is available to the members of the LChBC to help them 
formulate their decisions on the issues brought to the table? If limited, what can be 
done to make relevant information more readily available? 
• What is your opinion on the present levels of transparency, accountability and 
credibility in decision-making and implementation processes in the LChBC? If 
negative, what modifications or specifications do you think are needed to strengthen 
present levels? 
• What do you think is the perception of the population about the LChBC and what 
it does? If negative, what can be done to inform civil society about the issues dealt 
with in the LChBC and raise awareness about water problems in the basin? 
• How would you describe the level of stakeholder participation in the LChBC? If 
negative, what can be done to encourage a more active participation of water users 
(civil society in general) in governance forums such as the LChBC? 
• What can be done to improve water management in the basin using the LChBC and 
as a platform for negotiation among stakeholders? 
• Are there any limitations you perceive for the establishment of an effective water 
governance system in the LChB? 
• What opportunities do you see that could establish an effective water governance 
system in the LChB? 
 
Topic 8 Improvements to the governance system in the basin. 
• What changes would you suggest to strengthen the water governance systems in the 
basin? 
 
Complementary questions (in a few words): 
 What does integrated water resources management mean to you? 
 What does water governance mean to you? 
 How would you describe the role of the LChBC (as a governance forum) in the 
implementation of an IWRM process? 
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Appendix V: Percentage of texts occurring in the context of the five principles 
within each document 
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Table 1: Percentage of texts occurring in the context of the five principles within each document  
(Mexico’s water laws) 
 
*Note: These percentages are relative to the individual document. The totals represent that total percentage of each document that pertained to the five principles. 
Results in a post-Rio context demonstrate agreement with the definition of the five principles proposed in this thesis, while pre-Rio context indicate non-
compliance with the definitions provided for the five water governance principles. Includes all water laws at the federal level between 1972 and 2008. 
 
FWL:  Federal Water Law 
NWL:  National Water Law 
 
Table 2: Percentage of texts occurring in the context of the five principles within each document 
 (Mexico’s water policy documents) 
 
*Note: These percentages are relative to the individual document. The totals represent that total percentage of each document that pertained to the five principles. 
Results in a post-Rio context demonstrate compliance with the definition of the five principles proposed in this study, while pre-Rio context indicate non-
compliance with the definitions provided for the five water governance principles. All accessible water policy documents between 1975 and 2012 are 
included in the sample.  
 
NHP:  National Hydraulic Program/Plan 
Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent Knowledge Total Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent Knowledge Total 
1972 FWL Before 6 1 2 6 3 18 0 4 1 0 0 5
1992 NWL 13 4 6 6 9 38 0 2 0 0 0 2
2004 NWL 13 3 6 8 9 39 0 1 0 0 0 1
Water Law Paradigm Shift (1992)
Post-Rio Context Pre-Rio Context
After
Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent Knowledge Total Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent Knowledge Total 
1975 NHP 1 1 3 3 2 10 0 1 2 1 0 4
1981 NHP 2 1 4 2 3 12 0 1 4 0 1 6
1984 NHP 2 1 4 2 2 11 1 2 3 2 0 8
1995-2000 NHP 4 2 6 4 4 20 0 2 2 0 0 4
2001-2006 NHP 3 3 8 5 3 22 0 1 3 1 0 5
2007-2012 NHP 2 2 5 4 3 16 0 1 0 0 0 1
Before
After
Water Policy Paradigm Shift (1992)
Post-Rio Context Pre-Rio Context
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Table 3: Percentage of texts occurring in the context of the five principles within each document 
(Mexico’s institutional structure documents) 
 
*Note: These percentages are relative to the individual document. The totals represent that total percentage of each document that pertained to the five principles. 
Results in a post-Rio context demonstrate agreement with the definition of the five principles proposed in this thesis, while pre-Rio context indicate non-
compliance with the definitions provided for the five water governance principles. Because of the vast number of reforms to institutions that occurred over 
time, only documents that recorded major changes to institutional structures related to water resources were included in the analysis. Therefore, changes 
to areas with no direct implications for water resources (e.g., livestock, fisheries, forestry, and housing), are not considered as ‘major changes’ to the 
institutional structures because they have no effect on results nor do they contribute to the analysis. 
 
MHSPW:  Ministry of Human Settlements and Public Works 
MUDE:  Ministry of Urban Development & Ecology. 
MAHR:  Ministry of Agriculture & Hydraulic Resources. 
MENRF:  Ministry of the Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries 
MENR:  Ministry of the Environment & Natural Resources. 
 
 
Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent Knowledge Total Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent Knowledge Total 
1977 MHSPW 5 0 1 2 3 11 0 0 0 0 0 0
1977 MAHR 5 0 1 3 6 15 0 1 0 0 0 1
1983 MUDE 7 0 1 4 5 17 0 0 0 0 0 0
1985 MAHR 8 0 1 5 6 20 0 1 1 0 0 2
1989 MAHR 9 0 2 4 3 18 0 0 0 0 0 0
1993 MAHR 11 0 3 5 4 23 0 0 0 0 0 0
1996 MENRF 11 1 3 5 5 25 0 1 0 0 0 1
2001 MENR 10 2 2 5 5 24 0 2 0 0 0 2
2006 MENR 10 1 3 8 6 28 0 2 0 0 0 2
Internal 
Regulations
Paradigm 
Shift (1992)
Post-Rio Context Pre-Rio Context
Before
After
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Appendix VI: Percentage dominance of water governance principles within 
stakeholder interviews 
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Table 1: Percentage Dominance of Water Governance Principles within Stakeholder Interviews  
 
 
*Note: Results in a post-Rio context demonstrate compliance with the definition of the five water governance principles proposed in this study, while pre-Rio 
context indicate non-compliance with the definitions. Values show relative percentages of repetition of topics concerning the five water governance 
principles proposed in this thesis, in a pre-Rio and a post-Rio contexts. The levels of repetition are characterized based on stakeholder type.  
 
 
Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent Knowledge Total Rule of Law Participation Integration Coherent Knowledge Total 
Water Users 0 2 3 2 1 9 13 33 10 13 22 91
State Officials 1 5 9 4 1 19 13 21 11 20 16 81
Federal Officials 2 11 6 6 3 28 11 21 8 18 15 72
Stakeholder 
Groups
Post-Rio Context Pre-Rio Context
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Appendix VII: Percentage of respondents by principle, context and theme 
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Water 
users
State 
officials
Federal 
officials
Comprehensive of rules & 
regulations 0 47 38 28
Institutional structures for water 
management 4 20 46 23
Law enforcement 9 0 31 13
Legislation gaps & overlaps 83 80 85 83
Inadequate institutional 
structuress 87 80 77 81
Negligible law enforcement 87 93 77 86
Participation in multilateral 
decision-making forums 26 73 85 61
Multiple stakeholder 
engagement 52 73 100 75
Little participation / 
governments make decisions 91 100 100 97
Questionable water user's 
representation 87 93 100 93
Collaboration & coordination 30 60 85 58
Decentralization to the lowest 
viable level 52 67 92 70
Operational capacities 4 7 31 14
Fragmentation & sectoralization 91 100 100 97
Centralized decision making 78 100 92 90
Insufficient operational 
capacities 83 80 77 80
Information systems 22 13 46 27
Education 13 0 54 22
Dialogue & negotiation 17 27 31 25
Inefficient information system 74 87 69 77
Insufficient education 100 93 85 93
Lack of transparency 100 100 92 97
Basin planning & management 61 100 77 79
Sustainability & Conservation 52 100 77 76
Regional development planning 
& management 96 100 100 99
Negative environmental impacts 70 40 38 49
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Appendix VIII: Respondents key list 
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List of Characters and Numbers to Identify Respondents 
Sector Federal Entity* Respondent Number 
Aquaculture (water users) 
B 1 
C 2 
D 3 
E 4 
Agriculture (water users) 
A 5 
B 6 
C 7 
E 8 
Industrial (water users) 
B 9 
C 10 
E 11 
Livestock (water users) 
A 12 
B 13 
C 14 
Municipal water services (water 
users) 
B 15 
C 16 
D 17 
E 18 
Other services (water users) 
A 19 
B 20 
C 21 
D 22 
E 23 
State Water Institutions 
A 24 
B 25 
C 26 
D 27 
E 28 
 
* Name of states was withheld for confidentiality purposes. 
  Water users 
  State officials 
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List of Characters and Numbers to Identify Respondents (cont.) 
Sector Federal Entity* Respondent Number 
Environment State Institutions 
A 29 
B 30 
C 31 
D 32 
E 33 
Agriculture State Institutions 
A 34 
B 35 
C 36 
D 37 
E 38 
National Water Commission 
A 39 
B 40 
C 41 
D 42 
E 43 
F 44 
Ministry of the Environment and 
Natural Resources 
A 45 
B 46 
C 47 
D 48 
E 49 
F 50 
Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock, Rural Development, 
Fisheries and Food 
F 51 
 
* Name of states was withheld for confidentiality purposes. 
  State officials 
  Federal officials 
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Appendix IX: Summary of findings by water governance principle 
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Summary of findings for Participation 
Context Theme Constraints Achievement FWUR1 FSUA2 DMRC3 NHMR4 SNWC5 SWAA6 
Po
st-
Ri
o 
Participation in 
multilateral decision-
making forums 
The only important decision 
made by the LChBC is the 
yearly allocation of surface 
water ^. 
 Decentralization policies 
include basin councils and 
their subsidiary 
organizations *. 
  Water users and government 
representatives participated in 
negotiations and decision making 
in the Arrangement and 
Allocation Workgroup of the 
LChBC ^. 
Multiple stakeholder 
engagement 
Water users engaged in 
determining the yearly 
allocation of surface water for 
the basin ^. 
    Water users and government 
representatives negotiated and 
reached an agreement on the 
methodology to determine the 
yearly allocation of surface water 
in the basin ^. 
Pr
e-
Ri
o 
Little participation / 
governments make 
decisions 
Most decisions for water 
planning, development and 
management are made 
between governments, outside 
the River Basin Council ^. 
 Traditional authoritarian 
forces in the NWC do not 
see water user engagement 
as an important component 
in water governance ^. 
   
Questionable water 
user’s representation 
Some water user 
representatives have not been 
elected by their peers ^. 
Water user's interests and 
concerns are not being 
advanced in the LChBC ^. 
     
 
1 (FWUR) Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.  
2 (FSUA) A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management that limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the 
Lerma-Chapala basin.  
3 (DMRC) Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context.  
4 (NHMR) Not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law creates a significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation.  
5 (SNWC) General institutional structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity to function efficiently.  
6 (SWAA) 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement.  
 (*) Findings from official documents data analysis.  
(^) Findings from Interview data analysis. 
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Summary of findings for Coherence 
Context Theme Constraints Achievement FWUR1 FSUA2 DMRC3 NHMR4 SNWC5 SWAA6 
Po
st-
Ri
o 
Collaboration 
and 
coordination 
 IWRM encourages 
collaboration among all 
sectors and levels of 
government in a basin *. 
Collaborative networks 
(formal and informal) in 
the basin, not linked to the 
LChBC ^. 
    
Decentralization 
to the lowest 
viable level 
Auxiliary 
Organizations for 
public participation 
*. 
 Decentralization reforms 
since the 1980s *. 
Sub-basin Commissions, 
and COTAS have been 
created in the basin ^. 
  Decision 
made by 
stakeholders 
at the basin 
level^ 
Operational 
capacities 
      
Pr
e-
Ri
o 
Fragmentation 
and 
sectorization 
Precarious 
information flow 
between water user 
representatives and 
representees ^. 
Silo approach to planning 
and management due to 
political, institutional, 
occupational and 
professional biases ^. 
Limited or no 
collaboration activities 
between the LChBC and 
its Auxiliary 
Organizations ^. 
   
Centralized 
decision making 
  Decisions still made at 
National Water 
Commission's 
headquarters (top-down)^. 
No clear roles and 
responsibilities for RBOs 
thus decisions still made by 
the NWC’s headquarters ^. 
  
Insufficient 
operational 
capacities 
    Not enough 
staff in NWC 
to fulfill their 
mandate ^. 
 
1 (FWUR) Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.  
2 (FSUA) A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the LCHB.  
3 (DMRC) Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context.  
4 (NHMR) Not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law creates a significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation.  
5 (SNWC) General institutional structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity to function efficiently.  
6 (SWAA) 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement.  
(*) Findings from official documents data analysis.  
(^) Findings from Interview data analysis. 
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Summary of findings for Rule of Law 
Context Theme Constraints Achievement FWUR1 FSUA2 DMRC3 NHMR4 SNWC5 SWAA6 
Po
st-
Ri
o 
Comprehensive 
rules and 
regulations 
Enabling 
environment that 
promotes 
stakeholder 
participation *. 
  Mandatory Regulations to the 
2004 NWL to be enacted 
within twelve months from the 
publication of the law *. 
 Enabling environment for 
stakeholder dialogue and 
negotiation to seek 
solutions to water problems 
*. 
Institutional 
structures for 
water 
management 
Stakeholder 
participation can 
take place at 
RBCs and 
subsidiary 
organizations *. 
 2004 National 
Water Law 
reinforce 
decentralization 
policies for the 
water sector *. 
Roles and responsibilities of 
RBOs and restructuring of 
RBCs to be determined in 
Regulations to the 2004 NWL 
*. 
The NWC is the sole 
water authority. 
National and regional 
levels subordinated to 
the Director General's 
Office *. 
Stakeholders dialogue, 
negotiate, and make 
decisions in RBCs *. 
Workgroup negotiated 
agreement and oversees its 
implementation ^. 
Law 
enforcement 
      
Pr
e-
Ri
o 
Legislation gaps 
and overlaps 
Unprecise 
election process 
for water user 
representatives ^. 
  Mandatory Regulations of the 
2004 NWL have not been 
enacted, creating management 
and structural problems ^. 
  
Inadequate 
institutional 
structures 
Not enough 
Auxiliary 
Organizations in 
the basin ^. 
 Partial 
decentralization 
achieved ^. 
 Management and 
regulatory roles are 
merged under a single 
authority ^. 
 
Negligible law 
enforcement 
  2004 National 
Water Law is being 
partially applied, 
raising questions on 
accountability ^. 
No monitoring or oversight of 
volumes extracted, no 
cancellation of illegal wells ^. 
Lack of accountability 
because there are no clear 
roles for RBOs and NWC 
headquarters ^. 
NWC at local level not 
fulfilling supervision, 
oversight and law 
enforcement duties ^. 
 
 
1 (FWUR) Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.  
2 (FSUA) A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the LChB.  
3 (DMRC) Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context.  
4 (NHMR) Not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law creates a significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation.  
5 (SNWC) General institutional structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity to function efficiently.  
6 (SWAA) 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement.  
(*) Findings from official documents data analysis.  
(^) Findings from Interview data analysis. 
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Summary of findings for Knowledge 
Context Theme Constraints Achievement FWUR1 FSUA2 DMRC3 NHMR4 SNWC5 SWAA6 
Po
st-
Ri
o 
Information 
systems 
     Information was made 
available to all participants 
during the negotiations to 
aid in decision making ^. 
Education 
     Provided explanation of 
complex concepts in 
mathematical models 
during negotiations ^. 
Dialogue and 
negotiation 
  RBOs are not 
subordinated to 
any other areas at 
the NWC’s 
headquarters*. 
  Two years of dialogue and 
negotiations between 
stakeholders to reach an 
agreement for surface 
water allocation ^. 
Pr
e-
Ri
o 
Inefficient 
information 
systems 
 No mechanisms to inform 
water users or the general 
public about the LChBC, 
its purpose or activities ^. 
 Inaccurate or unreliable 
data in the Public Registry 
of Water Concessions ^. 
  
Insufficient 
education 
Water users have little 
or no knowledge about 
the Council's purpose or 
structure, or about their 
role in the Council ^. 
Difficult collaboration 
because stakeholders have 
little knowledge of issues 
in other states or water 
uses ^. 
    
Lack of 
transparency 
Partial or no 
information about the 
Council's activities 
reaching water users ^. 
Vertical and horizontal 
information flows are 
weak or nonexistent ^. 
Decision making 
remains largely 
centralized at the 
NWC’s 
headquarters ^. 
No clear mechanisms for 
the allocation of 
groundwater volumes^. 
Roles of RBOs, RBCs, 
and NWC's headquarters 
are not clear ^. 
  
1 (FWUR) Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.  
2 (FSUA) A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the LChB.  
3 (DMRC) Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context.  
4 (NHMR) Not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law creates a significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation.  
5 (SNWC) General institutional structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity to function efficiently.  
6 (SWAA) 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement.  
(*) Findings from official documents data analysis.  
(^) Findings from Interview data analysis. 
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Summary of findings for Integration 
Context Theme Constraints Achievement FWUR1 FSUA2 DMRC3 NHMR4 SNWC5 SWAA6 
Po
st-
Ri
o Basin planning and 
management 
  Basin plans to be developed 
by basin council in 
collaboration with River 
Basin Organizations *. 
  Agreement 
considers the basin 
as the unit for the 
allocation of 
surface water ^. 
Sustainability and 
Conservation 
      
Pr
e-
Ri
o 
Regional development 
planning and 
management 
 Stakeholders do not 
plan, think, or 
envision the basin 
as a unit ^. 
Water policy, plans or 
programs are not developed 
at the basin, sub-basin, 
micro-basin or aquifer level 
^. 
   
Negative 
environmental 
impacts 
   New wells being 
drilled in overexploited 
aquifers due to lack of 
regulation for water 
banks. Groundwater 
depletion increasing ^. 
Persistent water 
pollution, illegal 
wells, groundwater 
overexploitation 
because of negligible 
enforcement ^. 
 
 
1 (FWUR) Failure of water user representatives to advance issues that pertain to their stakeholder group in the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council.  
2 (FSUA) A fragmented, sectoral and uncoordinated approach to water management that limits the potential impact of programs and activities that are being implemented in the 
Lerma-Chapala basin.  
3 (DMRC) Decision making remains centralized and does not consider local context.  
4 (NHMR) Not having the mandatory Regulations of the 2004 National Water Law creates a significant gap in Mexico’s water legislation.  
5 (SNWC) General institutional structure of the National Water Commission is restraining its capacity to function efficiently.  
6 (SWAA) 2004 Surface Water Allocation Agreement.  
(*) Findings from official documents data analysis.  
(^) Findings from Interview data analysis. 
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Appendix X: Example of invitation to a meeting of the Evaluation and 
Monitoring Group of the Lerma-Chapala Basin Council. 
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Appendix XI: Curriculum Vitae 
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Curriculum Vitae 
Luis Francisco Silva Jimenez 
 
Education and training 
2005 – present Philosophy Doctor - Geography 
Western University 
Thesis: Water Governance in the Lerma-Chapala Basin of Mexico: 
A Shift from State-centred to a Multi-stakeholder Approach? 
 
2003 - 2005 Master of Environmental Studies – Geography 
University of Waterloo 
Thesis: Sustainable Water Resource Management: Capacity Building 
and Public Participation in the Lerma-Chapala Basin, Mexico. 
 
1989 - 1993 Bachelor of Environmental Studies – Geography (Honours)  
University of Waterloo 
Thesis: Coastal Tourism Development Planning in Mexico: Ixtapa-
Zihuatanejo and Cancun case study. 
 
Scholarships / Grants 
2005-2008 The University of Western Ontario Graduate Research Scholarship. 
2007 Terralingua, Travel Grant (February 9 to 18), Chihuahua, Mexico.  
2006 International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental 
Change (IHDP) /Asia-Pacific Network on Global Environmental Change 
(APN), Workshop funding and Travel Grant (October 10 to 29), Chiang 
Mai, Thailand. 
2005 Central American Water Resource Management Group, Travel Grant 
(March 6 to 12), Managua, Nicaragua.  
2003-2004 University of Waterloo Graduate Research Scholarship.  
2004 Central American Water Resource Management Group, Research Award. 
2001 Guanajuato State Water Commission, Travel Grant (April 8 to 14), 
Habana, Cuba. 
1987 Northland College, Entrance Scholarship. 
 
Academic Experience:  
Guest Lecturer: 
Guest Lecturer. Government, Communities, NGO’s and Development in Mexico. Personal 
Experiences. Presented to PSCI453/651, Advanced Topics in Third World Politics 
and Development. University of Waterloo, October 2003. 
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Guest Lecturer. Indigenous People in Latin America. Presented to PSCI350B, The Politics 
of Developing Areas. University of Waterloo, February 1993. 
Teaching Assistant: 
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2007), People, Places and Landscapes GEOG024, University 
of Western Ontario. 
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2007), Environment, Economy and Society GEOG153A, 
University of Western Ontario. 
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2006), Geopolitics GEOG148B, University of Western 
Ontario. 
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2006), World Cities GEOG155, University of Western 
Ontario. 
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2005), Economic Geography GEOG270, University of 
Western Ontario. 
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2005), Resource Planning and Management GEOG154G, 
University of Western Ontario. 
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2004), Resource Management, University of Waterloo. 
Graduate Teaching Assistant (2003), Human Geography, University of Waterloo. 
Teaching Assistant (1988), Ecology of the Tropical Rain Forest and Native People (field 
course in southern Mexico). Northland College. 
Teaching Assistant (1987), Spanish. Northland College. 
Research Assistant: 
Research Assistant, Department of Political Sciences, University of Waterloo (2003). 
Duties include:  
- Research topics related to: pesticide use in floriculture, cut-flower world 
markets, cut-flower world producers, pesticide impact on peasant’s health, 
women’s role in the cut-flower industry, and the cut-flower industry in Latin 
America. 
Research Assistant, Department of Political Sciences, University of Waterloo (1991). 
Duties include:  
- Assist in field research in the Ecuadorian Andes on topics related to: land and 
agrarian reform, government and NGO development rural programs, liberation 
theology, ethnic identity, and agrarian social movements. 
Non-Academic Experience 
Consultant, Terralingua (2006). 
Duties include:  
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- Provide a document on the geology, hydrology and forest resources of the 
region of Norogachi in the municipality of Guachochi, Chihuahua, in 
northwestern Mexico, as part of the project “Eco-cultural Health in the Sierra 
Tarahumara”. 
Technical Specialist, Marshal Mackin Monaghan Limited (2002) 
Duties include:  
- Develop a work plan for a project proposal pertaining alternative working 
activities within the formal sector of the economy, for the people working in 
the informal sector collecting recyclables from the garbage in the dump of 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras. 
Director General of Social Development, Guanajuato State Water Commission (2000 - 
2002). 
Duties include:  
- Negotiate with 33 municipal governments the creation of interdisciplinary 
teams to provide technical and administrative support for drinking water and 
sanitation service utilities in rural communities. 
- Plan, implement, supervise and evaluate a capacity building program involving 
33 interdisciplinary municipal teams that service over 700 rural communities.  
- Implement a watershed management program with a strong emphasis on public 
participation. Fifteen Water User Organizations collaborate with the state, 
federal and municipal governments aiming to balance overexploited aquifers 
and reduce pollution levels, among other activities.  
- Develop regulations for a government trust that supports water user 
organizations and supervise it.  
- Supervise and provide input in awareness programs related to water 
preservation (quality /quantity). 
Head Promotion Executive, Mid-West Regional Development Council of the State of 
Guanajuato (1999 – 2000). 
Duties include:  
- Develop a regional, environmental and recreational management project for the 
“Purísima Reservoir” with the participation of community members, private 
sector, landowners, civil social organizations including NGO’s and federal, 
state and municipal governments. 
- Supervise a multidisciplinary team working to improve the quality of life in 
very poor highland communities. This was done applying community 
development strategies, combined with the rehabilitation of depleted natural 
resources, within a River Basin Management approach. 
- Prepare and promote the Regional Development Support Program for the years 
2000 and 2001; and get the projects approved by the councillors (i.e., civil 
social organizations, private sector, and government representatives form eight 
municipalities) and by the corresponding administrative authorities. 
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Assistant State Representative for Natural Resources, Federal Attorney’s Office for 
Environmental Protection (1995-1999). 
Duties include:  
- Research and elaborate diagnostics on fisheries, wildlife and forestry activities 
in the states of Tabasco and Guanajuato, Mexico, in order to plan and 
implement law enforcement activities. 
- Field supervision of enforcement activities related to fisheries, flora, fauna, 
forestry, environmental impact assessment, the Centla Wetlands Biosphere 
Reserve, and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), in the states of Tabasco and Guanajuato.  
- Write and review technical assessments to support legal resolutions product of 
enforcement activities related to fisheries, forestry, wildlife, environmental 
impact, and CITES. 
- Coordinate and supervise field activities of 35 multi-level institutions and 
organizations (federal, state and municipal governments, academic institutions, 
private sector and NGO’s) to determine the cause of death of aquatic fowl in 
Lake Yuriria, Guanajuato, and complete a final technical report of the 
investigation. 
Assistant Director, (federal) Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (1993–
1995). 
Duties include:  
- Participate in multi-sector work groups for 14 productive chains related to the 
agriculture, livestock and forestry, to analyse and reduce unnecessary 
government restrictions. This work was done in order to become more 
competitive in NAFTA. 
- Research and elaborate diagnostic of the cotton, sugarcane and fructose, sheep 
and goat livestock sub-sectors; used to develop strategic plans in order to 
become more competitive in NAFTA. 
- Participate in the negotiations between the federal government and fertilizer 
producing companies, to stabilize national prices after soaring international 
prices and mitigate the impact on the Mexican agricultural sector. 
- Coordinate the activities of the National Milk Commission to establish import 
quotas to be auctioned in the national market to meet demands on a monthly and 
yearly basis, thus balancing demand and supply. 
Conference Presentations 
Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2012), A shift from government to governance: Integrated Water 
Resource Management in the Lerma-Chapala Basin. Canadian Association of 
Geographers: Annual Conference. University of Waterloo/Wilfrid Laurier 
University, Waterloo, Ontario.  
Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2007), Water Governance: New Issues or Old Problems. 
Environmental Research Western: Colloquium. University of Western Ontario, 
London, Ontario. 
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Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2005), Sustainable Water Resource Management: Capacity Building 
and Public Participation in the Lerma Chapala Basin, Mexico. Canadian 
Association of Geographers: Annual Conference. University of Western Ontario, 
London, Ontario.  
Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2005), Gestión Sustentable de Recursos Hídricos: Desarrollo de 
Capacidades y Participación Social en la Cuenca Lerma Chapala, México. 
International Hydrogeology and Water Resources Management Congress. Central 
American Water Resource Management Group. Managua, Nicaragua. 
Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2003), Sustainable Water Resource Management. Canadian 
Association of Geographers Ontario Chapter: Annual Conference. Queens 
University. Kingston, Ontario. 
Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2001), Regional and Community Planning and Organization in the 
Purisima Basin. 2nd International Scientific Congress of Hydrologic River Basins 
Management: Geocuenca II. University of Havana. Havana, Cuba. 
Silva Jimenez, L.F. (2000), Regional Planning and Public Participation: the Guanajuato 
Case Study. 6th National Congress on Regional Development and 6th International 
Congress of Regional Sciences of the Pacific Basin. National Autonomous 
University of Mexico, Pacific Regional Science Conference Organization, Regional 
Science International Association, and Regional Development Science Association 
of Mexico. Mexico City, Mexico. 
Article review 
2009 Reviewed manuscript entitled “Water governance in the Oldman River basin: 
advancing the goal of aquatic ecosystem protection”. Canadian Geographer. 
Relevant volunteer work 
2007 Workshop facilitator and interpreter (English/Spanish): Field work in a Native 
American community (i.e., Raramuri) in the Sierra Tarahumara in northwestern 
Mexico. Workshop implementing a participatory approach to diagnose problems, 
identify possible solutions, and prioritize activities to elaborate a collaborative plan 
linked to ecosystem health, as part of the project “Eco-cultural Health in the Sierra 
Tarahumara”. February 12 to 16, Chihuahua, Mexico. 
2006 Dialogue Event Facilitator: “Informed and Fair Water and Trade Futures: a 
dialogue about regional cooperation, development, and governance in upper 
Mekong region and the north-south economic corridor in 2025”. October 20-21, 
Chiang Mai, Thailand.  
1991 Simultaneous translator (English – Spanish, Spanish – English) for the Elders 
Group in the “Indigenous Nations of the Americas International Conference: 
Strengthening the Spirit”. November 10-14, Ottawa-Hull, Quebec, Canada. 
